

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALLSEASON ENTERPRISES, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

MYKYTA MELNIK, LLC, *et al.*,

Defendants.

Civil Action No.

FILED UNDER SEAL

**MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR: 1) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER;
2) AN ORDER RESTRAINING ASSETS AND MERCHANT STOREFRONTS;
3) AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD
NOT ISSUE; AND 4) AN ORDER AUTHORIZING EXPEDITED DISCOVERY**

Stanley D. Ference III
Pa. ID No. 59899
courts@ferencelaw.com

Brian Samuel Malkin
Pa. ID No. 70448
bmalkin@ferencelaw.com

FERENCE & ASSOCIATES LLC
409 Broad Street
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15143
(412) 741-8400 – Telephone
(412) 741-9292 – Facsimile

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALLSEASON ENTERPRISES, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

MYKYTA MELNIK, LLC, *et al.*,

Defendants.

Civil Action No.

Jury Trial Requested

FILED UNDER SEAL

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Allseason Enterprises, LLC, (“AE” or “Plaintiff”) submits this memorandum of law in support of its *ex parte* application for: 1) a temporary restraining order; 2) an order restraining assets and Merchant Storefronts (as defined *infra*); 3) an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue; and 4) an order authorizing expedited discovery against above-referenced Defendants (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Defendants” or individually as “Defendant”) and the third party entities identified below (“Application”).¹

Specifically, Plaintiff has obtained evidence clearly demonstrating that Defendants are without authorization or license using at least one of Plaintiff’s copyrighted Works (“Plaintiff’s Works”), and/or Plaintiff’s Trade Dress (*as defined below*) and/or Plaintiff’s Marks (*as defined below*) (“Infringing Products” or “Knock-off Products.”) More specifically, Defendants are manufacturing, importing, exporting, advertising, marketing, promoting, distributing, offering for sale and/or selling unlicensed and infringing versions of Plaintiff’s Products. Some of the Defendants are also engaged in trademark


¹ Plaintiff acknowledges it is seeking multiple forms of relief. Plaintiff will promptly provide supplemental briefing or oral argument on any issue should the Court request it.

counterfeiting and/or engaged in review hi-jacking by linking their fake products to Plaintiff's genuine product in order to claim the #1 Ranked Seller ranking and reviews owned by Plaintiff. Defendants accomplish their illegal sales through the use of, at least, the Internet based e-commerce stores operated via at least one of Amazon.com, eBay.com, Joybuy, Temu.com, Walmart.com, Wish.com and AliExpress.com Internet marketplace platforms. Based on this evidence, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges claims of federal copyright infringement, federal unfair competition, trademark infringement and counterfeiting as to some defendants, and related state claims.

Defendants' sale, distribution, and advertising of the Knock-off Products are highly likely to cause consumers to believe that Defendants are offering Plaintiff's genuine product when in fact they are not. To illustrate, below are several examples which vividly show that the Knock-off Products themselves and the manner in which they are marketed is designed to confuse and mislead consumers into believing that they are purchasing Plaintiff's genuine product or that the Knock-off Product is otherwise approved by or sourced from Plaintiff:




PLAINTIFF'S PRODUCT



INFRINGEMENT LISTING OF DEFENDANT VGO LIFE




PLAINTIFF'S PRODUCT



INFRINGEMENT LISTING OF DEFENDANT ZULAUF RR



PLAINTIFF'S PRODUCT



**INFRINGEMENT LISTING OF
DEFENDANT GOLDEN TIME**



Additional photographic comparisons of Plaintiff's Products and the Infringing Products are attached as **Complaint Exhibit 1**. See *Declaration of OSCAR PRECIADO* (the "*OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.*") at ¶ 18.

Defendants' actions have resulted in actual confusion in the marketplace between Defendants' Infringing Products and Plaintiff's genuine products. *Id.* at ¶ 18. In addition to copying one or more of the Plaintiff's Marks, Works and/or Trade Dress, Defendants SharklabsUSA, Doctor Commerce, and Mykyta melnik, Llc are also engaged in ratings hi-jacking by creating unauthorized child variant ASIN² with a few to zero consumer ratings and linking them to Plaintiff's #1 Ranked Amazon ASIN with thousands of ratings in order to confuse consumers into believing that the unauthorized child variant ASIN is another variant offered by the Plaintiff when it is not. *Id.* at ¶ 19.

² Refers to Amazon Standard Identification Number. Each product is assigned a unique ASIN when listed on Amazon.

It is no surprise that all of the Defendants are infringing on the Plaintiff's Marks and/or Works and/or Trade Dress because the Plaintiff's Product is the #1 Selling in the Category of Blended Vitamin & Mineral Supplements:

Product details

Package Dimensions : 3.82 x 1.89 x 1.85 inches; 0.07 ounces

Item model number : Black Seed Oil

Date First Available : October 15, 2022

Manufacturer : Clean Nutraceuticals

ASIN : B0BG94RWYN

Best Sellers Rank: #65 in Health & Household (See Top 100 in Health & Household)
#1 in Blended Vitamin & Mineral Supplements

Customer Reviews:

4.4 ★★★★★  13,347 ratings

Since some of the Infringing Products may be poorly designed and manufactured products, there is a risk of injury to and disappointment from the confused customers. *Id.* at ¶ 20. Some purchasers of Defendants' Infringing Products have written and/or complained about the quality of the Infringing Products believing the same to be a genuine version of Plaintiff's Products, for example:

Comment:

Good evening. I purchased Cleanutraceuticals multimineral Sea Moss, Black Seed oil, Ashwagandha, & Burdock Root from Walmart.com. I want to know if this is your authentic product. I took pictures of the bottle to attach to this message, however I don't see an option to attach pictures. When you respond to my email, I will be able to upload the pics. There is an ingredient of black pepper on this label that I don't see on your site and the front of the label states how many mg of each herb is in it and I don't see that on your label. The label is not properly aligned on the bottle. The sealed fir your protection seems off. The cap doesn't lock securely onto the bottle. Please advise.

Comment:

I ordered the sea moss blackseed oil ashwagandha and burdock root from Walmart but when I received my order it doesn't have the name of the company on it.

So I wanted to know if they are a knock-off or scam or what's going on.

Can you please help?

Comment:

I placed an order on Walmart.com for 2 bottles, 60 count, of the Clean Nutraceuticals Sea Moss 3000mg Black Seed Oil 2000mg Ashwagandha 1000mg Turmeric 1000mg Bladderwack 1000mg supplement on April 1st and received them but there is no identification that they are made and distributed by you on the bottle. I am not sure what is actually in the capsule and I feel this is false advertisement. The Seller name is MyLove and here is their # (+86) 18664937640 Here is my Order# 2000117-35721669. I would appreciate any help you could provide. Thanks!

Comment:

I purchased a few bottles of your sea moss, black seed oil, etc... bottle of supplements from Walmart. I didn't realize it was from a reseller. It took well over a month for me to receive it, and there is a claim under reviews that it was fake. Is there a way to determine if the product is real? Thanks.

Comment:

Just received the all in 1 supplement probably my 10th bottle but ordered from temu. Pills are different color label and bottle are different and the company name isn't on the label. I know people can print labels and other stuff but I'm scared to take this because it came from a house at ABOK-TK 1233 Flintlock Road Diamond Bar, California 91765. Arrest this fake person ID I was you guys. The pills are a charcoal grey color or more salt and pepper look

Comment:

I purchased two bottles of your supplements from Walmart.com. I also purchased from Amazon. The bottles are different that I received from Walmart.com and don't have the Clean Nutra logo on the packaging. Could these be counterfeit or do you sell supplements that don't carry your label on the bottles?

Since some of the Infringing Products may be poorly designed and manufactured products, there is a risk of injury to and disappointment from the confused customers. As such, the Infringing Products threaten to destroy the reputation of high quality that Plaintiff's Products have earned. *Id.* at ¶ 21.

According to the Fiscal Year 2021 U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") Intellectual Property Seizure Statistics Report, e-commerce sales have resulted in a sharp increase in the shipment of unauthorized products into the United States. *Declaration of Stanley D. FERENCE III* (the "FERENCE Dec.") at ¶ 3. Over 89% of all CBP intellectual property seizures were smaller international mail and express shipments (as opposed to large shipping containers). *Id.* Over half (51%) of CBP seizures originated from mainland China and Hong Kong. *Id.* An analysis by Daniel C.K. Chow, in "Alibaba, Amazon, and Counterfeiting in the Age of the Internet," 40 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 157, 186 (2020), finds that third-party service providers do not adequately subject new sellers to verification and confirmation of their identities, allowing counterfeiters to "routinely use false or inaccurate names and addresses when registering with these e-commerce platforms." *Id.* at ¶ 4. A report prepared by the U. S. Department of Homeland Security's Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (January 2020) finds that counterfeiters hedge against the risk of being caught and having their websites taken down from an e-commerce platform by preemptively establishing multiple virtual storefronts. Since platforms generally do not require marketplace sellers to identify the underlying business entity, counterfeiters have many difference profiles even though they are commonly owned and operated. *Id.* at ¶ 5.

Defendants' unlawful activities have deprived and continue to deprive Plaintiff of its rights to fair competition. By their activities, Defendants are defrauding Plaintiff and the consuming public for Defendants' benefit. Defendants should not be permitted to continue their unlawful activities, which are causing Plaintiff ongoing irreparable harm. Accordingly, Plaintiff is seeking entry of a temporary

restraining order prohibiting Defendants' further infringement of its valuable intellectual property as described below.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is seeking entry of a temporary restraining order prohibiting Defendants' from further harming the Plaintiff through their willful and bad faith infringement of the Plaintiff's Marks and/or Works and/or Trade Dress.

Plaintiff also seeks to restrain the illegal profits generated by Defendants. Plaintiff has obtained evidence that Defendants operating their Seller IDs via Amazon.com ("Amazon") necessarily use money transfer and/or retention/processing services with Amazon as a method to receive monies generated through the sale of counterfeit products. Amazon operates as a money transmitter for sales made on Amazon and as such Amazon has the ability to identify, and restrain, the payment accounts associated with the Defendants who use their respective Seller IDs via Amazon to conduct their commercial transactions. See Declaration of Brian Samuel Malkin ("*Malkin Dec.*"), ¶ 1 - 14. Additionally, Plaintiff also obtained evidence that the Defendants operating their Seller IDs via eBay.com use money transfer and retention services with PayPal, Inc. ("PayPal") or eBay.com as a method for accepting payment for the sale of their counterfeit products. *Id.* and *Odell Dec.* Furthermore, Plaintiff obtained evidence that Defendants operating their Seller IDs via Wish.com have their payments processed on their behalf using an aggregate escrow account in the name of ContextLogic, Inc. ("ContextLogic"). *Id.* Plaintiff also obtained evidence that Defendants operating their Seller IDs via Walmart.com use Walmart Pay to have their payments processed using an account in the name of Walmart Inc. and Wal-Mart.com USA, LLC. *Malkin Dec.*, ¶ 1 – 14. Plaintiff has also obtained evidence that Joybuy Marketplace operated by Jingdong E-Commerce (Trade) Hong Kong Co., Ltd., is an e-commerce marketplace that allows Defendants to conduct their commercial transactions privately via Joybuy's payment processing and retention services provided by Jingdong E-commerce (Trade) Hong Kong Corporation Limited (registered in Hong Kong)

and JD E-Commerce America (registered in California, USA). *Id.* Plaintiff has also obtained evidence that Temu Marketplace is an online platform operated by Whaleco Inc. and permits Defendants to conduct commercial transactions and sell their products. *Id.* Lastly, Plaintiff has obtained evidence that Defendants operating their Seller IDs via AliExpress.com (“AliExpress”) have their payments processed on their behalf using aggregate escrow accounts in the name of Alibaba.com Hong Kong Limited, which operates the AliExpress.com platform (i.e., “AliExpress”), and its related companies, Zhejiang Ant Small and Micro Financial Services Group Co., Ltd. AliPay (China) Internet Technology Co. Ltd., and Alipay.com Co., Ltd. (collectively referred to as “AliPay”).³ *Id.*

In light of the inherently deceptive nature of the knock-off and infringing business, Plaintiff has good reason to believe many of the Defendants will hide or transfer their ill-gotten assets beyond the jurisdiction of this Court unless they are restrained. The Copyright Act and Lanham Act allow Plaintiff to recover the illegal profits gained through Defendants’ distribution and sale of their copyright and/or trademark infringing goods. *See* 17 U.S.C. § 504(b); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Furthermore, in Pennsylvania, a pre-judgment restraint of existing assets is appropriate where a plaintiff asserts a claim for money damages.⁴ *Walter v. Stacey*, 837 A.2d 1205 (Pa. Super. 2003) (injunction entered restraining assets in action seeking damages for a wrongful death); *Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc.*, 903 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming injunction entered restraining assets in class action lawsuit). To preserve the disgorgement remedy and the ability to at least partially satisfy a judgment, Plaintiff seeks an *ex parte* order restraining Defendants assets, including specifically, funds transmitted through Amazon, eBay.com, Joybuy, PayPal, ContextLogic, AliPay, Temu, and Walmart Pay, Worldpay (collectively, the “Financial Institutions”). The Court has jurisdiction over all of the Third-Party Service Providers and Financial

³ WorldPay US, Inc. (“WorldPay”) processes transactions on behalf of Alibaba and Alipay, which may appear as “AliExpress” on a cardholder’s credit card statement. (*See* Brian Samuel Malkin (“*Malkin Dec.*”), ¶ 8, filed herewith.)

⁴ Fed. R. Civ. P. 64 provides “every remedy is available that, under the law of the state where the court is located, provides for seizing a person or property to secure satisfaction of the potential judgment.”

Institutions, or alternatively, they have voluntarily cooperated and submitted to the Court's jurisdiction in prior counterfeiting lawsuits like this one. *See Malkin Dec.*

Courts in our district have previously granted the relief sought herein in actions involving similar claims under the Copyright and Lanham Acts for passing off knock-offs using Plaintiff's Marks, Works, and/or Trade Dress. *Doggie Dental, Inc. v. Ahui*, No. 19-cv-1627 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2019) (Hornak, J.) (sellers on amazon.com), *Gorge Designs v Accessmall, et al.*, No 19-1454 (W.D. Pa.) (Stickman, J) (sellers on Aliexpress.com and eBay.com); *Doggie Dental Inc. v. Go Well*, No. 19-cv-1282 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2019) (Hornak, J.) (sellers on amazon.com); *Doggie Dental Inc. v. Worthbuyer*, No. 19-cv-1283 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2019) (Hornak, J.) (sellers on ebay.com); *Doggie Dental Inc. v. Max_Buy*, No. 19-cv-746 (W.D. Pa. June 27, 2019) (Hornak, J.) (sellers on ebay.com); *Doggie Dental Inc. v. Anywill*, No. 19-cv-682 (W.D. Pa. June 13, 2019) (Hornak, J.) (sellers on amazon.com). Other courts have granted the relief sought herein in actions involving claims under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and copyright infringement. *Millennium IP, Inc. v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule "A"*, No. 18-cv-3778 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 2018) (nearly 400 defendants, including sellers on amazon.com and ebay.com); *Nu Image, Inc. v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule "A"*, No. 17-cv-2918 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2017) (over 200 defendants, including sellers on amazon.com and ebay.com). Furthermore, other courts have granted the relief sought herein whether the defendants are located outside of the United States or based in the United States. *Cartier International A.G. v. Replicapaneraiwatches.cn*, No. 17-cv-62401 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 2, 2018) (mix of U.S. and foreign defendants) and *Juul Labs, Inc. v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule "A"*, No. 18-cv-1382 (E.D. Va. Nov. 16, 2018) (all U.S. defendants).

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. PLAINTIFF'S PRODUCTS

Plaintiff, ALLSEASON ENTERPRISES, LLC, ("AE"), a New Mexico Limited Liability Company, having its principal place and doing business at 7580 LAS VEGAS BLVD SO STE 115, LAS VEGAS, NV, 89123. AE produces, markets, and sells supplements comprising vitamins, minerals, and botanical extracts supporting whole body health. Declaration of *OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.*, ¶¶2 - 3.



Plaintiff has created and innovated all of its own products, packaging, and advertising. This is a costly effort involving graphic design, industrial design, and tooling. It takes time to create, design, test, redesign, and retest prototypes. Products are introduced to retailers via tradeshow across the world. This introduction process costs a lot of money but it is a chance to show customers the quality and use of the product. Today, Plaintiff sells many different original products throughout the world. *Id.* at ¶ 5. Today, Plaintiff proudly manufactures all of its products in the United States. *Id.* at ¶ 6.

Genuine goods comprising Plaintiff's Marks (as defined below), Works (as defined below) and Trade Dress (as defined below) are widely legitimately advertised and promoted by Plaintiff, its authorized distributors, and unrelated third parties via the Internet. *Id.* at ¶ 7. Over the past several years, visibility on the Internet, particularly via Internet search engines such as Google, Yahoo!, and Bing, has become increasing important to Plaintiff's overall marketing. *Id.* at ¶ 7.

Thus, Plaintiff and its authorized distributors expend significant monetary resources on Internet marketing, including search engine optimization ("SEO") strategies. *Id.* at ¶ 8. Other costs include print catalog ads, tradeshow, and handing out free samples. *Id.* Those strategies allow Plaintiff and its authorized retailers to fairly, and legitimately educate consumers about the value associated with Plaintiff's brand and the goods sold thereunder. *Id.* Similarly, Defendants' individual seller's stores are indexed on search engines and compete directly with Plaintiff for space in the search results. *Id.*

B. PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS

Plaintiff sells its original supplements using unique photographs and artwork (“Plaintiff’s Works”). Plaintiff has obtained the following copyright registrations on its original photographs used to market and advertise its products: TX 9-367-638, TX 9-388-519, TX 9-388-522, TX 9-388-523, TX 9-389-848, TX 9-389-849, TX 9-394-790 all with the title “Multimineral Sea Moss Black Seed” published on October 15, 2022. True and correct copies of the registrations and the deposit copies are attached to the Complaint and marked, respectively, as **Exhibits 3A – G**. *Id.* at ¶ 9.

Below are exemplar images of Plaintiff’s Products as marketed and advertised using the common law trademark CLEAN NUTRA™ and registered trademarks CLEAN NUTRA & design (U.S. Reg. No. 7031116):  and CLEAN NUTRACEUTICALS & design (U.S. Reg. No. 7031117):  (“Plaintiff’s Marks”) (True and Correct Copies of the registration certificates are attached hereto as **Exhibits 4A and 4B**):



Other such images and copyrighted photos appear in Exhibit 2 to this Complaint.

Id. at ¶ 10.

Plaintiff's Products have unique packaging, labels, and designs that are inherently distinct features, including, color, size, and shape selections, that all function as a source identifier for the Plaintiff's Product. The combined distinct features of the Plaintiff's Works all support the copyright registrations issued by the U.S. Copyright Office. Screen shots of the Plaintiff's Amazon Store and Web Site are shown in **Complaint Exhibit 2**.⁵ *Id.* at ¶ 11.

The combined unique features, ornamental, and decorative features of Plaintiff's Product packaging, Plaintiff's Marks, and Plaintiff's Works comprise Plaintiff's Trade Dress⁶, including the distinct photographs, the design, the instructions, the packaging, and the unique presentation of the product, all comprise Plaintiff's valuable intellectual property ("IP") and all have become distinct in consumer's minds such that consumers associate all of this IP with Plaintiff's Products. *Id.* at ¶ 12.

Plaintiff's Marks, Works and Trade Dress have been used in interstate commerce to identify and distinguish Plaintiff's goods. Plaintiff's Marks, Works and Trade Dress have been used by Plaintiff prior in time to Defendants' infringement of the Plaintiff's Marks, Works and Trade Dress. Plaintiff's Marks, Works and Trade Dress have never been assigned or licensed to any of the Defendants in this matter. The Plaintiff's Marks, Works and Trade Dress are symbols of Plaintiff's quality, reputation, and goodwill and have never been abandoned. *Id.* at 13.

C. PLAINTIFF'S EFFORTS TO POLICE THE DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT

⁵ As set forth in the Complaint, and proven in **Composite Exhibit 1**, all of the Defendants are infringing on one or more Plaintiff's federal copyright registration and/or trade dress. ("Infringing Products").

⁶ Plaintiff's Trade Dress comprises the organization, selection of the text, arrangement of the elements of the creative artwork and colors for the label, the differently colored spheres containing abbreviations for various vitamins, minerals, and supplements, the black tree shaped background and the distinctly proportioned text. The Trade Dress is distinct and immediately conveys the source of the goods to the consumer.

The Defendants use the interactive commercial Internet websites and Internet based e-commerce stores using the Seller IDs set forth on “**Schedule A**” to the Complaint. *See Odell Dec.*⁷, ¶ 3. These interactive commercial Internet websites provide on-line Merchant Storefronts (as defined *infra*) that allow the Defendants to maintain their anonymity while advertising, offering for sale, and selling Infringing Products into the United States and into Pennsylvania. The Internet marketplaces used by these Defendants include AliExpress.com, Amazon.com, eBay.com, Joybuy, Temu.com, Walmart.com, and wish.com. *See Odell Dec.*, ¶ 3 and **Composite Exhibit 1** attached thereto.

Due to the success of Plaintiff’s Products, Plaintiff has become the target of multiple infringers seeking to profit off the goodwill, reputation, and fame enjoyed by Plaintiff’s Products. *OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.*, ¶ 14. Plaintiff has been forced to police the various Internet marketplaces to identify and seek takedowns of unlawful listings for the Infringing Products since allowing the unlawful listings to continue is causing damage to Plaintiff’s reputation and bottom line. Some Defendants sell their infringing products at a lower price that specifically undercuts the controlled retail price of the Plaintiff’s Products. Because of the software provided by the various Internet Marketplaces, the lowest priced items are sorted to the top and/or promoted by the software and then purchased by the consumers. Plaintiff’s Products are thus ignored. Plaintiff has had varied success in identifying and requesting takedowns of the various unlawful listings and as soon as one is taken down another unlawful listing replaces it. *OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.* at ¶ 15.

Another major problem with the Internet Marketplaces is that there is a direct and convenient connection between various Chinese and other unidentified manufactures to the Infringing Products. In essence, a counterfeiter in Canada, Vietnam or Russia, for example, may order a crate of Infringing Products from a Chinese manufacturer, have them drop shipped to a fulfillment center in the United States,

⁷ Refers to the Declaration of Dee Odell in Support of Plaintiff’s Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, filed herewith.


and then sell the Infringing Products to a US consumer through a Third-Party Service Provider. The ease of this system encourages knock-offs to flourish. *OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.* at ¶ 16.

For these reasons, Plaintiff retained the legal counsel of Ference & Associates LLC (“the Ference firm”) to perform the policing of various Internet marketplaces. *Id.* at ¶ 17. During the process, the Ference firm identified many Chinese manufacturers operating on Marketplace Storefronts hosted by the Internet marketplaces. *See id.* These manufacturers were supplying many of the other identified Defendants with infringing products flooding the Internet marketplaces and damaging Plaintiff’s business. This damage to Plaintiff’s business will continue unless Plaintiff receives the sought after restraining order and injunctive relief. *Id.*


D. THE DEFENDANTS’ WRONGFUL CONDUCT

Defendants’ sale, distribution, and advertising of the Infringing Product are highly likely to cause consumers to believe that Defendants are offering genuine versions of Plaintiff’s Products when in fact they are not. To illustrate, below are several examples which vividly show that the Infringing Products themselves and the manner in which they are Marketed is designed to confuse and mislead consumers into believing that they are purchasing Plaintiff’s Products or that the Infringing Products are otherwise approved by or sourced from Plaintiff:


PLAINTIFF'S PRODUCT



**INFRINGEMENT LISTING OF
DEFENDANT Mykyta melnik, Llc**



PLAINTIFF'S PRODUCT



**INFRINGEMENT LISTING OF
DEFENDANT VGO LIFE**



| | |
|--|---|
| <p style="text-align: center;">PLAINTIFF'S PRODUCT</p>  | <p style="text-align: center;">INFRINGEMENT LISTING OF DEFENDANT ZULAUF RR</p>  |
| <p style="text-align: center;">PLAINTIFF'S PRODUCT</p>  | <p style="text-align: center;">INFRINGEMENT LISTING OF DEFENDANT GOLDEN TIME</p>  |

Additional photograph comparisons of Plaintiff's Products and the Infringing Products appear in **Exhibit 1** attached to the Complaint. *Id.* at ¶ 18.

Defendants' actions have resulted in actual confusion in the marketplace between Defendants' Infringing Products and the genuine version of Plaintiff's Products. Numerous purchasers of Defendants' Infringing Products have written complaints to Plaintiff and/or on-line reviews to complain about the quality of the Infringing Products believing same to be a genuine version of Plaintiff's Products. As

poorly designed and manufactured products, there is a risk of injury and disappointment from the confused customers. The Infringing Products threaten to destroy the reputation of high quality that Plaintiff's Products have earned *Id.* at ¶¶19 – 21.

Defendants do not have, nor have they ever had, the right or authority to use Plaintiff's Marks, Works or Trade Dress, for any purpose. Defendants' unlawful activities have deprived and continue to deprive Plaintiff of its rights to fair competition. By their activities, Defendants are defrauding Plaintiff and the consuming public for Defendants' benefit. Defendants should not be permitted to continue their unlawful activities, which are causing Plaintiff ongoing irreparable harm. Accordingly, Plaintiff is seeking entry of a temporary restraining order prohibiting Defendants' infringement of the Plaintiff. *Id.* at ¶ 22.

Given Defendants' copying and therefore infringing on Plaintiff's Works in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 501 (a), the Infringing Products are indistinguishable to consumers, both at the point of sale and post-sale. By using Plaintiff's intellectual property, Defendants have created a false association between their Infringing Products, their Internet e-commerce stores, and Plaintiff. Such false association is in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), constitutes unfair competition, infringes on Plaintiff's Trade Dress, and is causing and will continue to cause Plaintiff's irreparable harm and damage. Further, the Defendants that engaged in review hi-jacking are committing unfair or deceptive acts or practices and making false advertisements in or affecting commerce, thus violating Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. *Id.* at ¶ 23.

The infringements of Plaintiff's Works deprive Plaintiff of the ability to control the creative content protected by the Copyright Act, it devalues the Plaintiff's authentic products by associating them with inferior quality goods, and it undermines the value of the Plaintiff's IP by creating the impression that infringement may be undertaken with impunity which threatens Plaintiff's ability to attract investors and markets for the Plaintiff's Products. *Id.* at ¶ 24.

As part of Plaintiff’s counsel’s ongoing investigation regarding the sale of Infringing Products, Plaintiff’s counsel investigated the promotion and sale of Infringing Products by Defendants and obtained available payment account data for receipt of funds by Defendants for the sale of knock-off versions of Plaintiff’s genuine products through the Seller IDs. *Odell Dec.*, ¶ 3. Through visual inspection of Defendants’ listings for Infringing Products, it was confirmed that each Defendant is using the Plaintiff’s Works and/or Trade Dress without authorization and that the product that each Defendant is offering for sale, using product features virtually identical to Plaintiff’s Works and/or Trade Dress, are in fact, not genuine products. *Id.* The checkout pages or order forms for the Infringing Products confirm that each Defendant was and/or is still currently offering for sale and/or selling Infringing Products through their respective Merchant Storefronts and User Accounts and that each Defendant provides shipping and/or has actually shipped Infringing products to the United States, including to customers located in Pennsylvania. At checkout, a shipping address located in the Pittsburgh area (“the Pennsylvania Address”) in the Western District of Pennsylvania verified that each Defendant provides shipping to the Pennsylvania Address. *Id. OSCAR PRECIADO Dec. 25 – 27.* Mr. OSCAR PRECIADO inspected the detailed web listings describing the Infringing Products Defendants are offering for sale through the Internet based e-commerce stores operating under each of their respective Seller IDs, and determined the products were not genuine versions of Plaintiff’s products. *Id.* and Composite Exhibit 1, and *OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.* ¶¶ 25

– 27.⁸

⁸ See *e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Tyrrell-Miller*, 678 F. Supp. 2d 117, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Plaintiff’s Intellectual Property Manager found that the products offered for sale on the Defendant’s websites were non-genuine counterfeit products, based on a visual inspection of Defendant’s websites); *Malletier v. 2016bagsilouisvuitton.com*, No. 16-61554-CIV- DPG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93072, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 18, 2016) (Plaintiff’s representative reviewed the items bearing the Louis Vuitton Marks offered for sale through Defendant’s Internet websites and determined the products to be non-genuine, unauthorized versions of the Plaintiff’s products.); *Chanel Inc. v. Yang*, No. C-12-04428-PJH (DMR), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151104, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013) (Plaintiff’s Director of Legal Administration reviewed the various Chanel-branded products offered for sale by Defendants on each of the websites operating under the subject domain names, and determined that the products were non-genuine Chanel products); *Chanel, Inc. v. Powell*, No. C/A 2:08-0404-PMD-BM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127709, at *7 (D.S.C. 2009) (Plaintiff’s representative personally reviewed the printouts reflecting the various Chanel brand products offered for sale by the Defendant through its website, and concluded that those products were non-genuine Chanel products).

17 U.S.C. § 106 grants the owner of a copyright of a sculpture the exclusive rights to reproduce and display the Works. Through the copying of Plaintiff's Works, Defendants have violated the Plaintiff's exclusive rights in its sculpture. A comparison of Plaintiff's Works to the advertising and offering for sale of Defendants' products reveals the obvious knock-off and infringing nature of Defendants' activities. *Id.* Defendants' goods are being promoted, advertised, offered for sale, and sold by Defendants to consumers within this district and throughout the United States. Defendants are making substantial sums of money by preying upon members of the general public, many of whom have no knowledge Defendants are defrauding them. Defendants are also falsely representing to consumers that their goods are genuine, authentic, endorsed, and authorized by Plaintiff. Defendants' use of Plaintiff's Works in Defendants' advertising and copying and distributing their knock offs constitutes copyright infringement. Ultimately, Defendants' Internet activities infringe upon Plaintiff's intellectual property rights. The Seller IDs, and associated payment accounts, are a substantial part of the means by which Defendants further their scheme to fraudulently trade off of the fame and reputation of the Plaintiff's authentic goods and unjustly deprive of the Plaintiff of profits and cause harm to Plaintiff. *Id.* at ¶¶ 28 – 30.

In light of the covert nature of Defendants' offshore and infringing activities and the importance of creating economic disincentives for such infringing activities, courts have recognized these concerns and routinely grant *ex parte* applications for relief in cases asserting, *inter alia*, copyright infringements on the Internet.⁹ Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant its *ex parte* Application for the

⁹ See, e.g., *Intenze Products, Inc. v. 1586, et al.*, No. 18-cv-4611-RWS (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2018); *Allstar Marketing Group, LLC v. 158, et al.*, No. 18-cv-4101-GHW, Dkt. 22 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2018); *William Mark Corporation v. 1&cc, et al.*, No. 18-cv-3889-RA, Dkt. 18 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2018); *WOW Virtual Reality, Inc. v. Bienbest, et al.*, No. 18-cv-3305-VEC, Dkt. 9 (S.D.N.Y. April 16, 2018); *Ideavillage Products Corp. v. abc789456, et al.*, No. 18-cv-2962-NRB, Dkt. 11 (S.D.N.Y. April 11, 2018); *Ideavillage Products Corp. v. Aarhus, et al.*, No. 18-cv-2739-JGK, Dkt. 22 (S.D.N.Y. March 28, 2018); *Moose Toys Pty Ltd. et al., v. 963, et al.*, No. 18-cv-2187-VEC, Dkt. 16 (S.D.N.Y. April 2, 2018); *Off-White, LLC v. A445995685, et al.*, No. 18-cv-2009-LGS, Dkt. 5 (S.D.N.Y. March 27, 2018); *Spin Master Ltd. and Spin Master, Inc. v. 158, et al.*, No. 18-cv-1774-PAE, Dkt. 18 (Feb. 27, 2018); *JLM Couture, Inc. v. Aimibridal, et al.*, No. 18-cv-1565-JMF, Dkt. 18 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2018); *Spin Master Ltd. and Spin Master, Inc. v. Alisy, et al.*, No. 18-cv-543-PGG, Dkt. 16 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2018); *WowWee Group Limited, et al. v. Meirly, et al.*, No. 18-cv-706-AJN, Dkt. 11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2018); *Ideavillage Products Corp. v. Dongguan Shipai Loofah Sponge Commodity Factory, et al.*, No. 18-cv-901-PGG,

following: 1) a temporary restraining order; 2) an order restraining assets and Merchant Storefronts; 3) an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue; and 4) an order authorizing expedited discovery against Defendants, the Third Party Service Provider and Financial Institutions.

III. ARGUMENT

A. THIS COURT HAS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANTS

Federal courts “may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident of the state in which the court sits to the extent authorized by the law of that state.” *D’Jamoos v. Pilatus Aircraft*, 566 F.3d 94, 102 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting *Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n*, 819 F.2d 434, 436 (3d Cir. 1987)). This determination entails a two-step inquiry. First, the court must determine whether the long-arm statute of the forum allows courts of that state to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (1). Second, if the forum state allows jurisdiction, the court must determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant in a given case is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. *See IMO Industries, Inc. v. Kiekert AG*, 155 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir.1998). As alleged herein, Defendants’ unlawful, counterfeiting and/or infringing activities subject them to long-arm

Dkt. 20 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2018); *WowWee Group Limited, et al. v. A249345157, et al*, No. 17-cv-9358-VEC, Dkt. 18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2017); *HICKIES, Inc. v. Shop1668638 Store, et al.*, No. 17-cv-9101-ER, Dkt. 14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2017); *Ideavillage Products Corp. v. Dongguan Opete Yoga Wear Manufacturer Co., Ltd., et al.*, No. 17-cv-9099-JMF, Dkt. 19 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2017); *Ideavillage Products Corp. v. Shenzhen City Poly Hui Foreign Trade Co., Ltd., et al.*, No. 17-cv-8704-JGK. (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2017); *Moose Toys Pty LTD et al. v. Guangzhou Junwei Trading Company d/b/a Backgroundshop et al.*, No. 17-cv-2561-LAK, Dkt. 12 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2017); *Rovio Entertainment Ltd. and Rovio Animation OY v. Angel Baby Factory d/b/a Angelbabyfactory et al.*, No. 17- cv-1840-KPF, Dkt. 11 (S.D.N.Y. March 27, 2017); *Ontel Products Corporation v. Airbrushpainting Makeup Store a/k/a Airbrushespainting et al.*, No. 17-cv-871-KBF, Dkt. 20 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2017); *Ideavillage Products Corp. v. Bling Boutique Store, et al.*, No. 16-cv-09039-KMW, Dkt. 9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2016); *Gucci America, Inc., et al v. Alibaba Group Holding LTD, et al*, No. 1:15-cv-03784-PKC (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2015) (unpublished); *Chanel, Inc. v. Conklin Fashions, Inc.*, No. 3:15-cv-893-MAD/DEP, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109886, at *10-13 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2015); *Belstaff Grp. SA v. Doe*, No. 15-cv-2242-PKC/MHD, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178124, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2015); *AW Licensing, LLC v. Bao*, No. 15-cv-1373, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177101, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2015); *Klipsch Grp., Inc. v. Big Box Store Ltd.*, No. 1:12-cv-06283-VSB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153137, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2012); *True Religion Apparel, Inc. et al. v. Xiaokang Lee et al.*, No. 1:11-cv-08242-HB (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2011) (unpublished); *N. Face Apparel Corp. v. Fujian Sharing Imp. & Exp. Ltd. Co.*, No. 1:10- cv-1630-AKH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158807 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2011); *Tory Burch, LLC v. Yong Sheng Int’l Trade Co., Ltd.*, No. 1:10-cv-09336-DAB, (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2011) (unpublished); *Chloe v. Designersimports.com USA, Inc.*, No. 07-cv-1791 -CS/GAY, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42351, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2009); *see also In re Vuitton et Fils, S.A.*, 606 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that ex parte temporary restraining orders are indispensable to the commencement of an action when they are the sole method of preserving a state of affairs in which the court can provide effective final relief).

jurisdiction in Pennsylvania under 42 P. A. Cons. Stat. § 5322. Furthermore, Pennsylvania’s exercise of jurisdiction over Defendants thereunder comports with due process.

1. Defendants are Subject to Personal Jurisdiction Under 42 P.A. C.S.A. § 5322

Pennsylvania authorizes personal jurisdiction over the Defendant pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat § 5322 (a) which provides in pertinent part: “A tribunal of this Commonwealth may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person ... as to a cause of action or other matter arising from such person: (1) Transacting any business in this Commonwealth. Without excluding other acts which may constitute transacting business for the purpose of this paragraph: (ii) The doing of a single act in this Commonwealth for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit... (3) Causing harm or tortious injury by an act or omission in this Commonwealth. (4) Causing harm or tortious injury by an act or omission outside this Commonwealth. . . (10) Committing any violation within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of any statute, home rule charter, local ordinance or resolution, or rule or regulation promulgated thereunder by any government unit or of any order of court or other government unit.”

Courts have regularly conferred personal jurisdiction on a given defendant based on that defendant’s operation of a fully interactive website through which consumers can access the site from anywhere and purchase products, as is the case with Defendants’ User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts, and allow for customers all over the world (including within Allegheny County, Pennsylvania) to view and purchase products, including Infringing Products, as demonstrated by the websites themselves and Plaintiff’s purchase of Infringing Products. *See Odell Dec.*, ¶ 3 and Composite Exhibit 1, and *OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.*, ¶ 27 - 29. *See n. 6, infra.* (collecting cases in which operating interactive web sites was deemed sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction upon the Court).

Here, by advertising, offering for sale, selling, distributing and shipping retail products directly to consumers across the world, including consumers located throughout the U.S. and specifically in

Pennsylvania, Defendants have committed tortious acts, as alleged herein, outside of Pennsylvania, thus directly giving rise to the claims asserted in the instant action. *See Odell Dec.*, ¶ 2 and Composite Exhibit 1; *see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Applewood Party Store, Inc.*, 2006 WL 2925288 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (defendant's local sale of counterfeit "Newport" cigarettes had an economic effect on interstate commerce); *A1 Mortg. Corp. v. A1 Mortg. and Financial Services, LLC*, 2006 WL 1437744 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (while plaintiff's provision of services was "predominantly intrastate" in character, its mark was eligible for protection since, even absent an interstate sale, its advertising crossed state lines and, therefore, had entered interstate commerce), *see later opinion, A-1 Mortg. Corp. v. Day One Mortg., LLC*, 2007 WL 30317 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (court awarded permanent injunctive relief in its award of summary judgment to plaintiff).

Here, the injury clearly occurred within Pennsylvania, as Defendants' Infringing Listings, resulted in consumers throughout the U.S., and specifically in Pennsylvania, purchasing Infringing Products. *See Odell Dec.*, ¶ 2 and Composite Exhibit 1. As a direct result of Defendants' infringing actions, Plaintiff has suffered harm in Pennsylvania through lost sales in Pennsylvania and lost Pennsylvania consumers. *See OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.*, ¶¶ 27 - 30.

Accordingly, this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants who have intentionally availed themselves of the opportunity to do business in Pennsylvania, and specifically in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, through their fully interactive web sites, as well as yet undiscovered online marketplaces, to offer for sale and/or sell Infringing Products. The identified Defendants merely use fanciful and made-up store names or seller ids without complete addresses, contact information, phones numbers and the like. *See Ference Dec.*, ¶¶ 6 - 7; Defendants used and continue to advertise, market, promote, offer for sale, sell, distribute and/or import Infringing Products to Pennsylvania and/or potential customers, including in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. *See OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.* ¶¶ 28 - 30.

Here, the fact that Defendants have chosen to open their respective User Accounts for the purpose of selling Infringing Products through their Merchant Storefronts, as well as any and all as yet undiscovered online marketplace platforms, alone supports a finding that Defendants have intentionally used these marketplace platforms, “as a means for establishing regular business with a remote forum.” *EnviroCare Techs, LLC v. Simanovsky*, No. 11-CV-3458, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78088, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. June 4, 2012) (quoting *Boschetto v. Hansing*, 539 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008); see also *Lifeguard Licensing Corp.*, 2016 U.S. Dist.. LEXIS 89149, at *8 and *EnviroCare Techs., LLC*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78088, at *10. Courts have indeed found that “commercial sellers” on “well-known, national . . . website[s]” are in fact subject to personal jurisdiction, as these Defendants “must have been able to foresee the possibility of being hauled into court [in the present jurisdiction].” *Malcom v. Esposito*, 63 Va. Cir. 440, 446 (Cir. Ct. 2003); see also *EnviroCare Techs., LLC*, 2012 U.S. Dist.. LEXIS 78088, at *12.

Whether a Defendant physically shipped Infringing Products into Pennsylvania is not determinative of whether personal jurisdiction exists, as courts in this Circuit examine a given defendant’s online interactions with consumers in considering whether a particular defendant has transacted business in the forum state. See *Odell Dec.* ¶ 2. See *Zippo Mfg. Co.*, 952 F. Supp. at 1119; *Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc. v. Pharel*, 09 CV 4810 (RRM) (ALC), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32249, at 6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2011) (finding personal jurisdiction over defendant, a resident of South Carolina, because he transacted business in New York by monitoring and responding to inquiries for counterfeit watches through websites accessible in New York). Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel have viewed Defendant’s Infringing Products via their online User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts, physically received and examined them, and Defendant’s paid Pennsylvania sales tax for the privilege of intentionally shipping the products into this

district. *See Odell Dec.*, ¶ 2 and *OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.* ¶¶ 27 - 30.¹⁰ Thus, Defendants' sophisticated commercial operations, specifically including their offering for sale and/or selling of Infringing Products

¹⁰ *See Skrodzki v. Marcello*, 810 F. Supp. 2d 501, 512-13 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), and that, “[t]he offering for sale of even one copy of an allegedly infringing item, even if no sale results, is sufficient to give personal jurisdiction over the alleged infringer under N.Y. CPLR § 302. *Cartier v. Seah LLC*, 598 F. Supp. 2d 422, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Moreover, under Second Circuit case law, when analyzing personal jurisdiction in the Internet context, “traditional statutory and constitutional principles remain the touchstone of the inquiry,” and while a website's interactivity, “may be useful” for analyzing personal jurisdiction ‘insofar as it helps to decide whether the defendant ‘transacts any business’ in New York,” ... “it does not amount to a separate frameWorks for analyzing internet-based jurisdiction.” *Best Van Lines, Inc.*, 490 F.3d at 252 (quoting *Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker*, No. 03- Civ. 6585 (GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7830, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2004)) (citing *Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.*, 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997)). Sister circuits similarly rely on the traditional principles guiding the personal jurisdiction analysis when analyzing the same in the Internet context, namely the Eleventh Circuit (see, e.g., *Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A.*, 558 F.3d 1210, 1219-1224 (11th Cir. 2011) (criticizing the over-reliance on the sliding scale of interactivity analysis and instead applying a traditional personal jurisdiction analysis in an Internet case where the website was fully interactive); see also *Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri*, 736 F.3d 1339, 1356-58 (11th Cir. 2013) (applying the traditional purposeful availment test in a case where defendant’s fully interactive website was accessible in Florida, and was selling and distributing infringing goods through his website to Florida consumers), and the Seventh Circuit (see, e.g., *Advanced Tactical Ordnance Systems, LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc.*, 751 F.3d 796, 803 (7th Cir. 2010) (addressing the impact of a defendant's online activities upon the personal jurisdiction analysis and reiterating that, as with offline activities, the Court must focus upon the deliberate actions of the defendant within the State)), are instructive in considering whether the exercise of jurisdiction over Defendants in the instant action is appropriate under similar, if not identical facts. For example, courts in the Eleventh Circuit have routinely granted temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and default judgments in online counterfeiting cases where no purchases of the counterfeit/infringing products were made, but the plaintiffs alleged and confirmed that each of the foreign defendants operated fully interactive commercial websites through which they advertised, promoted, offered for sale, and sold products bearing what the plaintiff determined to be counterfeit and infringing trademarks into the U.S., and in interstate commerce, in violation of the plaintiff's rights. See, e.g., *Malletier*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93072, at *3; *Mycoskie v. 2016tomshoessaleoutlet.us*, No. 16-61523- CIV-GAYLES, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95963, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 22, 2016); *Adidas AG v. 007adidasuk.com*, No. 15-61275-CIV-GAYLES, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179020, at *8 (S.D. Fla. 2015); *Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. 2015shoplyhandbag.com*, No. 15-62531-CIV-BLOOM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181477, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2015); *Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co. v. Abercrombieclassic.com*, No. 15-62579-CIV-CMA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179041, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2015); *Gucci Am., Inc. v. Gucc- Outlet.com*, No. 15-62165-CIV-DPG, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181483, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2015); *Chanel, Inc. v. 2012leboyhandbag.com*, No. 15-61986-CIV-WJZ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177989, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2015); *Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co. v. Abercrombieandfitchdk.com*, No. 15-62068-CIV-BB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179117, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2015); *Malletier v. 2015louisvuittons.com*, No. 15-61973-CIV-BB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181452, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 29, 2015); *Chanel, Inc. v. Chanelsstore.com*, No. 15-61156-CIV- CMA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179101, at *5 (S.D. Fla. August 31, 2015). Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in *Illinois v. Hemi Group LLC*, held that it had personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendants because they operated a nationwide business model where they intentionally created and operated several commercial, interactive websites to offer products for sale and allow online orders from Illinois residents, specifically noting that the “[defendants] maintained commercial websites through which customers could purchase cigarettes, calculate their shipping charges using their zip codes, and create accounts,” and as a result, the “[defendants] stood ready and willing to do business with Illinois residents.” *Illinois v. Hemi Group LLC*, 622 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 2010); see also *Monster Energy Co. v. Chen Wensheng*, 136 F. Supp. 3d 897, 906 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (holding that defendants had “expressly aimed” their actions at the state, making specific personal jurisdiction proper even without a sale made to an Illinois resident, because in addition to intentionally creating and operating commercial, fully interactive AliExpress.com Internet stores through which consumers can purchase counterfeit Monster Energy Products, the defendants had affirmatively selected a shipping option to ship counterfeit products to the U.S., including to Illinois residents, and the plaintiffs' exhibits showed that the named defendants had specifically offered to sell particular counterfeit products to individuals with Illinois shipping addresses and provided PayPal account number for the buyer to make the payment for the item, and as a result, the defendants expressly elected to do business with the residents of all fifty states, including Illinois).

through their highly interactive User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts, along with Defendants' own representations on their Merchant Storefronts that they ship Infringing Products to the U.S., including to Pennsylvania addresses, unequivocally establishes that Defendants conduct business within this District and the claims in this suit arise from Defendants' business dealings and transactions with consumers in Pennsylvania. *See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo DOT Com*, 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).

2. Exercising Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants Comports With Due Process

The assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendants also comports with the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as Defendants have “certain minimum contacts ... such that maintenance of th[is] suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” *Calder v. Jones*, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984) (quoting *Milliken v. Meyer*, 311 U.S. 457 (1940)).

This Court may exercise personal jurisdiction when the plaintiff can establish that the cause of action at issue arose from the defendant's activities within the forum state. *Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall*, 466 U.S. at 414 (1984). The plaintiff initially bears the burden of proving a *prima facie* case, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's contacts with the forum state meet the “minimum contacts” test. *Carteret Sav. Bank, F.A. v. Shushan*, 954 F.2d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1992). *Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz*, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (U.S. 1985); *see Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker*, 490 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2007) (“In the language of minimum contacts, when the defendants committed ‘their intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions expressly aimed at California, they must have reasonably anticipated being hailed into court there.’”) (internal quotations omitted); Here, the Defendants intentionally directed their activity towards the Pennsylvania market, thereby purposefully availing themselves of “the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” *See OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.* ¶ 29. *See Odell Dec.* ¶ 2 and Composite Exhibit 1.

Thus, the Plaintiff has made out a *prima facie* case, by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants' contacts with the Pennsylvania meet the "minimum contacts" test.

Pennsylvania's long-arm statute provides that jurisdiction may be exercised "to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the U.S. and may be based on the most minimum contact with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the U.S." 42 Pa. C. S. A. § 5322(b) (1981). Thus, because Pennsylvania's long-arm statute is coextensive with the dictates of the U.S. Constitution, the traditional two-step analysis is collapsed into a single inquiry: "whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would conform with the Due Process Clause." *Poole v. Sasson*, 122 F. Supp. 2d 556, 558 (E. D. Pa. 2000); *see also Renner v. Lanard Toys Limited*, 33 F.3d 277, 279 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[T]his court's inquiry is solely whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would be constitutional."). Due process requires that the defendant have "minimum contacts" with the forum state. *Remick v. Manfredy*, 238 F.3d 248, 255 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). "Minimum contacts must have a basis in 'some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.'" *Remick*, 238 F.3d at 255 (quoting *Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California*, 480 U.S. 102, 109, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987)).

Here, each of the Defendants has used an interactive web site for offering for sale and selling infringing products. This Court has personal jurisdiction over each Defendant based upon internet-based sales activity into the US and this judicial district. The seminal opinion in this regard is *Zippo Mfg. Co.*, 952 F. Supp. at 1119. In *Zippo*, this court established a "sliding scale" analytical framework for internet-based personal jurisdiction cases based upon the "level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site." 952 F. Supp. at 1124. The court explained:

[T]he likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet. This sliding scale is consistent with well-developed personal jurisdiction principles. At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet. If the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. At the opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does little more than make information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.

Id.

The Third Circuit endorsed this general framework in *Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A.*, 318 F.3d 446 (3rd Cir. 2003), but clarified that the plaintiff must also provide evidence of “the intentional nature of the defendant’s conduct vis-a-vis the forum state.” *Id.* at 452. In other words, “there must be some evidence that the defendant ‘purposefully availed’ itself of conducting activity in the forum state, by directly targeting its website to the state, knowingly interacting with residents of the forum state via its website, or through sufficient other related contacts.” *Id.* at 454. *See also Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, N.A. v. DiVeronica Bros., Inc.*, 983 F.2d 551, 556 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing *Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz*, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985))

In the wake of *Zippo* and *Toys “R” Us*, most courts have concluded that a defendant that intentionally conducts business transactions over an interactive website with customers in the forum state has purposefully directed itself of the laws of that forum. In *Square D*, for example, the defendant’s website contained links providing “a [telephone] number and e-mail address for the purpose of placing an order,” information concerning product warranties, and a link that permitted a potential purchaser to “submit a form specifying the manufacturer, catalog number, and quantity of the product to be purchased, as well as the purchaser’s company name, phone, fax and e-mail.” *Square D Co. v. Scott Elec. Co.*, No.

06-459, 2008 WL 4462298, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2008). There was also a space on the form for additional “comments” concerning a proposed transaction. *Id.* Although a customer could not directly order products using only the website, customers could “commence the ordering process” by “provid[ing] much of the same type of information that would be required for an order (e.g., manufacturer, quantity, catalog number, contact information).” *Id.* at *8. Indeed, the court noted that the website had produced “twenty-four (24) Pennsylvania customers and a total of \$10,238.25 in sales” for the defendant. *Id.* at *9. Although this amount represented “less than 1%” of the defendant’s total sales, the Court concluded that it was sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in the state of Pennsylvania. *Id.* As explained by the court:

The website was more than a mere advertisement; rather, it was an interactive site that allowed customers to take the first step in an ordering process that could be completed with one phone call or e-mail. By knowingly selling and shipping a product that is at issue in this litigation to a customer [in] Pennsylvania, the Moving Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the laws and privileges of this forum. *Id.* at *11.

Willyoung v. Colorado Custom Hardware, Inc. is similarly instructive. *Willyoung v. Colorado Custom Hardware, Inc.*, 2009 WL 3183061 (W. D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2009). In *Willyoung*, the website at issue allowed visitors to “request a catalog by supplying certain information according to the website prompts, contact the company directly by e-mail, subscribe to [defendant’s] on-line newsletter, and search, view, and select products for on-line purchase via a ‘shopping cart.’” *Id.* at *12. Over a two-year period, Pennsylvania customers had utilized the website to place 211 orders amounting to \$41,566.05 in sales. *Id.* Based on the foregoing, the court concluded that the defendant had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the state of Pennsylvania by “intentionally and repeatedly engag[ing] in internet-based sales of its products to Pennsylvania residents via its website.” *Id.* at *13. Other courts have frequently reached the same conclusion. *See also Gentex Corp. v. Abbott*, 978 F. Supp. 2d 391, 398 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (finding personal jurisdiction where non-resident defendant’s interactive website was used by Pennsylvania residents to place at least 17 orders over a three-year period); *TRE Services, Inc. v.*

U.S. Bellows, Inc., 2012 WL 2872830, *4–5 (W.D. Pa. July 12, 2012) (finding personal jurisdiction based on defendant’s commercially interactive website that accepted orders from Pennsylvania); *Gourmet Video, Inc. v. Alpha Blue Archives, Inc.*, 2008 WL 4755350, *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2008) (“Personal jurisdiction is properly exercised over a defendant using the Internet to conduct business in the forum state.”); *L’Athene, Inc. v. EarthSpring LLC*, 570 F. Supp. 588, 593–94 (D. Del. 2008) (defendants purposely availed themselves of doing business in state of Delaware where they operated a website accessible in Delaware, received orders and payments from customers in Delaware, and shipped their products to Delaware). Thus, the Defendants in this case have all offered interactive web sites for viewing, ordering, and paying for the Counterfeit Goods and have purposefully availed themselves of the opportunity to conduct business with Pennsylvania citizens with their respective Merchant Storefronts.

Further there is sufficient evidence to establish the type of “intentional interaction with the forum state” required by the Third Circuit for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. *See Toys “R” Us*, 318 F.3d at 451–52 (requiring evidence that the defendant has “intentionally interact[ed] with the forum state). *See, e.g., Square D.*, 2008 WL 4462298 at *9 n. 10 (concluding that an amount equal to less than 1% of overall sales was sufficient to establish minimum contacts); *Zippo*, 952 F.Supp. at 1127 (exercising personal jurisdiction despite that only 2% of the defendant’s customers were Pennsylvania residents); *L’Athene*, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 593–94 (exercising personal jurisdiction despite that sales to the forum state constituted less than 1% of defendants’ total annual sales based on units sold). As noted in *Zippo*, “[t]he Supreme Court has made clear that even a single contact can be sufficient.” *Zippo*, 952 F. Supp. at 1127 (citing *McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co.*, 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L. Ed. 2d 223 (1957)); *see also Square D.*, 2008 WL 4462298 at *9 n. 10 (noting that, while an argument based on a minute number of overall sales might be “valid in the context of general jurisdiction, in the context of specific jurisdiction it is evidence that supports Plaintiff’s argument that the Moving Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the laws and privileges of Pennsylvania by selling and shipping products to residents of the Commonwealth.”).

Since the Defendants have purposefully availed themselves of the opportunity to conduct business with Pennsylvania citizens through their interactive websites, including collecting and paying Pennsylvania sales tax, the Court must next consider whether this litigation “arise[s] out of and relate[s] to” those sales. *D’Jamoos*, 566 F.3d at 102. Here, the lawsuit directly arises out of the Defendants’ respective sales of Infringing Products to Pennsylvania residents through their interactive websites. *See, e.g., Willyoung*, 2009 WL 3183061 at *13 (“The second part of our jurisdictional inquiry is also easily satisfied because this litigation arises out of and relates to BGM’s use of its web site to conduct internet-based sales of its merchandise to Pennsylvania residents.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); *Square D.*, 2008 WL 4462298 at *11 (finding the relatedness requirement satisfied where “at least one” of the products sold to a Pennsylvania resident by the defendant was from the allegedly infringing line of products at issue in the litigation). All of the Infringing Products which are the subject of this lawsuit were sold into Pennsylvania. Therefore, the “arise[s] out of and relate[s] to” test is easily met here.

Finally, the Court must consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction would otherwise comport with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” *O’Connor v Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd.*, 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3rd Cir. 2007)(quoting *Int’l Shoe*, 326 U.S. at 316). Because the existence of minimum contacts makes jurisdiction presumptively constitutional, the defendant at step three of the specific-jurisdiction-inquiry process “must present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” *Id.* (quoting *Burger King*, 471 U.S. at 477). The burden upon the defendant at this stage of the inquiry is considerable. *See Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & Assocs., Inc.*, 149 F.3d 197, 207 (3rd Cir. 1998) (noting that if minimum contacts are present, then jurisdiction will be unreasonable only in “rare cases”); *Grand Entm’t Group, Ltd., v. Star Media Sales, Inc.*, 988 F.2d 476, 483 (3rd Cir.1993) (“The burden on a defendant who wishes to show an absence of fairness or lack of substantial justice is heavy.”). As the Third Circuit has observed:

The Supreme Court has identified several factors that courts should consider when balancing jurisdictional reasonableness. Among them are the burden on the defendant, the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate [and international] judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and [t]he procedural and substantive interests of other nations.

O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 324 (internal quotations omitted).

Here, the Plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief in the forum of its choice and Pennsylvania's interest in protecting its citizens from the sale of infringing goods within its borders are factors that weigh heavily in finding personal jurisdiction of the Defendants. *See Square D*, 2008 WL 4462298 at *12 (concluding that jurisdiction should be exercised in Pennsylvania "because the counterfeit goods in question potentially pose a danger to the public and were sold to residents of this Commonwealth."); *Zippo*, 952 F.Supp. at 1127 (noting Pennsylvania's strong interest in resolving trademark infringement claims implicating its citizens and giving "due regard to the Plaintiff's choice to seek relief in Pennsylvania"). As the court noted in *Zippo*, "[i]f [the defendant] had not wanted to be amenable to jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, the solution would have been simple—it could have chosen not to sell its [products] to Pennsylvania residents." *Id.* at 1126–27.

Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully submits that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants in this action.

B. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN *EX PARTE* TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

An *ex parte* order is essential in this case to prevent immediate and irreparable injury to Plaintiff. Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that a temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice to the opposing party or that party's counsel where "it clearly appears from the specific facts shown by affidavit . . . that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or that party's attorney can be heard in

opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Further, this court has inherent power to grant an *ex parte* restraining order. *See Link v. Wabush R. R.*, 370 U.S. 626, 630 – 31 (1962) (“Inherent powers are governed by the ‘control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’(citation omitted)”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated that federal courts have broad inherent powers to accomplish justice. *See Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.*, 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991). Moreover, under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 502 (a), any court with jurisdiction may grant a temporary and final injunction to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.

Defendants herein fraudulently promote, advertise, sell, and offer for sale goods infringing Plaintiff’s Marks and/or Works and/or Trade Dress, via their fully interactive, commercial Internet e-commerce stores using the Seller IDs. Specifically, Defendants wrongfully use infringements of Plaintiff’s Marks and/or Works and/or Trade Dress to increase traffic to their illegal operations. By their actions, Defendants are passing off Defendants’ Infringing Products as Plaintiff’s genuine products and creating a false association in the minds of consumers between Defendants and Plaintiff. The entry of a temporary restraining order would serve to immediately stop Defendants from benefiting from their wrongful use of Plaintiff’s intellectual property at issue and preserve the status quo until such time as a hearing can be held. *See Dell Inc. v. BelgiumDomains, LLC*, Case No. 07-22674 2007 WL 6862341, at *2 (S.D Fla. Nov. 21, 2007) (finding *ex parte* relief more compelling where Defendants’ scheme “is in electronic form and subject to quick, easy, untraceable destruction by Defendants.”)

Absent a temporary restraining order without notice, Defendants can and, based upon Plaintiff’s counsel’s past experience, will significantly alter the status quo before the Court can determine the parties’ respective rights. In particular, the Seller IDs at issue are under the Defendants’ complete control. Thus, Defendants have the ability to modify e-commerce store data and content, redirect consumer traffic to other seller identification names, change payment accounts, and transfer assets. *Ference Dec.*, ¶ 6. Such

modifications can happen in a short period of time after Defendants are provided with notice of this action. *Id.* Defendants can also easily electronically transfer and secret the funds sought to be restrained if they obtain advance notice of Plaintiff's Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and thereby thwart the Court's ability to grant meaningful relief and can completely erase the status quo. *Id.* As Defendants engage in illegal infringing activities, Plaintiff has no reason to believe Defendants will make their assets available for recovery pursuant to an account of profits or will adhere to the authority of this Court any more than they have adhered to the Copyright Act.

"Courts in other circuits dealing with foreign on-line counterfeiters and infringers have not hesitated to exercise [their] authority [to grant an *ex parte* order] in infringement cases in which there is a danger the defendants will destroy, conceal, or transfer counterfeit goods." *Moose Toys Pty, Ltd. v. Thriftway Hylan Blvd. Drug Corp.*, No. 15-cv-4483-DLI/MDG, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105912, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2015). Moreover, federal courts have long recognized that civil actions against counterfeiters - whose very business is built around the deliberate misappropriation of rights and property belonging to others - present special challenges that justify proceeding on an *ex parte* basis. *See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Jasso*, 927 F. Supp. 1075, 1077 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (observing that "proceedings against those who deliberately traffic in infringing merchandise are often useless if notice is given to the infringers"); *Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. v. Does*, 876 F. Supp. 407, 410-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).

This Court should prevent an injustice from occurring by issuing an *ex parte* temporary restraining order which precludes Defendants from continuing to display their infringing products via the Internet e-commerce stores or modifying or deleting any related content or data. Only such an order will prevent ongoing irreparable harm and maintain the status quo. The immediate and irreparable harm to Plaintiff's business and reputation -- as well as to the goodwill associated with Plaintiff's Works and/or Trade Dress - in denying its Application for an *ex parte* temporary restraining order, greatly outweighs the harm to

Defendants' interests in continuing to offer for sale and sell Infringing Products. Many courts have granted an *ex parte* temporary restraining order in situations where the harm to plaintiffs far outweighed the harm to defendants.¹¹

The Third Circuit holds that a district court must evaluate the following four factors in deciding whether preliminary injunctive relief is appropriately entered: (1) the extent to which the moving party will suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief; (2) the likelihood that the moving party will succeed on the merits; (3) the extent to which the nonmoving party will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is issued; and (4) the public interest. *AT&T Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc.*, 42 F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994). Courts routinely grant preliminary injunctive relief when a party's intellectual property rights are threatened by the sale of counterfeit versions of its products based on a copyright holder's inability "to control the quality of the goods manufactured and sold under the holder's trademark." *El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc.*, 806 F.2d 392, 395 (2d Cir. 1986). As shown below, Plaintiff readily meets the criteria for obtaining a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. *Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp.*, 426 F.3d 532, 537 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting *Federal Express Corp. v. Federal Espresso, Inc.*, 201 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 2000)). The "standards which govern consideration of an application for a temporary restraining order are the same standards as those which govern a preliminary injunction." *Local 1814, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, Inc.*, 965 F.2d 1224, 1228 (2d Cir. 1992). *See also Hall v. Johnson*, 599 F.Supp.2d 1, 6 n. 2 (D.D.C. 2009); *accord Sterling Commercial Credit-Michigan, LLC v. Phoenix Industries I, LLC*, 762 F.Supp.2d 8 (D.D.C. 2011); *Coalition for Parity, Inc. v. Sebelius*, 709 F.Supp.2d 6 (D.D.C. 2010). As detailed below, Plaintiff has met the standard for a preliminary injunction, and accordingly, a temporary restraining order should also issue against Defendants.

¹¹ *See, supra* fn. 5, 6, and 7 (collecting cases granted *ex parte* temporary restraining order in situations where harm to plaintiffs far outweighed harm to defendants.).

1. **Plaintiff Will Suffer Irreparable Harm in The Absence of an Injunction Leaving It With No Adequate Remedy at Law**

Defendants' infringing activities must be stopped immediately in order to prevent any further harm to Plaintiff. Not only does Plaintiff stand to suffer lost profits as a result of Defendants' competing substandard Infringing Products, but it deprives Plaintiff of its exclusive rights under the Copyright Act, it destroys the inherent value of Plaintiff's Works, it impairs Plaintiff's reputation for providing quality products, it dilutes Plaintiff's brand and goodwill and it negatively affects Plaintiff's relationships with its current customers and its ability to attract new customers. *See OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.*, ¶¶ 29 - 31.

"In the context of copyright infringement cases, the harm to the plaintiff's property interest has often been characterized as irreparable in light of possible market confusion." *CJ Prods. LLC v. Concord Toys Int'l*, No. 10-CV-5712 (ENV)(JO), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4983, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2011) (citing *Merkos L'Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc.*, 312 F.3d 94, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2002)). Courts generally issue injunctions in this context because "proving 'the loss of sales due to infringement is . . . notoriously difficult.'" *CJ Prods. LLC v. Snuggly Plushez LLC*, 809 F. Supp. 2d 127, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citation omitted).

Also, because Defendants' substandard Infringing Products are virtually indistinguishable from Plaintiff's genuine products, not only could any injury that results from use of Defendants' substandard Infringing Products be attributed to Plaintiff (*See OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.*, ¶ 20), thereby causing irreparable harm to Plaintiff in the form of unquantifiable lost sales, loss of goodwill and loss of control of its reputation with authorized licensees, retailers and consumers, but also Plaintiff potentially could be exposed to legal liability for any such injury, which is of particular importance given the nature of the genuine products. *Id.* Thus, this factor weighs heavily in Plaintiff's favor.

2. **Plaintiff is Likely to Prevail on The Merits of Its Copyright Infringement Claims**

Plaintiff asserts one cause of action under 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). Plaintiff has established a likelihood of success on its cause of action for copyright infringement. To prove copyright infringement pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 501, the plaintiff must demonstrate two elements: (1) ownership of a copyright and (2) copying by the defendant. *Dam Things From Denmark v. Russ Berrie & Co.*, 290 F.3d 548, 561 (3d Cir. 2002). Plaintiff is the exclusive owner of all of its Works. A true and correct copy of which are attached as Complaint **Exhibit 3A-3G**. Defendants had actual notice of Plaintiff's exclusive rights in and to the copyrighted Works in the Plaintiff's Products.

Without permission, Defendants knowingly and intentionally reproduced, copied, and displayed the Plaintiff's Works by manufacturing, distributing, displaying, offering for sale and/or selling Infringing Products which copy or are substantially similar to the Plaintiff's Works. *See Odell Dec. Composite Exhibit 1*. Therefore, Defendants' display, distribution, and sale of the unauthorized copies infringe Plaintiff's exclusive rights to reproduce, prepare derivative Works, distribute, and display its copyrighted material under 17 U.S.C. § 106.

3. **Plaintiff is Likely to Prevail on The Merits of its Lanham Act Claims**

To prevail on a false designation of origin claim pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must show: (1) that defendants used a false designation of origin; (2) that the use of the false designation of origin occurred in interstate commerce in connection with goods or services; (3) that the false designation is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception as to the origin, sponsorship or approval of Plaintiff's goods by another person; and (4) that Plaintiff has been or is likely to be damaged as a result. *See AT&T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc.*, 42 F.3d 1421, 1428 (3d Cir. 1994). False designation of origin claims often take one of two forms: "passing off" claims and "reverse passing off" claims. The Supreme Court distinguished the two claims as follows: "Passing off (or palming off, as

it is sometimes called) occurs when a producer misrepresents his own goods or services as someone else's. Reverse passing off, as its name implies, is the opposite: The producer misrepresents someone else's goods or services as his own." *Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.*, 539 U.S. 23, 28 n. 1 (2003) (citations omitted).

Although the above sets out the general rule, in cases involving use of a plaintiff's photographs and common law trademarks, courts do not go through a detailed analysis of these four factors. Rather, the focus is on whether a defendant has used plaintiff's photographs to advertise defendant's own products; if the defendant has, Section 43(a) has been violated and an injunction issues. Similarly, when considering infringement of a common law trademark, the focus is on whether use of the same mark is by the defendant is likely to create confusion; if there is a likelihood of confusion, an injunction issues.

A. Defendants¹² Infringement of Plaintiff's Registered Trademark

In order to establish a likelihood of success on trademark infringement claims, a plaintiff must show: (1) that its marks are valid and entitled to protection, and (2) that defendants' use of plaintiff's marks is likely to cause confusion. In order for a party to prevail on a claim of trademark or service mark infringement under Section 1114 and the common law, the party must establish that (1) the mark is valid and legally protectable, (2) the mark is owned by the plaintiff and (3) use of the same mark by the defendant is likely to create confusion among the relevant consumers. *See, e.g., Otokoyama Co. Ltd v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc.*, 175 F.3d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 1999). *See also Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc.*, 30 F.3d 466, 472 (3d Cir.1994); *Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods. Inc.*, 930 F.2d 277, 291 (3d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 502 U.S. 939, 112 S.Ct. 373, 116 L.Ed.2d 324 (1991).

¹² Plaintiff alleges that only Defendants Lancan, Sea moss, and Fudly are using Plaintiff's Marks to sell their Knock-Off Product.

In the Third Circuit, likelihood of confusion is assessed by the so-called *Lapp* factors first enunciated in *Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc.*, 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978). Here, each of the ten, non-exhaustive factors used to analyze whether there is likelihood of confusion favor Plaintiff: (1) the strength of Plaintiff's Marks; (2) the degree of similarity between the Plaintiff's Marks and Defendants' marks; (3) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care and attention expected of consumers when making a purchase; (4) the length of time the defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual confusion; (5) the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark; (6) actual confusion; (7) the similarity of the channels of trade; (8) the extent to which the targets of the parties' sales efforts are similar; (9) the relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers; and (10) other factors suggesting that consumers might expect the trademark owner to manufacture both products, or manufacture a product in the defendant's market.

In order for a party to prevail on a claim of trademark infringement under Lanham Act Section 1114,¹³ the party must establish that (1) the mark is valid and legally protectable, (2) the mark is owned by the plaintiff and (3) use of the same mark by the defendant is likely to create confusion among the relevant consumers. *See, e.g., Otokoyama Co. Ltd v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc.*, 175 F.3d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 1999). *See also Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc.*, 30 F.3d 466, 472 (3d Cir.1994); *Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods. Inc.*, 930 F.2d 277, 291 (3d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 502 U.S. 939, 112 S.Ct. 373, 116 L.Ed.2d 324 (1991). Plaintiff's evidence submitted herewith satisfies all three requirements.

¹³ Like other courts, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals also recognize another type of passing off that violates Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) — where the objectionable conduct is the defendant's passing off that lures potential customers away from the plaintiff but where the customers recognize the passing off before actually transacting business with the defendant. *Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc.*, 269 F.3d 270, 294–95 (3d Cir. 2001). This particular type of passing off, which creates what is known as “initial interest confusion,” is prohibited by the Lanham Act because without such protection, “an infringer could use an established mark to create confusion as to a product's source thereby receiving a ‘free ride on the goodwill’ of the established mark.” *Id.*

The first two elements of Plaintiff's trademark infringement claim are easily met. Plaintiff's Mark is inherently distinctive. Moreover, Defendants have never had the right or authority to use the Plaintiff's Mark. *OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.* ¶ 25.

Turning to the third element of confusion, the Third Circuit uses a ten-factor test, the so-called *Lapp* factors, in determining the third element, likelihood of confusion. *Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc.*, 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978). These factors are: (1) the strength of Plaintiff's Marks; (2) the degree of similarity between the Plaintiff's Marks and Defendants' marks; (3) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care and attention expected of consumers when making a purchase; (4) the length of time the defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual confusion; (5) the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark; (6) actual confusion; (7) the similarity of the channels of trade; (8) the extent to which the targets of the parties' sales efforts are similar; (9) the relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers; and (10) other factors suggesting that consumers might expect the trademark owner to manufacture both products, or manufacture a product in the defendant's market. These ten factors are to be weighed and no single factor is dispositive. *Id.*

i. Plaintiff's Mark is Strong and Distinctive

In determining the strength of a mark, the Third Circuit has repeatedly applied a two-prong test of "(1) the distinctiveness or conceptual strength of the mark; and (2) the commercial strength or marketplace recognition of the mark." *A & H Sportswear v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc.*, 237 F.3d 198, 221 (3d Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted); *see also Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Industries*, 30 F.3d 466, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1994). Lanham Trade-Mark Act, §§ 32, 43(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1114, 1125(a)(1)(A). The Plaintiff's Mark and Trade Dress are distinct as applied to the goods with which they are associated and as used in connection with Plaintiff's Product, which has achieved recognition and fame. *See OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.*, ¶¶ 9 and 10. Likewise, the Plaintiff's Mark is suggestive as applied to the goods with

which it is associated, as each “requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods,” and thus, the Plaintiff’s Mark is inherently distinctive and is thereby entitled to trademark protection “without proof of secondary meaning.” *Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc.*, 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); *see also Thompson Medical Co., v. Pfizer Inc.*, 753 F.2d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1985); *Bernard v. Commerce Drug Co.*, 774 F. Supp. 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying the aforementioned standards in the context of an unregistered trademark). Thus, this factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor since Plaintiff owns an inherently distinct trademark.

ii. Defendants’ Knock-Off Products and Marks are Virtually Identical to Plaintiff’s Product and Plaintiff’s Marks

Defendants have used identical copies of the Plaintiff’s Marks in marketing and promoting their substandard, Knock-Off Products at Defendants’ User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts; as such, this factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff. Defendants’ Knock-Off Products are clearly designed to look as much like the Plaintiff’s Products as possible, without the quality and workmanship of the Plaintiff’s Products. *See id.*; *see also Rado Watch Co. v. ABC, Co.*, 92-cv-3657-PKL, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8356, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1992) (finding that the similarity of the marks weighed heavily in plaintiff’s favor where it is “exceedingly difficult” to distinguish between authentic and infringing goods, “even in a side-by-side comparison”). Only minor differences exist between the Knock-Off Products and the Plaintiff’s Product, which have no bearing on a finding of likelihood of confusion. *See id.*; *see also Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp.*, 111 F.3d 993, 1004-1005 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the test for confusion is “whether they create the same general overall impression such that a consumer who has seen” the authentic product would, when seeing the Knock-Off Product, be confused). Further, courts do “not look with much favor on the businessman who, out of the wealth of words available, chooses as a trademark one which comes as close as he dares to a well-known mark on the identical product.” *A.T. Cross Co. v. Jonathan Bradley Pens, Inc.*, 470 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1972).

iii. *The Sophistication of Purchasers*

“Where the purchasers of a products are highly trained professionals, they know the market and are less likely than untrained consumers to be misled or confused by the similarity of different marks.” *Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab*, 335 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2003). In contrast, ordinary “retail customers,” (i.e., the consumers of Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ products), “are not expected to exercise the same degree of care as professional buyers, who are expected to have greater powers of discrimination.” *Pretty Girl, Inc. v. Pretty Girl Fashions, Inc.*, 778 F. Supp. 2d 261, 268-269 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing *Virgin Enterprises*, 335 F.3d at 151) (quoting district court). *See also Fisons*, 30 F.3d at 478–79. Thus, this factor favors Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits.

iv. *Defendants Acted in Bad Faith*

Given that Defendants’ choice of marks, which is identical to the Plaintiff’s Marks and used in connection with the offering for sale and/or sale of virtually identical products, it can be presumed that Defendants intended to trade off the goodwill and reputation of Plaintiff, its Product and its Marks. *See OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.*, ¶¶ 22 – 24 and *Odell Dec.*, ¶ 2 and Composite Exhibit 1; *see also Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Allied Old English, Inc.*, 831 F. Supp. 123, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“When a company appropriates an identical mark that is well known and has acquired a secondary meaning, an inference can be drawn that the company intends to capitalize on the goodwill and reputation of the mark as well as any confusion that might result concerning the common origin of that mark and the senior user's product.”).¹⁴

¹⁴ *See also Toys "R" Us, Inc.*, 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1199 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing *E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida International, Inc.*, 393 F. Supp. 502, 514 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)) (“On the assumption that a businessman will ordinarily act to his commercial advantage, and that the attraction of an established business’ good will to the newcomer's product is such an advantage, the inference to be drawn from imitation is the imitator's own expectation of confusion as to the source of origin of his product. Where, as here, there is little to distinguish the marks themselves and the prior mark is a long-established one of which the newcomer was aware, doubts about intent are resolved against the newcomer, and a reasonable explanation of its choice is essential to establish lack of intent to deceive.”) and *Gucci America, Inc. v. Action Activewear, Inc.*, 759 F. Supp. 1060, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Where the evidence "shows or requires the inference that another's name was adopted deliberately with a view to obtain some advantage from the good will, good name, and good trade which another has built up, then the inference of likelihood of confusion is readily drawn, for the very act of the adopter has indicated that he expects confusion and resultant profit.”) (internal citation omitted).

If Defendants' infringing actions are found to be willful, "likelihood of confusion will be presumed as a matter of law." *N.Y. State Soc'y of CPA's v. Eric Louis Assocs.*, 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

v. Actual Confusion Can Be Inferred Between Defendants' Knock-Off Products and the Plaintiff's Product

Seeing as Defendants are offering for sale and/or selling knock-off versions of the Plaintiff's Product under the Plaintiff's Mark, or a confusingly similar mark, actual confusion can be inferred. *See OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.*, ¶¶ 22 – 23 and *Odell Dec. at ¶ 2* and *Composite Exhibit 1*. Moreover, actual confusion exists in this case. *See OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.* ¶ 18. Notwithstanding, Plaintiff does not need to prove actual confusion, only a likelihood of confusion to obtain equitable relief. *See Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America Prot.*, 920 F.2d 187, 195 (citations omitted). *See also One Alarm Monitoring, Inc. v. Exec. Prot. One Sec. Serv., LLC*, 553 F. Supp. 2d 201, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting *Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc.*, 658 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1981) ("To obtain an injunction in a trademark case the plaintiff need show 'only a likelihood of confusion or deception ... in order to obtain equitable relief.'").

vi. Defendants' Knock-Off Products Are of Inferior Quality

The Plaintiff's Product is manufactured with high quality materials. *See OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.* ¶ 23. Plaintiff has neither authorized Defendants' use of the Plaintiff's Marks or confusingly similar marks in connection with the Knock-Off Products nor approved or tested Defendants' Knock-Off Products being offered for sale and/or sold under or in connection with the Plaintiff's Marks and/or confusingly similar marks. *See Id. at ¶¶ 23 - 26*. Hence, Defendants have encroached on Plaintiff's right to control the quality of the goods manufactured and sold under the Plaintiff's Mark. *See Groupe SEB USA v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC*, 774 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 2014). *See also Polymer Technology Corp. v. Mimran*, 975 F.2d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting *El Greco Leather Products Co.*, 806 F.2d at 395) ("One of the most valuable and important protections afforded by the Lanham Act is the right to control the quality of the goods

manufactured and sold under the holder's trademark . . . the actual quality of the goods is irrelevant; it is the control of quality that a trademark holder is entitled to maintain”). In light of the above, this factor further supports a finding of likelihood of confusion.

vii. Defendants’ Knock-Off Products Directly Compete with the Plaintiff’s Product and There is No Gap to Bridge

In considering the proximity of the products in the market, the concern is “competitive proximity,” meaning “whether and to what extent the two products compete with each other.” *Cadbury Beverages Inc. v. Cott Corp.*, 73 F.3d 474, 480 (2d Cir. 1996). In assessing the proximity of the parties’ products, courts “look to the nature of the products themselves and the structure of the relevant market. Among the considerations germane to the structure of the market are the class of customers to whom the goods are sold, the manner in which the products are advertised, and the channels through which the goods are sold.” *Id.* (citations and internal quotations omitted). “[T]he closer the secondary user’s goods are to those the consumer has seen marketed under the prior user’s band, the more likely that the consumer will mistakenly assume a common source.” *Virgin Enterprises v. Nawab*, 335 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2003). In this case, Knock-Off Products and the Plaintiff’s genuine products are both marketed through the same channel of trade (the Internet), to the same retail consumers, and the retail customers are likely to be confused that the products are the same, so this factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff.

Further, where, as here, Defendants are offering for sale and selling products that are virtually identical in kind, but not in quality to the Plaintiff’s genuine products, bearing infringing marks in the same class of goods under which Plaintiff sells its products, they are already in competitive proximity and there is no “gap” to bridge. *See OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.*, ¶¶ 24 - 26; *Odell Dec.*, ¶ 3 and Composite Exhibit 1. “[T]here is a great likelihood of confusion when an infringer uses the exact trademark...” *U.S. Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees*, 639 F.2d 134, 142 (3d. Cir. 1981). Thus, likelihood of confusion is inevitable, when, as in this case, the identical mark is used concurrently by unrelated entities. *See also 2*

McCarthy, § 23:3 (“Cases where a defendant uses an identical mark on competitive goods hardly ever find their way into the appellate reports. Such cases are ‘open and shut’ and do not involve protracted litigation to determine liability for trademark infringement.”). *Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc.*, 588 F.3d 97, 115 (2d Cir. 2009) (This factor “is irrelevant . . . where . . . the two products are in direct competition with each other.”); *see also Star Indus. v. Bacardi & Co.*, 412 F.3d 373, 387 (2d Cir. 2005) (concluding that “[b]ecause . . . [the] products are already in competitive proximity, there is really no gap to bridge, and this factor is irrelevant to the *Polaroid* analysis”) and *Pfizer, Inc. v. Y2K Shipping & Trading, Inc.*, 00-cv-5304-SJ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10426, at *15-16 (E.D.N.Y. March 26, 2004) (citations omitted) (“Where the products are competitive, there is no gap to bridge and the likelihood of confusion is greater.”)

Plaintiff is also likely to prevail on the merits of their passing off claim as the evidence shows Defendants have misrepresented the Knock-off Products as Plaintiff’s genuine products by using Plaintiff’s copyrighted photographs and/or Trade Dress while marketing their knock-off products, and Defendants’ actions have created actual confusion between Defendants’ knock-offs and Plaintiff’s genuine Products.

B. Defendants’ Use of Plaintiff’s Photographs to sell the Infringing Products violates Section 43(a)

The Lanham Act, including Section 43(a), was enacted in 1946. The very first case to consider whether a defendant’s use of a plaintiff’s photograph in defendant’s advertising was a Section 43(a) violation was *L’Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc.*, 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954). The Third Circuit reversed a district court’s grant of a defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, summarizing the case as follows:

Plaintiff, a manufacturer, and defendant, a retailer, are both members of the dress industry, selling dresses in commerce. Each is incorporated in Pennsylvania. Alleging a fraudulent

and injurious use of a picture of plaintiff's dress in defendant's advertising, the plaintiff brought this action under the Lanham trade-Mark Act of 1946 for damages and injunctive relief. ...

* * * *

On its face Section 43(a) seems rather clearly to cover the present claim. It provides in relevant part that "Any person who shall * * * use in connection with any goods * * * any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods * * * to enter into commerce, * * shall be liable to a civil action by any person * * * who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation." Section 39 gives federal district courts jurisdiction of causes arising under this statute regardless of the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the litigants.

The present complaint alleges that plaintiff created and alone sold to the retail trade throughout the country a certain distinctively styled dress. To advertise this dress plaintiff published pictures of it, together with its price, \$17.95, in advertisements in leading newspapers and in some two million individual mailing pieces distributed through retailers. In this way the picture and price of this dress became associated in the minds of many readers and identified as plaintiff's \$17.95 dress.

It is further alleged that, at about the same time, defendant was offering for sale through mail order and otherwise in interstate commerce a dress which in fact was much inferior to plaintiff's in quality and notably different in appearance. In this connection defendant published under its name in a magazine of national circulation a display advertisement worded and designed to promote the mail order sale of its dress at a stated price of \$6.95, but showing as the most prominent feature of the advertisement an actual photographic reproduction of plaintiff's dress, thus fraudulently represented as the article defendant was selling for \$6.95. Plaintiff alleges that this misrepresentation caused some trade to be diverted from plaintiff to defendant and caused other trade to be lost by plaintiff as a result of the mistaken impression conveyed to those familiar with the advertising of both parties that plaintiff was offering for \$17.95 a dress worth only \$6.95.

In relation to the language of Section 43(a) this complaint states about as plain a use of a false representation in the description of goods sold in commerce as could be imagined.

L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 650 (3d Cir. 1954) (emphasis added). It seems that some things never change.

In a 1967 case – pre-Internet – the plaintiffs created, designed, engineered and sold a novelty signal light. The defendant caused to be copied and manufactured in Hong Kong a "Chinese" copy of plaintiff's novelty signal light. In granting a preliminary injunction, the Court stated:

This unfair competition is also sufficient to sustain a cause of action cognizable under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a). This Section provides, in pertinent part, that:

"Any person who shall affix * * * or use in connection with any goods or services, or any container * * * for goods, a false designation or origin, or any false description or representation, including any words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin or description or representation cause or procure the same to be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action * * * by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation."

Plaintiffs and defendant are in competition for the signal light market. Suffice it to say that plaintiffs' light appears to be of a higher quality than defendant's.

The application of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act to this type of activity has been firmly established. **In a series of cases, the courts have held that defendant may not use a photograph of plaintiff's product to advertise and sell its own less expensive and inferior product.**¹⁵ Such action is clearly unfair competition within the meaning of the statute and may be enjoined under the proper circumstances.

A preliminary injunction has issued even where a defendant has altered the photograph of a plaintiff's product in order to put defendant's trade name or trademark on the product when, in fact, defendant's product was not identical but inferior, *National Dynamics Corp. v. John Surrey, Ltd., (Inc.)* 238 F.Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), and when all identifying marks have been removed from plaintiff's pictured product. *Zandelin v. Maxwell Bentley Mfg. Co.*, supra. In the latter case, Judge Van Pelt Bryan stated the rationale for these decisions:

"This section [Lanham Act § 43(a)] applies where a defendant advertises its inferior and much cheaper product by featuring a photographic reproduction of plaintiff's product, thus creates the impression that his product is precisely the same as plaintiffs' and causes trade to be diverted from plaintiff to himself and other trade to be lost." (197 F.Supp. at 611).

Crossbow, Inc. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 335, 339-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (emphasis added).

¹⁵ *American Optical Co. v. Rayex Corp.*, 266 F. Supp. 342 (S.D.N.Y.1966); *Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd. (Inc.)*, 261 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y.1966); *Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd. (Inc.)*, 266 F. Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y.1964), *aff'd*, 360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1966); *National Dynamics Corp. v. John Surrey Ltd.*, 238 F. Supp. 423 (S. D.N.Y.1964); *National Dynamics Corp., v. John Surrey Ltd.*, 238 F. Supp. 422 (S. D.N.Y.1963); *Zandelin v. Maxwell Bentley Mfg., Co.*, 197 F. Supp. 608, 611 (S.D. N.Y.1961); *L'Aiglon Apparel v. Lana Lobell, Inc.*, 214 F.2d 649 (3rd Cir. 1954).

In cases where a defendant has used the plaintiff's photograph in defendant's advertising, courts do not engage in a rigorous factor-by-factor analysis and simply conclude there has been a violation of Section 43(a). See *Bangor Punta Operation v. Universal Marine Co.*, 543 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1976) ("The plaintiff contends that the misappropriation of its advertising material by defendants results in the violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. We agree."); *Ebling & Reuss Co. v. International Collectors Guild, Ltd.*, 462 F. Supp. 716, 720 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Preliminary Injunction issued where "the advertisements do not depict the cup set actually sold by defendant; rather, they show plaintiff's Taltos set. This, in itself, is a false description or representation, actionable under the Lanham Act."); 1 Federal Unfair Competition: Lanham Act 43(a) § 6:12 (Dec. 2018 Update) ("Generally stated, using one product or its facsimile such as a still photograph or motion picture, or otherwise in an advertisement or promotion, while actually delivering another product even though similar in quality or appearance, has been held actionable under Section 43(a)." (citations omitted).) As demonstrated in **Composite Exhibit 1**, Defendants have used Plaintiff's photographs in Defendants' listings and have caused confusion in the marketplace. Such conduct is a clear violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. For the same reasons, Plaintiff has also shown that it will likely prevail on its claims for false designation of origin, passing off and unfair competition.

C. Defendants that Hi-Jacked Plaintiff's Reviews Violate Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act¹⁶

Amazon allows its vendors and third-party sellers to create or submit requests to create "variation" relationships between products sold on [Amazon.com](https://www.amazon.com) that are substantially similar. Such products may differ only in narrow, specific ways – such as color, size, quantity, or flavor – that do not alter the core essence of the item. According to Amazon, substantially different products should not share a variation relationship. Products that have a variation relationship share the same product detail page. Each product

¹⁶ Only the Defendants Sharklabs, Dr. Commerce, and Mykyta have been identified as hi-jacking the Plaintiff's reviews on Amazon.

in the variation relationship will appear as an alternative choice on the product detail page and when a shopper selects a different product in the variation relationship, the content of the product detail page, such as the pictured product, the product description, or the price, may change. The variation relationship enables buyers to compare and choose among product attributes (such as color, size, quantity, or flavor) from a single product detail page, thereby facilitating customer choice and ease of shopping. An example would be the same shirt that comes in multiple colors and different sizes. An Amazon page explaining variation relationships, gives the following example:



5280 Fl. e. 5.2 oz. ComfortSoft® Cotton T-Shirt

Be the first to review this item

Price: ~~\$2.63~~ - ~~\$23.09~~

Size:

Select Size Chart

Color: Deep Red



- 100% preshrunk ComfortSoft® cotton
- Double-needle coverseamed neck
- Taped shoulder-to-shoulder
- Tag-free neck label
- Ash is 99% cotton, 1% polyester

Another example would be the same dietary supplement that is sold in 100 count bottles:



Fig. 1

and in 200 count bottles:



Fig. 2

The product detail page of products that are in a variation relationship displays the total number of ratings and reviews and the average star rating for all of the products in the variation relationship. (See, e.g., Fig. 1 & 2, above). All the products in a variation relationship also share any “#1 Best Seller” or “Amazon’s Choice” badges. (See, e.g., Fig. 1 & 2, above). The product detail page of products that are in a variation relationship shows the ratings and reviews of all the products in the variation relationship.

At all times relevant hereto, each of the Hi-Jacking Defendants, as shown in **Composite Exhibit 1** deliberately created variants comprising Infringing Products and linked them to Plaintiff’s genuine listing in order to deceive consumers into believing that the Infringing Products owned all of the listings and ratings and “#1 Best Seller” badge of the Plaintiff when the Hi-Jacking Defendants did not earn any of the reviews, rankings, or best seller badge.

Each of the Hi-Jacking Defendants have advertised, promoted, offered for sale, or sold their products on Amazon, and represented, directly or indirectly, expressly or by implication that: (a) the apparent reviewers of certain of their products sold on Amazon had used and endorsed their products; (b) certain of their products sold on Amazon had received the numbers of the customer ratings appearing on their Amazon product pages; (c) certain of their products sold on Amazon had obtained the average star ratings displayed on their Amazon product pages; and (d) certain of their products were number one best sellers, when none of those representations were true. The Hi-Jacking Defendants deliberate actions have resulted in false and misleading claims and deceptive practices constituting unfair competition under 43(a). As a result of the Defendants intentional misconduct, they have stolen Plaintiff's reputations, sales and profits and will continue to do so unless enjoined. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law and are suffering irreparable injury and damages as a result of Defendants' actions. As a result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief preventing them from further hi-jacking activities and directing them to de-link their illegal variants from Plaintiff's genuine listing.

4. Plaintiff Is Likely to Prevail on Its State Law Claims

Because Plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on its Lanham Act claims, Plaintiff respectfully submits that it has also shown a likelihood of success on its unfair competition and common law trademark infringement claims under Pennsylvania Law. *Mateson Chemical Corp. v. Veronon*, 2000 WL 680020, at *5 n.7 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2000). *See also Advance Magazine Publs. Inc. v. Vogye Intern.*, 123 F. Supp. 2d 790, 795 (D.N.J. 2000) (citing *A &H Sportswear, Inc.*, 237 F.3d at 201 - 11.)

5. The Balance of Hardships Favors Plaintiff

The balance of hardships unquestionably and overwhelmingly favors Plaintiff in this case. Here, as described above, Plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer, irreparable harm to its business, the value, goodwill, and reputation built up in and associated with the Plaintiff's Works and to its reputation as a result of Defendants' willful and knowing sales of substandard imitations of the Plaintiff's genuine product. *See OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.*, ¶¶ 19 - 29. In contrast, any harm to Defendants would only be the loss of Defendants' ability to continue to offer their Infringing Products for sale, or, in other words, the loss of the benefit of being allowed to continue to unfairly profit from their illegal and infringing activities. "Indeed, to the extent defendants 'elect[] to build a business on products found to infringe[,] [they] cannot be heard to complain if an injunction against continuing infringement destroys the business so elected.'" *Windsurfing Intern, Inc. v. AMF, Inc.*, 782 F.2d 995, 1003 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1986); *Broad. Music, Inc. v. Prana Hosp., Inc.*, 158 F. Supp. 3d 184, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting *Mint, Inc. v. Amad*, 2011 U.S. Dist.. LEXIS 49813, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); *see also Mitchell Group USA LLC*, No. 14-cv-5745-DLI/JO, 2014 U.S. Dist.. LEXIS 143001, at *6-7 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 17, 2014) (citing *Philip Morris USA Inc. v. 5 Bros. Grocery Corp.*, No. 13-cv-2451- DLI/SMG, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112274 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2014) ("Absent an injunction, there will be further erosion of plaintiff's goodwill and reputation. Defendants, on the other hand, will be called upon to do no more than refrain from what they have no right to do in the first place.")). Further, the Defendant's continuing infringing activities are causing irreparable harm to the Plaintiff's reputation and depriving Plaintiff of its exclusive rights to duplicate, reproduce and distribute its Works.

6. The Relief Sought Serves the Public Interest

Defendants are directly defrauding the consuming public by palming off the Infringing Products as Plaintiff's genuine goods. The "public has an interest in not being deceived—in being assured that the mark it associates with a product is not attached to goods of unknown origin and quality." Public interest can be defined a number of ways, but in a trademark case, it is most often a synonym for the right of the public not to be deceived or confused. 2 *McCarthy*, § 30:21. See *Bill Blass, Ltd. v. Saz Corp.*, 751 F.2d at 156 (there is a public interest in the protection of the trademark and to avoid confusion in the public); *SK & F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories*, 625 F.2d 1055, 1057 (3d Cir.1980) ("preventing deception of the public is itself in the public interest"). See also *International Kennel Club v. Mighty Star, Inc.*, 846 F.2d at 1092 n. 8 ("[T]he relevant consideration is the consumer's interest in not being deceived.") Here, the public has an interest in being able to rely on the high quality of the Plaintiff's genuine products using the Plaintiff's Works. Since Defendants have willfully and knowingly inserted substandard Infringing Products into the marketplace, the public would benefit from a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction halting any further sale and distribution of Defendants' Infringing Products. See *OSCAR PRECIADO Dec.*, ¶¶ 23 - 31.

C. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER PREVENTING 1) THE FRAUDULENT TRANSFER OF ASSETS AND 2) FREEZING OF DEFENDANTS' MERCHANT STOREFRONTS

1. Defendants' Assets Must be Frozen

In addition, the Court should enter an order limiting the transfer of Defendants' unlawfully gained assets. Plaintiff has demonstrated above that it will likely succeed on the merits of its claims. As such, under 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), Plaintiff will be entitled to an accounting and payment of the profits earned by Defendants throughout the course of their unlawful scheme. Furthermore, it is unlikely that Defendants possess the funds to satisfy any

potential judgment and Pennsylvania law also permits the prejudgment restraint sought by Plaintiff.¹⁷ Due to the deceptive nature of Defendants' business, and Defendants' deliberate violations of the Copyright Act, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court grant additional *ex parte* relief restraining the transfer of all monies held or received by Context Logic, PayPal, Amazon, and AliPay or other financial institutions for the benefit of any one or more of the Defendants. *See, e.g., Balenciaga Am., Inc. v. Dollinger*, No. 10-cv-2912-LTS, 2010 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 107733, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2010) (citing *Wishnatzki & Nathel, Inc. v. H.P. Island-Wide, Inc.*, No. 00-cv-8051-JSM, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15664, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[W]here plaintiffs seek both equitable and legal relief in relation to specific funds, a court retains its equitable power to freeze assets.”); *Int'l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger USA., Inc.*, 146 F.3d 66, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1998) (“A district court faced with a Lanham Act violation possesses some degree of discretion in shaping [the] relief according to the principles of equity and the individual circumstances of each case” within the parameters of allowing an accounting for profits); *George Basch Co., Inc. v. Blue Coral, Inc.*, 968 F.2d 1532, 1537 (2d Cir. 1992); *Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse*, No. 11-cv-4976-NRB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72148, at *34 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012); *Warner Bros. Entm't Inc. v. Doe*, No. 14-cv-3492-KPF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190098 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2014); and *Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc.*, 903 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1990) (district court has power to issue an injunction in order to protect a future damages remedy; the satisfiability of a money judgment can constitute irreparable injury).

¹⁷ To the extent, discover may later reveal that some of the Defendants be US-based as they have self-reported and/or published on their various online storefronts, or otherwise, Pennsylvania provides for pre-judgment restraint of assets to satisfy potential damages awarded through a final judgment. *See* discussion and cases cited on page 7, *supra*.

This Court has broad authority to grant such an order. The Supreme Court has provided that district courts have the power to grant preliminary injunctions to prevent a defendant from transferring assets in cases where an equitable interest is claimed. *Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Funds, Inc.*, 527 U.S. 308 (1999). The Third Circuit has additionally ruled that district courts have the power to grant preliminary injunctions to prevent a defendant from transferring assets in order to protect a future damages remedy. *Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc.*, 903 F.2d 186 (1990). Moreover, almost every Circuit has interpreted Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to grant authority to restrain assets *pendent lite*. See *Mason Tenders Dist. Council Pension Fund v. Messera*, 1997 WL 223077 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1997) (acknowledging that “[a]lmost all of the Circuit Courts have held that Rule 65 is available to freeze assets *pendent lite* under some set of circumstances”).

Courts have the inherent authority to issue a prejudgment asset restraint when plaintiff’s complaint seeks relief in equity. *Animale Grp. Inc. v. Sunny’s Perfume Inc.*, 256 F. App’x 707, (5th Cir. 2007); *Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading Inc.*, 51 F.3d 982, 987 (11th Cir. 1995); *Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc.*, 970 F.2d 552, 559 (9th Cir. 1992). In the years since *Marnatech*, many federal courts have granted the temporary restraint of an infringer’s assets in cases similar to this one, including recently in actions against operators of ‘rogue’ websites selling infringing products to ensure the availability of an equitable accounting. See, e.g., *The North Face Apparel Corp. and PRL USA Holdings, Inc. v. Fujian Sharing, et al.*, Civil Action No. 10-Civ-1630 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. March 2, 2010); *National Football League v. Chen Cheng, et al.*, No. 11-Civ-00344 (S.D.N.Y. January 19, 2011); *Tory Burch LLC v. Yong Sheng Intl Trade Co., Ltd.*, No. 10-Civ-9336 (S.D.N.Y. December 17, 2010).

Plaintiffs may obtain an order restraining Defendants' Assets by demonstrating a "likelihood of dissipation of the claimed assets, or other inability to recover money damages, if relief is not granted." *DatatechEnters. LLC v. FFMagnatLtd.*, No. 12-cv-04500-CRB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131711, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2012) (citing *Johnson v. Couturier*, 572 F.3d 1067, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009)). District courts have the "authority to freeze those assets which could [be] used to satisfy an equitable award of profits." *North Face Apparel Corp. v. TC Fashions, Inc.*, No. 05-cv-9083-RMB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14226, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2006) (internal citation omitted). In doing so, a court "may exempt any particular assets from the freeze on the ground that they [are] not linked to the profits of allegedly illegal activity." *Id.* at *11. Yet, the onus is on "the party seeking relief [from any such asset freeze] to 'present documentary proof'" that its profits do not stem from such illegal activity. *Id.*

Under 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), a plaintiff in an action arising under the Copyright Act is entitled to recover a defendant's profits derived from the infringement and also the plaintiff's damages. Furthermore, in the Third Circuit, the inability of a defendant to satisfy a judgment for legal damages justifies a pre-judgment restraint of existing assets. *Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc.*, 903 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1990) (concluding the unsatisfiability of a money judgment can constitute irreparable injury).

An asset freeze in the instant matter is unquestionably warranted because Defendants, who appear to be unknown individuals, that are manufacturing, importing, exporting, advertising, marketing, promoting, distributing, displaying, offering for sale and/or selling Infringing Products to U.S. consumers solely via the Internet, and accepting payment for such Infringing Products in U.S. Dollars through Financial Institutions, thereby causing irreparable harm to Plaintiff in the form of lost sales, loss of goodwill and loss of control of its reputation

with licensees, retailers and consumers, and can, and most certainly have the incentive to, transfer and hide their ill-gotten funds if their assets are not frozen. *See Ference Dec.*, ¶ 6.

Moreover, to provide complete equitable relief, courts have granted such orders without providing notice to the defendants. Specifically, federal courts have held that where advance notice of an asset restraint is likely to cause a party to alienate the assets sought to be restrained, a temporary restraining order may be issued *ex parte*. *See F.T. Int'l Ltd. v. Mason*, 2000 WL 1514881 *3 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (granting *ex parte* TRO restraining defendants' bank accounts upon finding that advance notice would likely have caused the defendants to secret or alienate funds); *CSC Holdings, Inc. v. Greenleaf Elec., Inc.*, 2000 WL 715601 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (granting *ex parte* TRO enjoining cable television pirates and restraining pirates' assets); *Dama S.P.A. v. Doe*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178076, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2015) (agreeing that, "Plaintiff's concerns regarding the likelihood of dissipating assets merit the extraordinary remedy of *ex parte* relief and that there is a strong likelihood that advance notice of the motion would cause Defendants to drain Financial Institution accounts, thereby depriving Plaintiff of the remedy it seeks") and *SEC v. Caledonian Bank Ltd.*, 317 F.R.D. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (granting plaintiff's request for an *ex parte* asset freeze based on plaintiff's assertion that Defendants were foreign entities, and therefore could easily move assets out of bank or brokerage accounts at a moment's notice).¹⁸

In this case, Defendants' blatant violations of the Copyright Act warrant an *ex parte* order restraining the transfer of their ill-gotten assets. Moreover, as Defendants' business are conducted anonymously over the Internet, Plaintiff has additional cause for *ex parte* relief, as Defendants may easily secret or transfer their assets with the Court's or Plaintiff's knowledge.

¹⁸ See also *supra* fn. 5

2. Defendants' User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts Must be Frozen

A temporary restraining order which, in part, restrains and enjoins the Third Party Service Provider(s), as well as any and all as yet undiscovered online marketplace platforms, from providing services to Defendants' User Accounts and Merchant Storefronts is warranted and necessary because the continued offering for sale and/or sale of the Infringing Products by Defendants on their Merchant Storefronts through their User Accounts will result in immediate and irreparable injury to Plaintiff, as described above. *See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li*, 768 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2014) (Hon. Richard J. Sullivan entered a temporary restraining order, which, in part, enjoined the sale of counterfeit goods on the Internet) and *AW Licensing, LLC v. Bao*, No. 15-cv-1373, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177101, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2015) (Hon. Katherine B. Forrest entered a temporary restraining order which was subsequently converted into a preliminary injunction, which, in part, disabled the defendants' websites, which were their means of distributing, offering for sale and selling counterfeit products.).¹⁹

One reason why courts have ordered this relief is the ease with which a Merchant Storefront may be set up. For example, a defendant who knowingly sells Infringing Products will likely try and set up another Merchant Storefront to keep selling when the current Merchant Storefront stops working. *See FERENCE Dec.*, ¶ 6. This brings into play a balancing of the hardship to Defendants against the hardship to Plaintiff if the relief is not granted. In the present case, the hardship to Plaintiff outweighs any hardship to Defendants. The proposed Order does not block any of the enjoined Defendants from setting up another Merchant Storefront to sell non-Infringing Products. The proposed Order merely blocks any goodwill associated with the

¹⁹ See *id.*

Merchant Storefront which sold Infringing Products; the Defendants are free to set up a new Merchant Storefront that does not sell Infringing Products.

Blocking the good will associated with the Merchant Storefront helps prevent the situation with the defendants where the Infringing Product listing has been taken down but if someone (e.g., a repeat buyer) contacts a Defendant at the Merchant Storefront using the messaging system provided by the online marketplace asking for the Infringing Product it will be made available by a Defendant. *Id.* The only way to preclude this type of harm to Plaintiff is to freeze the Defendants' Merchant Storefronts.

A freezing of Defendants' Merchant Storefronts also acts to provide immediate notice of the present action to Defendants. Indeed, a number of cases have required that the domain names on which a defendant's storefront operates be turned over to the plaintiff and pointed to a webpage providing notice of the lawsuit against the defendant. *Iron Maiden Holdings Ltd. v. The P'ships & Unincorporated Assns. Identified on Schedule "A"*, No. 18-CV-522 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2018) ("Plaintiff may provide notice of these proceedings to Defendants, including notice of the preliminary injunction hearing and service of process pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(f)(3), by electronically publishing a link to the Complaint, this Order and other relevant document on a website to which the Defendant Domain Names which are transferred to Plaintiff's control will redirect"). Thus, the freezing of Defendants' Merchant Storefronts is also a manner of ensuring that Defendants receive notice of the present action.

D. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER AUTHORIZING EXPEDITED DISCOVERY

Additionally, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court order expedited discovery from Defendants, Financial Institutions and the Third Party Service Provider regarding the scope and

extent of Defendants' infringing activities, as well as Defendants' account details and other information relating to Defendants' Financial Accounts, Assets and/or any and all User Accounts and or Financial Accounts with the Third Party Service Provider, including, without limitation any and all websites, any and all accounts with online marketplace platforms, as well as any and all as yet undiscovered accounts with additional online marketplace platforms held by or associated with Defendants, their respective officers, employees, agents, servants and all other persons in active concert with any of them ("User Accounts"), and any and all User Accounts through which Defendants, their respective officers, employees, agents, servants and all persons in active concert or participation with any of them operate storefronts to manufacture, import, export, advertise, market, promote, distribute, display, offer for sale, sell and/or otherwise deal in products, including Infringing Products, which are held by or associated with Defendants, their respective officers, employees, agents, servants and all persons in active concert or participation with any of them ("Merchant Storefront(s)") including, without limitation, those owned and operated, directly or indirectly, by the Third Party Service Provider and the Financial Institutions.

District courts have broad power to require early document production and to permit expedited discovery. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b), 34(b). Expedited discovery may be granted when the party seeking it demonstrates: (1) irreparable injury; (2) some likelihood of success on the merits; (3) some connection between expedited discovery and the avoidance of irreparable injury; and (4) some evidence that the injury which will result without expedited discovery looms greater than the injury that defendant will suffer if expedited discovery is granted. *See, e.g., Advanced Portfolio Technologies, Inc. v. Advanced Portfolio Technologies Ltd.*, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18457, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1994).

Generally, a party may not seek discovery prior to a Rule 26(f) conference unless authorized by a court order. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). While in the past, Courts have often applied a four-factor test to determine when expedited discovery may be granted,²⁰ they now apply a more flexible “good cause” test to examine “the discovery request . . . on the entirety of the record to date and the *reasonableness* of the request in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” *Ayyash v. Bank Al-Madina*, 233 F.R.D. 325, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting *Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. O’Connor*, 194 F.R.D. 618, 624 (N.D. Ill. 2000)).²¹ Regardless of which test is applied, Plaintiff has established that it is entitled to the expedited discovery requested. Plaintiff has demonstrated both irreparable injury and its probability of success on the merits above, and taking into account the covert nature of Defendants, their business operations and the fact that they appear to be foreign individuals or companies who have both the incentive and the capability to hide or destroy relevant business records and other discoverable information and documentation upon hearing of this action, Plaintiff respectfully submits that there is good cause for this Court to grant Plaintiff the expedited discovery requested herein because it will prevent further injury to Plaintiff and assist Plaintiff in pursuing its claims against Defendants and in recovering the damages to which it is entitled. *See Ayyash*, 233 F.R.D., at 327.

²⁰ “. . . the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) irreparable injury, (2) some probability of success on the merits, (3) some connection between the expedited discovery and the avoidance of the irreparable injury, and (4) some evidence that the injury that will result without expedited discovery looms greater than the injury that the defendant will suffer if the expedited relief is granted.” *Advanced Portfolio Techs., Inc. v. Advanced Portfolio Techs., Ltd.*, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18457, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1994).

²¹ *See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64656, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2016); *Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87751, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2015); *Milk Studios, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38710, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2015); *Admarketplace, Inc. v. Tee Support, Inc.*, No., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129749, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2013); *Dig. Sin, Inc. v. Does 1-176*, 279 F.R.D. 239, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); and *Stern v. Cosby*, 246 F.R.D. 453, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (agreeing with the *Ayyash* Court that the more flexible approach is the better approach.).

Despite the likelihood of success of Plaintiff's claims and the injury it has and continues to endure, if this Court were to deny expedited discovery, Plaintiff may lose the opportunity to effectively pursue its claims against Defendants because there are several aspects of Defendants' infringing activities that Plaintiff is not yet able to confirm, including: 1) the true identities of Defendants, 2) the full scope of Defendants' infringing activities, 3) the source or location of Defendants' inventory of Infringing Products and/or 4) where the proceeds from Defendants' infringing activities have gone. *See Admarketplace, Inc. v. Tee Support, Inc.*, No. 13-cv-5635-LGS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129749, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 11, 2013) (finding that a plaintiff "who has a potentially meritorious claim and no ability to enforce it absent expedited discovery, has demonstrated good cause for expedited discovery"). Therefore, only through an order from the Court allowing expedited discovery will Plaintiff be able to fully ascertain the extent of Defendants' infringing activities.

Plaintiff respectfully requests an *ex parte* Order allowing expedited discovery in order to permit it to discover certain identifying information, including information concerning all of Defendants' Financial Accounts, Assets and User Accounts and their sales of Infringing Products. The discovery requested on an expedited basis in Plaintiff's [Proposed] Order has been limited to include only that which is essential to prevent further irreparable harm. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)(C), this Court has the power to bind any third parties who are in active concert with Defendants that are given notice of the Order to provide expedited discovery. Moreover, Financial Institutions and the Third-Party Service Provider have complied with similar requests for expedited discovery in like actions before this Court. *See supra* note 5. Plaintiff respectfully submits that its request should be granted.

**E. PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR A SECURITY BOND
IN THE AMOUNT OF \$5,000 IS ADEQUATE**

Generally, a bond is a condition of preliminary injunctive relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c) requires a successful applicant for a preliminary injunction to post a bond, “in such sum as the [district] court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined.” Thus, the injunction bond “provides a fund to use to compensate incorrectly enjoined defendants.” *Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc.*, 882 F. 2d 797, 804 (3d Cir. 1989) (quotations omitted).

The injunction bond also serves other functions. “It is generally settled that, with rare exceptions, a [party] wrongfully enjoined has recourse only against the bond.” *Id.*; *see also Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc.*, 903 F. 2d 186, 210 n. 31 (3d Cir. 1990) (Applicants “derive some protection from the bond requirement, for [enjoined parties] injured by wrongfully issued preliminary injunctions can recover only against the bond itself.”). Thus, the bond generally limits the liability of the applicant and informs the applicant of “the price [it] can expect to pay if the injunction was wrongfully issued.” *Instant Air Freight*, 882 F.2d at 805; *see also id.* at 805 n. 9 (“The bond can thus be seen as a contract in which the court and [the applicant] ‘agree’ to the bond amount as the ‘price’ of a wrongful injunction.”) (quotations omitted).

Plaintiff respectfully submits that in connection with the Court’s order pursuant to its inherent equitable power requiring that the Defendants’ Assets and Defendants Financial Accounts be frozen by the Financial Institutions, Plaintiff’s’ provision of security in the amount of \$5,000 (“Security Bond”) is more than sufficient. This Security Bond is equal to an amount that similar plaintiffs have posted in related cases before Courts. *See generally* Request for

Judicial Notice and cases cited therein; *See also Doggie Dental Inc. v. Go Well*, No. 19-cv-1282 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2019) (Hornak, J.) (Temporary Restraining Order required \$5,000 bond); *Doggie Dental Inc. v. Worthbuyer*, No. 19-cv-1283 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2019) (Hornak, J.) (Temporary Restraining Order required \$5,000 bond); *Doggie Dental Inc. v. Max_Buy*, No. 19-cv-746 (W.D. Pa. June 27, 2019) (Hornak, J.) (Temporary Restraining Order required \$5,000 bond); *Doggie Dental Inc. v. Anywill*, No. 19-cv-682 (W.D. Pa. June 13, 2019) (Hornak, J.) (Temporary Restraining Order required \$5,000 bond); *Airigan Solutions, LLC v. Artifacts_Selling, Civil Action No. 18-cv-1462-NBF* (Temporary Restraining Order entered on November 2, 2018, \$5,000.00 bond required), and *Airigan Solutions, LLC v. Babymove, Civil Action No. 19-cv-166-NBF* (Temporary Restraining Order entered on February 14, 2019, \$5,000.00 bond required), *Rapid Slicer, LLC v. Buyspry, Civil Action No. 19-cv-249-MJH* (Temporary Restraining Order entered on March 11, 2019, \$5,000 bond required), *Showtech Merchandising, Inc. v. Various John Doe, et al*, 2:12-cv-1270 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2012); *See Wow-Virtual Reality, Inc. v. 740452063 et al.*, No. 18-cv-3618, Dkt. 18 (S.D.N.Y. April 25, 2018); *Rovio Entertainment Ltd. and Rovio Animation OY v. Best Baby and Kid Store, et al.*, No. 17-cv- 4884-KPF, Dkt. 6 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2017); *Rovio Entertainment Ltd. and Rovio Animation OY v. Angel Baby Factory d/b/a Angelbaby_factory et al.*, No. 17-cv-1840-KPF, Dkt. 11 (S.D.N.Y. March 27, 2017). Moreover, one New York Court has gone as far as to hold that no security bond is necessary in similar circumstances. *See, e.g., Ontel Products Corp. v. Airbrushpainting Makeup Store a/k/a Airbrushespainting, et al.*, No. 17-cv-871-KBF, Dkt. 20 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2017).²²

²² The Second Circuit has held that “[d]istrict courts ... are vested with wide discretion in determining the amount of the bond that the moving party must post.” *Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Stuart*, 85 F.3d 975, 985 (2d Cir. 1996). Typically, “the amount of the bond posted is the limit that a wrongfully restrained party may recover,” but the

Plaintiff believes that Defendants would be unable to show a strong likelihood of harm, and even if Defendants were to experience a likelihood of harm, such harm is outweighed by the harm to Plaintiff, as detailed above. For these reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a), enter the Security Bond in the amount of \$5,000.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that its Application be granted *ex parte* and that the Court enter: 1) a temporary restraining order; 2) an order restraining assets and Merchant Storefronts; 3) an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue; and 4) an order authorizing expedited discovery against Defendants, the Third Party Service Providers and the Financial Institutions, in the form of the [Proposed] Order accompanying this Application, and such other relief to which Plaintiff may show it is legally entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: July 2, 2024

/s/ Stanley D. Ference III

Stanley D. Ference III

Pa. ID No. 59899

courts@ferencelaw.com

Brian Samuel Malkin

Pa. ID No. 70448

bmalkin@ferencelaw.com

FERENCE & ASSOCIATES LLC

409 Broad Street

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15143

(412) 741-8400 – Telephone

(412) 741-9292 – Facsimile

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Court must also balance this against a likelihood of harm the non-movant would be able to show. *Interlink Int'l Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Block*, 145 F. Supp. 2d 312, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); *see also Doctor's Assocs.*, 85 F.3d at 985.