

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PUSHPEEL LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

SCHEDULE A DEFENDANTS,

Defendants.

Case No. 25-cv-1957

**COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**

Pushpeel LLC (“Pushpeel” or “Plaintiff”) hereby sues Defendants, the Individuals, Partnerships, and Unincorporated Associations identified on Schedule “A” (collectively “Defendants”). All Defendants have infringed, and continue to infringe, one or more of the claims of Plaintiff’s United States Patent No. 12,478,892 (“the ‘892 patent”) by manufacturing, importing, offering for sale, and/or selling infringing sensorial activity toys (the “Infringing Products”) on the Amazon.com online marketplace, operating under the seller identities and/or the online marketplace accounts as set forth on **Schedule “A”** hereto (the “Seller IDs” and collectively, the “Defendant Merchant Storefronts”). In support of its claims, Plaintiff alleges as follows:


**NATURE OF ACTION**




1. Plaintiff sells a fidget toy for calming, stress, anxiety, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and autism. An example of Plaintiff’s product appears below:



Plaintiff's product provides a screen-free, tactile experience with silicone strings on a surface, allowing users to push, peel, loop, and create patterns to relieve stress, improve focus, and develop fine motor skills, hand-eye coordination, and problem-solving. Plaintiff primarily sells its product through the Amazon.com online marketplace.

2. Plaintiff is the owner of the '892 patent, one or more of the claims of which are infringed by Defendants. Below is a side-by-side comparison of figures of the '892 patent showing different embodiments and examples of Defendants' products that infringe:

| Figure No. | Figure                                                                              | Example of Defendants' Product<br><i>Type 1</i>                                      |
|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Fig. 1A    |  |  |

| Figure No. | Figure                                                                              | Example of Defendants' Product                                                                         |
|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Fig. 6     |    | <b>Type 2</b><br>    |
| Fig. 7     |   | <b>Type 3</b><br>   |
| Fig. 5     |  | <b>Type 4</b><br> |

## **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

3. The Infringing Products are substantially identical to each other and the same in all respects to infringement of the ‘892 patent.

4. This Court has original subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims in this action pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Patent Act, 15 U.S.C. § 101, et seq., 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)–(b), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

5. Personal jurisdiction over each Defendant satisfies constitutional due process because, upon information and belief, each Defendant has sold products that infringe Plaintiff’s ‘892 patent to consumers within Pennsylvania not affiliated in any way with Plaintiff through the regular course of business, with the knowledge that Plaintiff is harmed in Pennsylvania as a result of its sales of infringing products to Pennsylvania residents. In addition, each Defendant has been willing to accept an order for a product that infringes Plaintiff’s ‘892 patent from a representative of Plaintiff with a Pennsylvania address, to ship the product to that representative in Pennsylvania, and to collect Pennsylvania sales tax. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of and relate to Defendants’ offers to sell and sales of products that infringe Plaintiff’s ‘892 patent to Pennsylvania residents through the regular course of business.

6. Personal jurisdiction over each Defendant also satisfies constitutional due process because the causes of action asserted herein, including patent infringement, are intentional torts, were aimed at Pennsylvania, and caused harm that each Defendant should have anticipated would be suffered by Plaintiff in Pennsylvania.

7. Personal jurisdiction over each Defendant satisfies the Pennsylvania long-arm statute, and therefore Rule 4(k)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure. The Pennsylvania long-arm statute provides for jurisdiction “to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of

the United States and may be based on the most minimum contact with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5322(b). The Pennsylvania long-arm statute is, therefore, coextensive with the Due Process Clause.

8. Upon information and belief, Defendants have cooperated, communicated, shared information, and coordinated their efforts in order to create an infringing marketplace operating in parallel to the legitimate marketplace of Plaintiff and third parties authorized to sell products embodying Plaintiff’s patented invention, including employing and benefitting from substantially similar paid advertising, marketing, and advertising strategies (*e.g.*, search engine optimization or “SEO”), in order to make their online storefronts appear more relevant and target a consumer searching for products embodying Plaintiff’s patented invention. By their actions, in addition to the damages associated with unauthorized use of Plaintiff’s patent invention, Defendants are causing concurrent and irreparable harm to Plaintiff and the consuming public by: (1) reducing the online visibility of Plaintiff’s patented invention; (2) diluting and eroding the retail market price for Plaintiff’s patented invention; (3) causing overall degradation of the value of goodwill associated with Plaintiff’s patented invention; (4) devaluing the exclusivity that enhances the worth of Plaintiff’s patented invention and Plaintiff’s reputation; and (5) increasing Plaintiff’s overall cost to market its goods and educate consumers about Plaintiff’s patented invention.

9. Upon information and belief, Defendants are aware of Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s patent and are aware that their infringement is likely to cause harm to Plaintiff in Pennsylvania.

10. Plaintiff is suffering irreparable and indivisible injury and has suffered substantial damages as a result of Defendants’ unauthorized sale of the Infringing Products in direct competition with Plaintiff.

11. By virtue of the civil conspiracy claim in Count II of this Complaint, the Pennsylvania contacts of each Defendant are imputed to every other Defendant because, upon information and belief, each Defendant was aware of, or should have been aware of, the actions of the other co-conspirators.

12. By virtue of the civil conspiracy claim in Count II of this Complaint and the allegations of coordinated actions by Defendants, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants arise out of the same series of transactions and occurrences.

13. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3). Defendants do not reside in the United States and are subject to venue in any district. Further, Defendants solicit business from this Judicial District and, upon information and belief, conduct and transact significant business in this Judicial District.

### INTRODUCTION

14. Plaintiff is the owner of the '892 patent that protects Plaintiff's patented invention. Sayer Murphy, the owner of Plaintiff, invented, designed, developed, marketed, and sold the first toy marketed as a sensory activity board. Indeed, Mr. Murphy coined the term "sensory activity board." Mr. Murphy is the named inventor on the '892 patent.

15. Plaintiff filed this action to combat online infringers who trade upon Plaintiff's reputation, goodwill, and valuable patent by selling and/or offering for sale products infringing Plaintiff's patented invention. In addition, Defendants are selling unauthorized products that are based on and derived from the patented invention of the '892 patent.

16. The '892 patent was issued on November 25, 2025 and is valid, subsisting, and in full force and effect. A true and correct copy of the '892 patent is attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**.

17. In an effort to illegally profit from the creative content of Plaintiff's invention, Defendants have created numerous Defendant Merchant Storefronts and designed them to appear to be selling products that are authorized by Plaintiff.

18. The Defendant Merchant Storefronts share unique identifiers, such as design elements and similarities of the unauthorized products offered for sale. Defendants attempt to avoid liability by going to great lengths to conceal both their identities and the full scope and interworking of their illegal operation. Plaintiff is forced to file this action to combat Defendants' piracy of Plaintiff's invention. Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, irreparable harm due to the loss of control over the quality and creative content of Plaintiff's valuable patented invention, as well as damage to Plaintiff's reputation, goodwill, and ability to license as a result of Defendants' actions. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks injunctive and monetary relief.

19. The rise of online retailing, coupled with the ability of sellers on e-commerce sites to hide their identities, has made it nearly impossible for Plaintiff to undertake non-litigation policing actions because taking advantage of takedown procedures to remove infringing products would be an ineffective and endless game of whack-a-mole against the mass piracy that is occurring over the internet. The aggregated effect of the mass piracy that is taking place has overwhelmed Plaintiff and Plaintiff's ability to police Plaintiff's rights against the dozens of anonymous defendants who are selling illegal infringing products at prices well below an original.

20. To be able to offer the infringing products at a price substantially below the cost of original, while still being able to turn a profit after absorbing the cost of manufacturing, advertising, and shipping requires an economy of scale only achievable through a cooperative effort throughout the supply chain. As Homeland Security's recent report confirms, infringers act

in concert through coordinated supply chains and distribution networks to unfairly compete with legitimate brand owners while generating huge profits for the illegal pirating network:

Historically, many counterfeits were distributed through swap meets and individual sellers located on street corners. Today, counterfeits are being trafficked through vast e-commerce supply chains in concert with marketing, sales, and distribution networks. **The ability of e-commerce platforms to aggregate information and reduce transportation and search costs for consumers provides a big advantage over brick-and-mortar retailers. Because of this, sellers on digital platforms have consumer visibility well beyond the seller's natural geographical sales area.**

...  
Selling counterfeit and pirated goods through e-commerce is a highly profitable activity: production costs are low, millions of potential customers are available online, transactions are convenient, and listing on well-branded e-commerce platforms provides an air of legitimacy.

...  
The impact of counterfeit and pirated goods is broader than just unfair competition. Law enforcement officials have uncovered intricate links between the sale of counterfeit goods and transnational organized crime. **A study by the Better Business Bureau notes that the financial operations supporting counterfeit goods typically require central coordination**, making these activities attractive for organized crime, with groups such as the Mafia and the Japanese Yakuza heavily involved. Criminal organizations use coerced and child labor to manufacture and sell counterfeit goods. In some cases, the proceeds from counterfeit sales may be supporting terrorism and dictatorships throughout the world.

See Department of Homeland Security, *Combating Trafficking in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods*, Jan. 24, 2020, (<https://www.dhs.gov/publication/combating-trafficking-counterfeit-and-pirated-goods>), at 10, 19 (emphasis added) attached hereto as **Exhibit 2**.

21. The Defendant Merchant Storefronts share unique identifiers, such as design elements and similarities of the unauthorized products offered for sale, establishing a logical relationship between them and suggesting that Defendants' illegal operations arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. Defendants use aliases to avoid liability by going to great lengths to conceal both their identities as well as the full scope and

interworking of their illegal network. Despite deterrents such as takedowns and other measures, the use of aliases enables infringers to stymie authorities:

The scale of counterfeit activity online is evidenced as well by the significant efforts e-commerce platforms themselves have had to undertake. A major e-commerce platform reports that its proactive efforts prevented over 1 million suspected bad actors from publishing a single product for sale through its platform and blocked over 3 billion suspected counterfeit listings from being published to their marketplace. Despite efforts such as these, private sector actions have not been sufficient to prevent the importation and sale of a wide variety and large volume of counterfeit and pirated goods to the American public.

...

A counterfeiter seeking to distribute fake products will typically set up one or more accounts on online third-party marketplaces. The ability to rapidly proliferate third-party online marketplaces greatly complicates enforcement efforts, especially for intellectual property rights holders. Rapid proliferation also allows counterfeiters to hop from one profile to the next even if the original site is taken down or blocked. On these sites, online counterfeiters can misrepresent products by posting pictures of authentic goods while simultaneously selling and shipping counterfeit versions.

...

Not only can counterfeiters set up their virtual storefronts quickly and easily, but they can also set up new virtual storefronts when their existing storefronts are shut down by either law enforcement or through voluntary initiatives set up by other stakeholders such as market platforms, advertisers, or payment processors.

*Id.* at 5, 11, 12.

22. Plaintiff has been and continues to be irreparably harmed through the loss of control over Plaintiff's reputation, goodwill, ability to license, and the quality of goods featuring the Plaintiff's invention, as well as the devaluation of the exclusivity associated with Plaintiff's invention and professional reputation. The rise of eCommerce as a method of supplying goods to the public exposes brand holders and content creators that make significant investments in their products to significant harm from counterfeiters:

Counterfeiting is no longer confined to street-corners and flea markets. The problem has intensified to staggering levels, as shown by a recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report, which details a 154 percent increase in counterfeits traded internationally — from \$200 billion in 2005 to \$509 billion in 2016. Similar information collected by the U.S.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) between 2000 and 2018 shows that seizures of infringing goods at U.S. borders have increased 10-fold, from 3,244 seizures per year to 33,810.

...

The rise in consumer use of third-party marketplaces significantly increases the risks and uncertainty for U.S. producers when creating new products. It is no longer enough for a small business to develop a product with significant local consumer demand and then use that revenue to grow the business regionally, nationally, and internationally with the brand protection efforts expanding in step. Instead, with the international scope of e-commerce platforms, once a small business exposes itself to the benefits of placing products online — which creates a geographic scope far greater than its more limited brand protection efforts can handle — it begins to face increased foreign infringement threat.

...

Moreover, as costs to enter the online market have come down, such market entry is happening earlier and earlier in the product cycle, further enhancing risk. If a new product is a success, counterfeiters will attempt, often immediately, to outcompete the original seller with lower-cost counterfeit and pirated versions while avoiding the initial investment into research and design.

...

Counterfeiters have taken full advantage of the aura of authenticity and trust that online platforms provide. While e-commerce has supported the launch of thousands of legitimate businesses, their models have also enabled counterfeiters to easily establish attractive “store-fronts” to compete with legitimate businesses.

*See Combating Trafficking in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods*, Jan. 24, 2020, (**Exhibit 2**) at 4, 8,

11.

23. Not only are the creators and patent owners harmed, the public is harmed as well:

The rapid growth of e-commerce has revolutionized the way goods are bought and sold, allowing for counterfeit and pirated goods to flood our borders and penetrate our communities and homes. Illicit goods trafficked to American consumers by e-commerce platforms and online third-party marketplaces threaten public health and safety, as well as national security. This illicit activity impacts American innovation and erodes the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturers and workers. The President’s historic memorandum provides a much warranted and long overdue call to action in the U.S. Government’s fight against a massive form of illicit trade that is inflicting significant harm on American consumers and businesses. This illicit trade must be stopped in its tracks.

*Id.* at 3, 4. (Underlining in original).

### **THE PLAINTIFF**

24. Plaintiff has expended substantial time, money, and other resources developing, advertising, and otherwise promoting Plaintiff's invention. Plaintiff has also invested substantial time, money, and effort in building up and developing consumer awareness, goodwill, and recognition in the Plaintiff's invention. As a result, reproductions associated with Plaintiff are recognized and exclusively associated by consumers, collectors, the public, and the trade as authorized by Plaintiff.

25. The success of the Plaintiff's invention is due in large part to Plaintiff's marketing, promotional, and distribution efforts.

26. As a result of Plaintiff's efforts, the quality of Plaintiff's products, the promotional efforts for Plaintiff's products and designs, press and media coverage, and social media coverage, members of the public have become familiar with the Plaintiff's invention and associate Plaintiff's invention exclusively with Plaintiff.

27. Plaintiff has made efforts to protect Plaintiff's interests in and to Plaintiff's invention. No one other than Plaintiff and Plaintiff's licensees are authorized to manufacture, import, export, advertise, create derivative works, offer for sale, or sell any goods embodying Plaintiff's invention without the express written permission of Plaintiff or Plaintiff's representative.

28. Plaintiff is engaged in the business of distributing a variety of products throughout the world, including within Pennsylvania. Plaintiff, either directly or indirectly, offers for sale and sells Plaintiff's products within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, including via the Internet on <https://www.amazon.com>. Defendants, through the advertising, offering for sale, and sale of infringing versions of Plaintiff's invention are directly and unfairly competing with

Plaintiff's economic interests in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and causing Plaintiff irreparable harm and damage within this jurisdiction.

29. Plaintiff suffers ongoing daily and sustained violations of Plaintiff's '892 patent at the hands of infringers such as Defendants who wrongfully offer for sale, reproduce, and infringe Plaintiff's patented invention. The natural and intended byproduct of Defendants' combined actions is the erosion and destruction of the goodwill associated with Plaintiff's name in Pennsylvania and brand and the destruction of the legitimate market sector in Pennsylvania in which Plaintiff operates. Defendants' marketing and sales of their infringing products in Pennsylvania directly and adversely affects Plaintiff's sales and profits in Pennsylvania.

#### **THE DEFENDANTS**

30. Defendants are individuals and business entities who, upon information and belief, reside in the People's Republic of China or other foreign jurisdictions or distribute goods from foreign jurisdictions. Defendants conduct business throughout the United States, including within Pennsylvania and in this judicial district, through the operation of the fully interactive commercial websites and online marketplaces operating under the Defendant Merchant Storefronts. Each Defendant targets the United States, including Pennsylvania, and has offered to sell and, on information and belief, has sold and continues to sell illegal reproductions of the Plaintiff's Works to consumers within the United States, including Pennsylvania and in this judicial district.

31. Defendants directly engage in infringing one or more of the claims of Plaintiff's '892 patent by advertising, offering for sale, and/or selling goods to consumers within Pennsylvania through e-commerce stores using, at least, the Defendant Merchant Storefronts, as well as additional ecommerce store or seller identification aliases not yet known to Plaintiff. Defendants have purposefully directed some portion of their unlawful activities toward consumers

in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania through the advertisement, offer to sell, sale, and/or shipment of infringing versions of patented invention into Pennsylvania.

32. Defendants are using Plaintiff's patented invention to drive Internet consumer traffic to their e-commerce stores operating under the Defendant Merchant Storefronts, thereby decreasing the size and value of Plaintiff's legitimate Pennsylvania marketplace and intellectual property rights.

### **THE DEFENDANTS' UNLAWFUL CONDUCT**

33. The success of the Plaintiff's patented invention has resulted in significant copying of the creative content protected by Plaintiff's '892 patent. Plaintiff has identified numerous fully interactive marketplace listings for infringement of one or more claims of Plaintiff's '892 patent on Amazon.

34. Upon information and belief, Defendants facilitate sales by designing the Defendant Merchant Storefronts so that they appear to unknowing consumers to be authorized online retailers, outlet stores, or wholesalers selling genuine versions of Plaintiff's patented invention.

35. The Defendant Merchant Storefronts intentionally conceal their identities and the full scope of their piracy operations in an effort to deter Plaintiff from learning Defendants' true identities and the exact interworking of Defendants' illegal operations. Through their operation of the Defendant Merchant Storefronts, Defendants are directly and personally contributing to, inducing, and engaging in the sale of Infringing Products as alleged, often times as partners, co-conspirators, and/or suppliers. Upon information and belief, Defendants are an interrelated group of infringers working in active concert to knowingly and willfully manufacture, import, distribute, offer for sale, and sell Infringing Products.

36. Upon information and belief, at all times relevant hereto, the Defendants in this action have had full knowledge of Plaintiff's ownership of the '892 patent, including Plaintiff's exclusive right to use and license such intellectual property and the goodwill associated therewith.

37. Infringers often go to great lengths to conceal their identities by often using multiple fictitious names and addresses to register and operate their massive network of Defendant Merchant Storefronts. Upon information and belief, Defendants regularly create new websites and online marketplace accounts on Amazon and other online marketplaces using the identities listed in Schedule A to the Complaint as well as other unknown fictitious names and addresses. Such Defendant Internet Store registration patterns are one of many common tactics used by the Defendants to conceal their identities and the full scope and interworking of their massive pirating operations and to avoid being shut down.

38. The Infringing Products for sale in the Defendant Merchant Storefronts bear similarities and indicia of being related to one another, suggesting that the Infringing Products were manufactured by and come from a common source and that, upon information and belief, Defendants are coordinating and working in concert to profit from Plaintiff's protected intellectual property.

39. In addition to operating under multiple fictitious names, Defendants in this case and defendants in other similar cases against online infringers use a variety of other common tactics to evade enforcement efforts. For example, infringers like Defendants will often register new online marketplace accounts under new aliases once they receive notice of a lawsuit. Infringers also typically ship products in small quantities via international mail to minimize detection by U.S. Customs and Border Protection. A 2021 U.S. Customs and Border Protection report on seizure

statistics indicated that e-commerce sales accounted for 13.3% of total retail sales with second quarter of 2021 retail e-commerce sales estimated at \$222.5 billion. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Intellectual Property Right Seizure Statistics*, FY 2021

([https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2022-Sep/202994%20-](https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2022-Sep/202994%20-%20FY%202021%20IPR%20Seizure%20Statistics%20BOOK.5%20-%20FINAL%20%28508%29.pdf)

[%20FY%202021%20IPR%20Seizure%20Statistics%20BOOK.5%20-](https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2022-Sep/202994%20-%20FY%202021%20IPR%20Seizure%20Statistics%20BOOK.5%20-%20FINAL%20%28508%29.pdf)

[%20FINAL%20%28508%29.pdf](https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2022-Sep/202994%20-%20FY%202021%20IPR%20Seizure%20Statistics%20BOOK.5%20-%20FINAL%20%28508%29.pdf)) at 23. A true and correct copy of CBP’s FY 2021 report is attached hereto as **Exhibit 3**. In FY 2021, there were 213 million express mail shipments and 94 million international mail shipments. *Id.* Nearly 90 percent of all intellectual property seizures occur in the international mail and express environments. *Id.* at 27. The “overwhelming volume of small packages also makes CBP’s ability to identify and interdict high risk packages difficult.” *Id.* at 23.

40. Further, Infringers such as Defendants typically operate multiple credit card merchant accounts and third-party accounts, such as PayPal, Inc. (“PayPal”) accounts, behind layers of payment gateways so that they can continue operation in spite of Plaintiff’s enforcement efforts. Upon information and belief, Defendants maintain offshore bank accounts and regularly move funds from their PayPal accounts to offshore bank accounts outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Indeed, analysis of PayPal transaction logs from previous similar cases indicates that offshore infringers regularly move funds from U.S.-based PayPal accounts to foreign-based bank accounts, such as China-based bank accounts, outside the jurisdiction of this Court.

## COUNT I

### DIRECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT

41. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in the above paragraphs of this Complaint.

42. Each Defendant has directly infringed, and continues to infringing, at least independent claim 1 of the '892 patent. (See Exhibit 4, claim charts comparing the text of Claim 1 of the '892 patent to each of the Infringing Products).

43. Defendants' Infringing Products are toys.

44. Defendants' Infringing Products comprise a platform defined by at least a surface, a first channel, and a second channel not rectilinearly parallel to the first channel, each of the first channel and the second channel including a first sidewall of a first protrusion extending from the surface and a second sidewall of a second protrusion extending from the surface, wherein optionally the first protrusion or the second protrusion of the first channel corresponds to one of the first protrusion or the second protrusion of the second channel.

45. Defendants' Infringing Products comprise a discrete flexible member being cylindrical along at least a partial length thereof and having a thickness such that a bulk of the discrete flexible member is releasably securable along the partial length thereof within the first channel or the second channel such that at least a portion of the discrete flexible member is curvilinear, wherein the discrete flexible member has a cross-sectional profile having a circumdiameter less than a length of the discrete flexible member.

46. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 287, Plaintiff has complied with the marking provisions of the Patent Act.

47. Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages adequate to compensate it for such infringement but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for Defendants' infringement of the '892 patent, together with interest and costs.

48. The patent application that matured into the '892 patent was published as U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 20250288918 on October 19, 2025.

49. Each Defendants had actual notice of U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 20250288918.

50. The claims of U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 20250288918 and the '892 patent are substantially identical.

51. The foregoing acts of infringement constitute a collective enterprise of shared, overlapping facts and have been willful, intentional, and in disregard of and with indifference to the rights of the Plaintiff.

52. As a result of each Defendant's infringement of Plaintiff's exclusive rights, Plaintiff is entitled to relief pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 284, including enhanced damages, and to Plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 285.

53. The conduct of each Defendant is causing and, unless enjoined and restrained by this Court, will continue to cause Plaintiff great and irreparable injury that cannot fully be compensated or measured in money. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 283, Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief prohibiting each Defendant from further infringing Plaintiff's '892 patent and specifically enjoining further importation, offer for sale, and sale of Infringing Products in the United States.

## **COUNT II**

### **CIVIL CONSPIRACY**

54. Plaintiff repeats and adopts and incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in the above paragraphs of this Complaint.

55. Plaintiff is informed and believes and therefore alleges upon information and belief that Defendants knowingly and voluntarily entered into a scheme and agreement to engage in a combination of unlawful acts and misconduct including, without limitation, a concerted and

collaborated effort to maintain the distribution, marketing, advertising, shipping, and sale of products that infringe at least one claim of Plaintiff's '892 patent.

56. The intent, purpose, and objective of the conspiracy and the underlying combination of unlawful acts and misconduct committed by the Defendants was to unfairly compete against Plaintiff and to profit from Plaintiff's intellectual property.

57. Each Defendant understood and accepted the foregoing scheme and agreed to do its respective part to further accomplish the foregoing intent, purpose, and objective. Thus, by entering into the conspiracy, each Defendant has deliberately, willfully, and maliciously permitted, encouraged, and induced all of the foregoing unlawful acts and misconduct.

58. As a direct and proximate cause of the unlawful acts and misconduct undertaken by each Defendant in furtherance of the conspiracy, Plaintiff has sustained, and unless each Defendant is restrained and enjoined, will continue to sustain severe, immediate, and irreparable harm, damage, and injury for which Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.

59. As a result of Defendants' actions alleged herein, Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief, an order granting Plaintiff's damages and disgorging Defendants' profits stemming from their false advertisements, and exemplary or punitive damages for Defendants' intentional misconduct.

### **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows:

1) That Defendants, their affiliates, officers, agents, employees, attorneys, and all persons acting for, with, by, through, under, or in active concert with them be temporarily, preliminarily, and permanently enjoined and restrained from:

- a. promoting, advertising, distributing, having manufactured, importing, offering for sale, and selling Defendants' Infringing Products; and
- b. using, linking to, transferring, selling, exercising control over, or otherwise owning the Defendant Merchant Storefronts, or any other online marketplace account that is being used to sell products or inventory not authorized by Plaintiff which infringe at least one claim of Plaintiff's '892 patent.

2) Entry of an Order that, upon Plaintiff's request, those in privity with Defendants and those with notice of the injunction, including any online marketplaces, social media platforms, Facebook, YouTube, LinkedIn, Twitter, internet search engines such as Google, Bing, and Yahoo, web hosts for the Defendant Merchant Storefronts, shall:

- a. disable and cease providing services for any accounts through which Defendants engage in the sale of products not authorized by Plaintiff which infringe at least one claim of Plaintiff's '892 patent, including any accounts associated with the Defendants listed on Schedule A;
- b. disable and cease displaying any advertisements used by or associated with Defendants in connection with the sale of products that infringe at least one claim of Plaintiff's '892 patent; and
- c. take all steps necessary to prevent links to the Defendant accounts identified on Schedule A from displaying in search results, including, but not limited to, removing links to the Defendant accounts from any search index;

3) For judgment in favor of Plaintiff against Defendants declaring that they have: a) willfully infringed Plaintiff's rights in the claims of the '892 patent; and b) otherwise injured the

business reputation and business of Plaintiff by Defendants' acts and conduct set forth in this Complaint;

4) For judgment in favor of Plaintiff against Defendants for actual damages and enhanced damages in an amount to be determined at trial, together with interests and costs as fixed by the Court;

5) That Plaintiff be awarded Plaintiff's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs;

6) That Plaintiff be awarded punitive damages; and

7) Award any and all other relief that this Court deems just and proper.

**DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

Plaintiff respectfully demands a trial by jury on all claims.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: December 16, 2025

/s/ Stanley D. Ference III

Stanley D. Ference III

Pa. ID No. 59899

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(412) 741-9292 – Facsimile

Attorneys for Plaintiff

**LIST OF EXHIBITS**

- Exhibit 1 Registration certificates for the Plaintiff's Works
- Exhibit 2 Department of Homeland Security, *Combating Trafficking in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods*, Jan. 24, 2020 (<https://www.dhs.gov/publication/combating-trafficking-counterfeit-and-pirated-goods>)
- Exhibit 3 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Intellectual Property Right Seizure Statistics*, FY 2021  
(<https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2022-Sep/202994%20-%20FY%202021%20IPR%20Seizure%20Statistics%20BOOK.5%20-%20FINAL%20%28508%29.pdf>)
- Exhibit 4 Claim Charts

**Schedule “A”**

**Defendants with Store Name and Seller ID**

**[This page is the subject of Plaintiff’s Motion to File Under Seal. As such, this page has been redacted in accordance with L.R. 5.4(b)(1)]**

# **EXHIBIT 1**



US012478892B2

(12) **United States Patent**  
**Murphy**

(10) **Patent No.:** **US 12,478,892 B2**  
(45) **Date of Patent:** **\*Nov. 25, 2025**

(54) **SENSORIAL ACTIVITY TOYS**

(71) Applicant: **Pushpeel LLC**, Albany, NY (US)

(72) Inventor: **Sayer Murphy**, East Aurora, NY (US)

(\*) Notice: Subject to any disclaimer, the term of this patent is extended or adjusted under 35 U.S.C. 154(b) by 0 days.

This patent is subject to a terminal disclaimer.

(21) Appl. No.: **18/947,172**

(22) Filed: **Nov. 14, 2024**

(65) **Prior Publication Data**

US 2025/0288918 A1 Sep. 18, 2025

**Related U.S. Application Data**

(63) Continuation of application No. 18/604,422, filed on Mar. 13, 2024.

(51) **Int. Cl.**  
**A63H 33/06** (2006.01)

(52) **U.S. Cl.**  
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USPC ..... 472/85, 120-122, 124-125, 127; 446/105, 107, 108, 111, 113, 116, 118, 446/119, 124, 127, 491  
See application file for complete search history.

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
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(57) **ABSTRACT**

A toy may include a platform including a surface, a channel defined by: the surface of the platform, a protrusion, including: a first protrusion segment extending from the surface of the platform, the first protrusion segment having a first distal edge segment disposed a protrusion distance from the surface of the platform; and a second protrusion segment extending from the surface of the platform, the second protrusion segment having a second distal edge segment, wherein the second distal edge segment is disposed the protrusion distance from the surface of the platform, wherein the platform and the protrusion are monolithic. A toy may include a removable member having a cross-sectional profile

(Continued)



having a circumdiameter larger than a separation distance between the first distal edge segment and the second distal edge segment such that the removable member is configured for insertion into the channel to form a snap fit therebetween.

### 23 Claims, 13 Drawing Sheets

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
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

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
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**FIG. 1A**

**FIG. 1B****FIG. 1C**

**FIG. 1D**








**FIG. 1E**





**FIG. 3**


**FIG. 4**

**FIG. 5**

**FIG. 6**

**FIG. 7**

**FIG. 8**

**FIG. 9**




**FIG. 10**

## 1

## SENSORIAL ACTIVITY TOYS

## CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 18/604,422, filed on Mar. 13, 2024, the entire disclosure of which is hereby incorporated by reference.

## BACKGROUND

Toy products may include fidget toys, brain teasers, parental aids, activity boards, puzzles, stress relievers, and fine motor skill development tools. Novel toys aim to address diverse needs within a single, comprehensive solution, catering to both children and adults alike. Such toy products may perform functions related both to play, to development, to enhance focus, and more.

## SUMMARY

This Summary is intended to introduce, in an abbreviated form, various topics to be elaborated upon below in the Detailed Description. This Summary is not intended to identify key or essential aspects of the claimed invention. This Summary is similarly not intended for use as an aid in determining the scope of the claims.

In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a toy, including: a platform including a surface and extending therefrom a first protrusion including a first sidewall and a second protrusion including a second sidewall; and a flexible slender removable member having a thickness such that the flexible slender removable member is disposable at least partially within a channel formed by the surface, the first sidewall, and the second sidewall.

In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a toy, wherein a first channel width between the first sidewall and the second sidewall is larger than a second channel width between the first sidewall and the second sidewall, and wherein the second channel width is further from the surface than the first channel width.

In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a toy, wherein the flexible slender removable member has a cross-sectional profile having a circumdiameter larger than the second channel width such that the flexible slender removable member is configured for insertion into the channel to form a snap fit therebetween.

In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a toy, wherein the cross-sectional profile is elliptical, circular, or polygonal.

In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a toy, wherein the first sidewall is concave with respect to the first protrusion and the second sidewall is concave with respect to the second protrusion.

In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a toy, wherein the first sidewall is at least partially arcuate and the second sidewall is at least partially arcuate.

In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a toy, wherein the surface is planar.

In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a toy, wherein the surface is cylindrical.

In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a toy, wherein the surface is polyhedral or spherical.

In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a toy, wherein the first sidewall is axially symmetric about a longitudinal axis of the first protrusion.

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In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a toy, further including a rigid back plate having the platform disposed thereon.

In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a toy, wherein the platform includes an interconnect configured to connect the platform with a further platform of a further toy.

In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a toy, wherein the interconnect is further configured to connect the platform with the further platform such that the flexible slender removable member is disposable simultaneously within the channel and a further channel of the further toy.

In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a toy, wherein the interconnect includes an interlocking geometric feature of the platform.

In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a toy, wherein the interconnect includes a tether.

In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a toy, wherein the flexible slender removable member includes silicone.

In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a toy, wherein the platform is prismatic.

In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a toy, wherein the platform includes an opening to a cavity defined by the platform.

In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a toy, further including a cap configured to attach to the platform to close the opening.

In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a toy, including: a platform including a surface and extending therefrom a first protrusion including a first sidewall and a second protrusion including a second sidewall, wherein a first channel width between the first sidewall and the second sidewall is larger than a second channel width between the first sidewall and the second sidewall, and wherein the second channel width is further from the surface than the first channel width; and a flexible slender removable member having a thickness such that the flexible slender removable member is disposable at least partially within a channel formed by the surface, the first sidewall, and the second sidewall, wherein the flexible slender removable member has a cross-sectional profile having a circumdiameter larger than the second channel width such that the flexible slender removable member is configured for insertion into the channel to form a snap fit therebetween.

## BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES

For a fuller understanding of the nature and objects of the disclosure, reference should be made to the following detailed description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which:

FIG. 1A illustrates a toy, according to one or more implementations herein.

FIG. 1B illustrates an isometric view of a detailed section of a toy, according to one or more implementations herein.

FIG. 1C illustrates a side view of a detailed section of a toy, according to one or more implementations herein.

FIG. 1D illustrates a further isometric view of a toy, according to one or more implementations herein.

FIG. 1E illustrates a group of interlocking toys, according to one or more implementations herein.

FIG. 2 illustrates various examples of removable members, according to one or more implementations herein.

FIG. 3 illustrates a toy having removable members attached thereto, according to one or more implementations herein.

FIG. 4 illustrates a toy having elastic removable members, according to one or more implementations herein.

FIG. 5 illustrates a toy having a cylindrically shaped platform, according to one or more implementations herein.

FIG. 6 illustrates a toy having a spherically shaped platform, according to one or more implementations herein.

FIG. 7 illustrates a toy having a polyhedron-shaped platform, according to one or more implementations herein.

FIG. 8 illustrates various example channel path designs, which may be overlaid on varying platforms to define channels, according to one or more implementations herein.

FIG. 9 is a flowchart of an example method for using a toy, according to one or more implementations herein.

FIG. 10 illustrates an example of two platforms tethered together, according to one or more implementations herein.

### DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Implementations disclosed herein include sensorial activity toys and methods of using the same, which provide a tactile activities to children and adult users. Such sensorial activity toys may be quiet, easy to transport, and provide for creative engagement of the user's motor skills.

Implementations may offer users a holistic experience, engaging their senses through tactile, and visual stimuli while simultaneously challenging cognitive abilities and promoting relaxation. The intricate design of such toys incorporates diverse textures, shapes, and resistance, providing a comprehensive platform for skill enhancement and sensory exploration.

A conventional fidget toy, such as a spinner or a popping toy, operates by providing a physical outlet for restless energy or nervous tension through repetitive movements or tactile sensations, typically in the form of small handheld objects. By offering a means to engage one's hands and senses, a fidget toy addresses the need for sensory stimulation and cognitive focus, aiding individuals in managing stress, improving concentration, and enhancing fine motor skills. Fidget toys like spinners or popits often produce clicking, popping, or snapping sounds that can disrupt those nearby. Furthermore, their repetitive nature and lack of creative opportunity may lead to diminished appeal over time, limiting their entertainment value and longevity for users seeking more engaging activities.

Conventional puzzles offer mental stimulation, problem-solving challenges, and a sense of accomplishment upon completion. They engage individuals of all ages in critical thinking, spatial reasoning, and cognitive development, fostering patience and perseverance. However, conventional puzzles may lack versatility in accommodating various skill levels and interests, potentially leading to boredom or frustration for users seeking more dynamic or customizable experiences. Furthermore, puzzles lack a tactile reward experience, limiting engagement for users seeking more hands-on or multisensory stimulation.

Such conventional toys do not include a product that seamlessly integrates these disparate functionalities into a single, cohesive product, this new hybrid toy category represents a significant advancement in the field of play therapy, parental assistance, developmental aid, and recreational activities.

Implementations disclosed herein include sensorial activity toys and methods of using the same. Such sensorial activity toys may include a platform and protrusions defining one or more channels.

From the user's perspective, implementations may provide various advantages over conventional products. Implementations may provide a mesmerizing Autonomous Sensory Meridian Response (ASMR) quality, engaging the senses with visual and tactile sensations. Completing the toy by properly seating each removable element may offer a user a profound sense of achievement, bolstering confidence and encouraging further exploration. Implementations may foster problem-solving skills and intellectual stimulation through an intricate puzzle-like challenge, promoting cognitive development and critical thinking abilities.

Implementations may further aid in concentration and patience, serving as a calming outlet for stress relief while simultaneously developing spatial reasoning and fine motor skills. Implementations may offer a constructive outlet for restless energy and sparks creativity through interactive play. Implementations may provide a valuable reprieve by engaging their children's attention in a quiet, non-messy, safe, and non-distracting activity, offering moments of tranquility whether out to eat, in a waiting room, in a car/plane or at home.

FIG. 1A illustrates a toy **100**, according to one or more implementations herein. The toy **100** may provide users of various ages and developmental statuses with a safe, quiet, stimulating, and engaging activity.

The toy **100** may include a platform **110** and one or more protrusions **120**, which may alternatively be referred to herein as the protrusions **120** or be collectively referred to as the protrusion **120**.

One or more protrusions **120** may extend from the platform **110**, for example, perpendicular to the platform. The protrusions and the platform may be monolithic.

In some implementations, the platform **110** and the protrusions **120** may not be monolithic. In this instance one protrusion **120** or neither may be monolithic with the platform **110** in either a rigid or deformable material. While the other protrusion **120** may be co-molded, overmolded or assembled to the platform **110** in either a similar or dissimilar, rigid, or deformable material. This partial or non-monolithic variation may offer a decorative or utilitarian purpose. A decorative purpose would include but not limited to color variation between protrusions **120** and platform **110**, whereas the utilitarian purpose could be, but not limited to, dissimilar protrusion **120** material providing the deformable property to accept the removable elements, and the platform **110** providing the rigidity, eliminating the need for an additional rigid back plate.

The protrusions **120** and the platform **110** may define one or more channels **122**. Each channel **122** may be defined by the platform **110** and the protrusion **120**, each protrusion having a distal edge including a distal edge segment. Each protrusion **120** may extend a protrusion distance from the surface of the platform **110**.

For example, a portion of the channel **122** may be defined by a first protrusion **120** and a second protrusion **120**, or between segments of a single protrusion **120**. The first protrusion **120** may have a first distal edge segment and the second protrusion **120** may have a second distal edge segment.

The first distal edge segment and the second distal edge segment may be separated by varying distances over their protrusion elevation from the platform **110** to enable a snap fit with a removable member. As such, the first distal edge

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segment and the second distal edge segment may be separated by a separation distance. The separation distance may include a reference to a distance between the two closest points, or a local minimum, separation distance between the first distal edge segment and the second distal edge segment). This separation distance may be less than a circum-

diameter of a cross-sectional profile of the removable member. In some implementations, the first distal edge segment and the second distal edge segment are parallel. In some implementations, the first distal edge segment and the second distal edge segment are concentric. It will be understood that some segments of the first distal edge and second distal edge may be parallel, and others may be concentric or otherwise follow a path such that each edge is substantially equidistant from the path.

One or more channels **122**, delineated by the platform **110** and protrusions **120**, may be arranged in diverse patterns to accommodate numerous elastic, plastic, or rigid removable elements. Users may place removable elements directly within the specified channels or adopt a more imaginative approach by looping, bridging, or traversing over the channels along alternative dimensional axes not prescribed by the channels **122** themselves.

The channels **122** may be configured such that the distance between the distal edges of the protrusions is smaller than the circumdiameter of a cross-sectional profile of the removable member. In this arrangement, either the platform **110**, the protrusions **120**, or the removable member can deform, resulting in a slight transitory resistance during the seating process of the removable element. This feature demands an appropriate level of attention and motor skills from the user, instilling confidence in the secure positional alignment of the slender elements with the platform, while offering the user a satisfying sensorial experience with a fidget like play quality. In some implementations, the sensorial activity toy **100** may further include a rigid back plate **130**.

The platform **110** may have a surface. The surface may be, for example, planar, cylindrical, cubic, spherical, or of another shape based on the geometry of the platform.

In some implementations, the platform **110** may have a planar surface terminated in varying shapes, including various polygons, non-polygons, irregular shapes, branded shapes, or themed shapes. This planar surface may thus be placed on various working surfaces. It will also be understood that the toy **100** can be of varying sizes, ranging from a size operable by a single user up to sizes providing for the interaction of multiple users.

FIG. 1B illustrates an isometric view of a detailed section **100A** of a toy, according to one or more implementations herein. The detailed section **100A** of the toy may illustrate the definition of the channel **122** by the platform **110** and the protrusion(s) **120**.

FIG. 1C illustrates a side view of a detailed section **100A** of a toy, according to one or more implementations herein. The detailed section **100A** of the toy may further illustrate the definition of the channel **122** by the platform **110** and the protrusion(s) **120**.

FIG. 1D illustrates a further isometric view of the toy **100**, according to one or more implementations herein. FIG. 1D illustrates implementations including a rigid back plate **130**. The platform **110** may be disposed on the rigid back plate **130**. For example, the platform **110** and protrusions **120** may be a flexible material (e.g., silicone) while the rigid back plate **130** may be a rigid or semi-rigid material (e.g., a rigid polymer or a semi-rigid polymer). In this way, the platform

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**110** and protrusions **120** may be monolithic such that the protrusions **120** are able to elastically deform, while the platform **110** is prevented from flexing due to its attachment to the rigid back plate **130**. The rigid back plate **130** may thus enable the toy to be placed on an uneven or non-rigid surface while the platform maintains shape, thus preventing the removable members from unintentionally unseating.

FIG. 1E illustrates a group of interlocking toys **150A** and **150B**, according to one or more implementations herein. Each of the interlocking toys **150A** and **150B** may share some or all of the aspects of toy **100** as described herein. In some implementations, multiple planar platforms of the interlocking toys **150A** and **150B** can be planarly placed adjacent each other, either freely or through a connecting feature. This may expand the field of play and offers another level of interest.

FIG. 2 illustrates various examples of removable members, according to one or more implementations herein.

A sensorial activity toy may include at least one removable member. The removable member may have a cross-sectional profile. The cross-sectional profile may be, for example, elliptical (e.g., circular, or non-circular) or polygonal (e.g., triangular, rectangular, square, pentagonal, hexagonal, octagonal, another number of sides greater than three, or an irregular polygon). The cross-sectional profile may be understood to have a circumdiameter, which is the diameter of the circle circumscribing the cross-sectional profile.

An example removable member **210** may have a circular profile. An example removable member **220** may have a square profile. An example removable member **230** may have an elliptical profile. An example removable member **240** may have a pentagonal profile. An example removable member **250** may have a diamond profile. An example removable member **260** may have a triangular profile. An example removable member **270** may have a rectangular profile. An example removable member **280** may have an oval profile. An example removable member **290** may have an irregular profile. References herein made to the removable member **210** may be understood to include alternatively the removable members **220**, **230**, **240**, **250**, **260**, **270**, **280**, **290**, and other shapes of removable members as will be readily understood.

The circumdiameter of the cross-sectional profile of the removable member **210** may be such that, when the removable member **210** is inserted into the channel (e.g., the channel **122**), a fit is established between the portion of the removable member **210** within the channel and the channel walls (e.g., the platform **110** and protrusions **120**). The fit may be, for example, a clearance fit, a transition fit, or an interference fit. Removable members may be of varying lengths, groups of lengths, or the same lengths.

In some implementations of the protrusions the circumdiameter of the cross-sectional profile of the removable member **210** may be such that, when the removable member **210** is inserted into the channel, an interference fit, dependent on deformation of either the removable member **210**, platform, or channel, is maintained by the channel defined by the protrusion spacing being consistently smaller than the circumdiameter of the removable member **210** along the entire length of the protrusion distance. Unlike a snap fit where resistance required to seat the removable member **210** passes through an interference fit before the resistance dissipates. In an interference fit, the resistance required to seat the removable member **210** remains constant, increases

(assuming friction holds it seated) or reduces without completely dissipating as it translates through or is inserted into a channel.

In some implementations, the removable member **210** is slender and deformable. In such implementations, the removable member **210** can be elastically deformed to conform to the shape defined by the channel and held in place by a snap or interference fit. Once the removable member **210** is removed it may return to its original shape.

In some implementations, the removable member **210** is laterally plastically deformable. In such implementations, the removable member **210** can be plastically deformed to conform to the shape defined by the channel and held in place by a snap or interference fit. Once the removable member **210** is removed it may maintain its assumed shape until further manipulation.

In some implementations, the removable member **210** can be deformed either plastically or elastically localized outside of the channel to form loops, bridge, or other shapes supported on either side by the channel or terminated outside a channel. A twist in the removable member **210** may be maintained, for example, by the interference between the removable member **210** and the channels to deform the member into a loop.

In some implementations, the removable member **210** includes a rigid rod. In some implementations, the removable member may be rigid (e.g., non-deformable) and the snap or interference fit may be imparted by, for example deformable protrusions and or platform. The channel's shape, as defined by the protrusions, may either directly correspond to the rigid removable member **210** or would elastically or plastically deform for the removable member **210** to be securely seated.

In some implementations, the platform and protrusions are monolithic and rigid. The removable member **210** may be elastically or plastically deformable and could assume the shape of various rigidly defined channels.

In some implementations, the cross-sectional profile of the removable member **210** may change over the length of the removable member **210**. For example, the cross-sectional profile may be elliptical or circular over one segment, polygonal in another, and transition therebetween.

FIG. 3 illustrates a toy **300** having removable members **330** attached thereto, according to one or more implementations herein.

The circumdiameter of the cross-sectional profile of the removable member **330** may be such that, when the removable member **330** is inserted into the channel (e.g., between segments **320a** and **320b** of a protrusion and the platform **310**), a fit is established between the portion of the removable member **330** within the channel and the channel wall (e.g., the platform **310** and protrusion segments **320a** and **320b**). The fit may be, for example, a clearance fit, a transition fit, or an interference fit.

In some implementations, the circumdiameter of the cross-sectional profile of the removable member **330** may be such that, when the removable member **330** is inserted into the channel, an interference fit, dependent on deformation of either the removable member **330**, platform **310**, or channel, is maintained by the channel defined by the protrusion spacing (e.g., the spacing between the distal edges of segments **320a** and **320b**) being consistently smaller than the circumdiameter of the removable member **330** along the entire length of the protrusion distance. Unlike a snap fit where resistance required to seat the removable member **330** passes through an interference fit before the resistance dissipates. In an interference fit, the resistance required to

seat the removable member **330** remains constant, increases (assuming friction holds it seated), or reduces without completely dissipating as it translates through or is inserted into a channel.

FIG. 4 illustrates a toy **400** having elastic removable members **430**, according to one or more implementations herein. The removable members **430**, being elastic, may provide for an additional dimension of play using the toy **400**. In such implementations, the removable member **430** can be deformed either plastically or elastically localized outside of a channel **422** to form loops, bridge, or other shapes supported on either side by the channel **422** or terminated outside a channel **422**. A twist in the removable member **430** may be maintained, for example, by the interference between the removable member **430** and the channels **422** to deform the member into a loop.

In use, the removable member **430** may be inserted and removed from a channel **422** of the toy **400**. The user may be provided a single or multitude of removable members **430**, similar or dissimilar (e.g., various lengths, or colors). The variations may be strategically or randomly determined. The removable members **430** may be securely placed in the channels **422** of the platform **410** with creative focus, as an outlet for restless energy, or with the goal to fill every channel. The intentional resistance when seated may offer a user a satisfying tactile experience.

Unlike a puzzle where each element's orientation is predetermined, and unlike a doodle board with a blank slate, implementations may provide a balance between customization and guided play.

The act of inserting a member with precision and intentionality may be juxtaposed to the act of removing or peeling away the removable member. The removal process may in some implementations require little fine motor skill, or accuracy, for example, a gentle controlled pull separates the member from the platform in what, for some users may be an experience just as relevant to the play value as the insertion.

FIG. 5 illustrates a toy **500** having a cylindrically shaped platform **510**, according to one or more implementations herein. As such, the platform **510** may have a cylindrical surface, accompanied by corresponding protrusions **520** defining channels **522** that may fully wrap around the centralized axis in a loop. In some implementations, multiple cylindrical platforms **510** could be axially stacked or snapped together to scale the play value.

In some implementations, the removable members can be stored within a hollowed volume defined by a cavity **540** corresponding to the platform surface (e.g., inside a spherical, polyhedron, cylindrical platform). The cavity **540** may be accessible by an opening **542** to the cavity **540**. Storage of removable members within such a hollowed volume may utilize an access point. The access point may be left open, covered with a removable lid, or a lid connected with a living hinge. The lid may have protrusions on the exterior to define channels or be left without protrusions.

FIG. 6 illustrates a toy **600** having a spherically shaped platform **610**, according to one or more implementations herein. As such, the platform **610** may have a spherical surface, accompanied by corresponding protrusions **620** defining channels **622**, for example, to allow the user to rotate the object exposing more channels without a defined start, stop, top or bottom.

FIG. 7 illustrates a toy **700** having a polyhedron-shaped platform **710**, according to one or more implementations herein. As such, the platform **710** may have surfaces defining a polyhedron (e.g., tetrahedron, cubic, octahedron,

another number of planar surfaces greater than four, or an irregular polyhedron) and protrusions 720 extending therefrom defining channels 722. The central space within the three-dimensional (e.g., spherical, cylindrical, prismatic, etc.) platform may be hollow (e.g., a cavity similar to the cavity 540) to provide for storage of removable members or other elements. In such an implementation, a side of the polyhedron-shaped platform 710 may include a cap 712. The cap 712 may be configured to attach to the platform 710 to close an opening of the platform 710.

In other implementations, the platform's surface could have alternative three-dimensional shape that either defines a solid volume (e.g., capsule, toroidal, ellipsoid, kidney shape) or an irregular curved surface (e.g., hyperbolic paraboloid, Möbius strip, gyroid). For example, one of the sides of the platform may be openable or removable to access storage space inside.

In some implementations, the platform includes an interconnect configured to connect with a further platform of a further toy. Various platform shapes can be interconnected to expand channels and increase play optionality. The connection between platforms may be, for example, through an interlocking puzzle geometry, snap fit feature, or tether. For example, the platforms may be connected with a snap fit or interference fit feature. In one implementation, the platforms may be connected with one or multiple tether connectors. The tethers may be distinct tethers for the purpose of interconnecting platforms or in another implementation the removable member doubles as platform tethers.

FIG. 8 illustrates various example channel path designs, which may be overlaid on varying platforms to define channels, according to one or more implementations herein. An example channel path design 810 may include straight channels. An example channel path design 820 may include skewed channels. An example channel path design 830 may include circular channels. An example channel path design 840 may include cross-hatched channels. An example channel path design 850 may include wave channels. An example channel path design 860 may include spiral channels. An example channel path design 870 may include polygonal channels. An example channel path design 880 may include variously designed channels. For example, a channel path design may include channels designed to follow paths resembling various shapes and objects (e.g., owls, robots, branded shapes).

FIG. 9 is a flowchart of an example method 900 for using a toy, according to one or more implementations herein. In some implementations, one or more operations may be performed using a toy as described in one or more of FIGS. 1A-8. In some implementations, one or more operations may be performed by another device or system, or group of devices or systems separate from or including these. Additionally, or alternatively other devices, components, or systems, may be employed to perform the operations.

At step 902, a toy may be provided. The toy may comprise: a platform including a surface, a channel defined by: the surface of the platform, a protrusion, including: a first protrusion segment extending from the surface of the platform, the first protrusion segment having a first distal edge segment disposed a protrusion distance from the surface of the platform; and a second protrusion segment extending from the surface of the platform, the second protrusion segment having a second distal edge segment, wherein the second distal edge segment is disposed the protrusion distance from the surface of the platform, wherein the platform, the first protrusion, and the second protrusion are monolithic; and a removable member having a cross-sectional

profile having a circumdiameter larger than a separation distance between the first distal edge segment and the second distal edge segment such that the removable member is configured for insertion into the channel to form a snap fit therebetween.

At step 904, the removable member may be inserted into the channel to form the snap fit therebetween.

At step 906, the removable member may then be removed (e.g., extracted) from the channel.

Although FIG. 9 depicts example method 900 and operations thereof, in some implementations, a method illustrated herein may include additional operations, fewer operations, differently arranged operations, or different operations than the operations depicted in FIG. 9. Moreover, or in the alternative, two or more of the operations depicted in FIG. 9 may be performed at least partially in parallel.

FIG. 10 illustrates an example of two platforms 1010 and 1020 tethered together, according to one or more implementations herein. The platforms 1010 and 1020 may be connected by one or more tethers, for example, tethers 1032 and 1034, which may be distinct from the flexible slender removable members for the purpose of interconnecting platforms.

The invention is limited only by the appended claims. Variations, characteristics, advantages, implementations, constructions, arrangements, terminology, materials, dimensions, embodiments, illustrations, depictions, and examples composing the above description and accompanying drawings show some possible implementations of the invention without limiting the invention. It is not necessary that every implementation of the invention achieve or possess every advantage, purpose, or characteristic identified herein, and as such, one skilled in the art may effect various additions, changes, modifications, or omissions without departing from the scope or spirit of the invention or its legal equivalents.

All ranges are inclusive of the stated limits, the orders of magnitude thereof, and all values and ranges substantially therebetween unless otherwise defined. Unless otherwise stated, every use of "and" forms an inclusive list comprising at least the conjoined elements, and every use of "or" forms an inclusive list comprising at least one element of conjoined elements. Unless otherwise stated, singular usage (e.g., 'a', 'an', or 'the') includes plurals of the same.

The order of recitations in a claim do not imply a temporal or ordered relationship unless unavoidable by the plain language of that claim. No claim may be interpreted to invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) unless that claim recites "means for" or "step for."

I claim:

1. A toy, comprising:

a platform defined by at least a surface, a first channel, and a second channel not rectilinearly parallel to the first channel, each of the first channel and the second channel including a first sidewall of a first protrusion extending from the surface and a second sidewall of a second protrusion extending from the surface, wherein optionally the first protrusion or the second protrusion of the first channel corresponds to one of the first protrusion or the second protrusion of the second channel; and

a discrete flexible member being cylindrical along at least a partial length thereof and having a thickness such that a bulk of the discrete flexible member is releasably securable along the partial length thereof within the first channel or the second channel such that at least a portion of the discrete flexible member is curvilinear, wherein the discrete flexible member has a cross-

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sectional profile having a circumdiameter less than a length of the discrete flexible member.

2. The toy of claim 1, wherein a first channel width between the first sidewall and the second sidewall is larger than a second channel width between the first sidewall and the second sidewall, and wherein the second channel width is further from the surface than the first channel width.

3. The toy of claim 2, wherein the discrete flexible member has a cross-sectional profile having a circumdiameter larger than the second channel width such that the discrete flexible member is configured for insertion into the first channel or the second channel to form a snap fit therebetween.

4. The toy of claim 1, wherein the first sidewall is concave with respect to the first protrusion and the second sidewall is concave with respect to the second protrusion.

5. The toy of claim 1, wherein the first sidewall is at least partially arcuate and the second sidewall is at least partially arcuate.

6. The toy of claim 1, wherein the surface is planar.

7. The toy of claim 1, wherein the surface is cylindrical.

8. The toy of claim 1, wherein the surface is polyhedral or spherical.

9. The toy of claim 1, wherein the first sidewall is axially symmetric about a longitudinal axis of the first protrusion.

10. The toy of claim 1, further comprising a rigid back plate having the platform disposed thereon.

11. The toy of claim 1, wherein the platform includes an interconnect configured to connect the platform with a further platform of a further toy.

12. The toy of claim 11, wherein the interconnect is further configured to connect the platform with the further platform such that the discrete flexible member is disposable simultaneously within the first channel and a further channel of the further toy.

13. The toy of claim 11, wherein the interconnect comprises an interlocking geometric feature of the platform.

14. The toy of claim 11, wherein the interconnect comprises a tether.

15. The toy of claim 1, wherein the discrete flexible member comprises silicone.

16. The toy of claim 1, wherein the platform is polyhedron-shaped.

17. The toy of claim 16, wherein the platform includes an opening to a cavity defined by the platform.

18. The toy of claim 17, further comprising a cap configured to attach to the platform to close the opening.

19. The toy of claim 1, wherein a ratio of the circumdiameter to the length is less than 0.1.

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20. A toy, comprising:

a platform defined by at least a surface, a first channel, and a second channel not rectilinearly parallel to the first channel, each of the first channel and the second channel including a first sidewall of a first protrusion extending from the surface and a second sidewall of a second protrusion extending from the surface, wherein optionally the first protrusion or the second protrusion of the first channel corresponds to one of the first protrusion or the second protrusion of the second channel, wherein a first channel width between the first sidewall and the second sidewall is larger than a second channel width between the first sidewall and the second sidewall, and wherein the second channel width is further from the surface than the first channel width; and

a discrete flexible member being cylindrical along at least a partial length thereof and having a thickness such that a bulk of the discrete flexible member is releasably securable along the partial length thereof within the first channel or the second channel such that at least a portion of the discrete flexible member is curvilinear, wherein the discrete flexible member has a cross-sectional profile having a circumdiameter larger than the second channel width such that the discrete flexible member is configured for insertion into the first channel or the second channel to form a snap fit therebetween, and wherein the circumdiameter is less than a length of the discrete flexible member.

21. A toy, comprising:

a platform defined by at least a surface, a first channel, and a second channel, each of the first channel and the second channel being serpentine and including a first sidewall of a first protrusion extending from the surface and a second sidewall of a second protrusion extending from the surface, wherein optionally the first protrusion or the second protrusion of the first channel corresponds to one of the first protrusion or the second protrusion of the second channel; and

a discrete flexible member being cylindrical along at least a partial length thereof and having a thickness such that a bulk of the discrete flexible member is releasably securable along the partial length thereof within the first channel or the second channel.

22. The toy of claim 21, wherein the discrete flexible member has a cross-sectional profile having a circumdiameter less than a length of the discrete flexible member.

23. The toy of claim 22, wherein a ratio of the circumdiameter to the length is less than 0.1.

\* \* \* \* \*

# **EXHIBIT 2**



# Combating Trafficking in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods

Report to the President of the United States

*January 24, 2020*



Homeland  
Security

*Office of Strategy, Policy & Plans*

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## Foreword/Message from the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security

The rapid growth of e-commerce has revolutionized the way goods are bought and sold, allowing for counterfeit and pirated goods to flood our borders and penetrate our communities and homes. Illicit goods trafficked to American consumers by e-commerce platforms and online third-party marketplaces threaten public health and safety, as well as national security. This illicit activity impacts American innovation and erodes the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturers and workers.

Consumers must be confident in the safety, quality, and authenticity of the products they purchase online. DHS is committed to combating counterfeiters and pirates with the help of our U.S. Government partners and private sector stakeholders - who are critical to helping secure supply chains to stem the tide of counterfeit and pirated goods.



“Combating Trafficking in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods,” has been prepared by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans. The report uses available data, substantial public input, and other information to develop a deeper understanding of how e-commerce platforms, online third-party marketplaces, and other third-party intermediaries facilitate the importation and sale of massive amounts of counterfeit and pirated goods. The report identifies appropriate administrative, statutory, regulatory, and other actions, including enhanced enforcement measures, modernization of legal and liability frameworks, and best practices for private sector stakeholders. These strong actions can be implemented swiftly to substantially reduce trafficking in counterfeit and pirated goods while promoting a safer America.

This report was prepared pursuant to President Donald J. Trump’s April 3, 2019, *Memorandum on Combating Trafficking in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods*. The President’s historic memorandum provides a much warranted and long overdue call to action in the U.S. Government’s fight against a massive form of illicit trade that is inflicting significant harm on American consumers and businesses. This illicit trade must be stopped in its tracks.

This report was prepared in coordination with the Secretaries of Commerce and State, the Attorney General, the Office of Management and Budget, the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, the United States Trade Representative, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Assistant to the President for Trade and Manufacturing Policy, and with other partners in the U.S. Government. The report also benefitted from extensive engagement with the private sector.

Sincerely,

Chad Wolf  
Acting Secretary,  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

# 1. Executive Summary

The President's April 3, 2019, *Memorandum on Combating Trafficking in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods* calls prompt attention to illicit trade that erodes U.S. economic competitiveness and catalyzes compounding threats to national security and public safety.

Counterfeiting is no longer confined to street-corners and flea markets. The problem has intensified to staggering levels, as shown by a recent Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report, which details a 154 percent increase in counterfeits traded internationally — from \$200 billion in 2005 to \$509 billion in 2016. Similar information collected by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) between 2000 and 2018 shows that seizures of infringing goods at U.S. borders have increased 10-fold, from 3,244 seizures per year to 33,810.

Relevant to the President's inquiry into the linkages between e-commerce and counterfeiting, OECD reports that "E-commerce platforms represent ideal storefronts for counterfeits and provide powerful platform[s] for counterfeiters and pirates to engage large numbers of potential consumers."<sup>1</sup> Similarly, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that e-commerce has contributed to a shift in the sale of counterfeit goods in the United States, with consumers increasingly purchasing goods online and counterfeiters producing a wider variety of goods that may be sold on websites alongside authentic products.

Respondents to the July 10, 2019, Federal Register Notice issued by the Department of Commerce echoed these observations.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps most notably, the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition (IACC) reports that the trafficking of counterfeit and pirated goods in e-commerce is a top priority for every sector of its membership — comprised of more than 200 corporations, including many of the world's best-known brands in the apparel, automotive, electronics, entertainment, luxury goods, pharmaceutical, personal care and software sectors. The IACC submission goes on to say:

*Across every sector of the IACC's membership, the need to address the trafficking of counterfeit and pirated goods in e-commerce has been cited as a top priority. The vast amounts of resources our members must dedicate to ensuring the safety and vitality of the online marketplace, bears out the truth of the issue highlighted by Peter Navarro, Assistant to the President for Trade and Manufacturing Policy, in his April 3, 2019 Op-Ed piece in The Wall Street Journal - that the sale of counterfeit brand-name goods presents a pervasive and ever-growing threat in the online space. One IACC member reported making*

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<sup>1</sup> OECD (2018), *Governance Frameworks to Counter Illicit Trade*, Illicit Trade, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264291652-en>.

<sup>2</sup> Under Federal Register Notice (84 FR 32861), the Department of Commerce sought "comments from intellectual property rights holders, online third-party marketplaces and other third-party intermediaries, and other private-sector stakeholders on the state of counterfeit and pirated goods trafficking through online third-party marketplaces and recommendations for curbing the trafficking in such counterfeit and pirated goods."

*hundreds of investigative online test purchases over the past year, with a nearly 80% successfully resulting in the receipt of a counterfeit item.<sup>3</sup>*

The scale of counterfeit activity online is evidenced as well by the significant efforts e-commerce platforms themselves have had to undertake. A major e-commerce platform reports that its proactive efforts prevented over 1 million suspected bad actors from publishing a single product for sale through its platform and blocked over 3 billion suspected counterfeit listings from being published to their marketplace. Despite efforts such as these, private sector actions have not been sufficient to prevent the importation and sale of a wide variety and large volume of counterfeit and pirated goods to the American public.

The projected growth of e-commerce fuels mounting fears that the scale of the problem will only increase, especially under a business-as-usual scenario. Consequently, an effective and meaningful response to the President's memorandum is a matter of national import.

### **Actions to be Taken by DHS and the U.S. Government**

Despite public and private efforts to-date, the online availability of counterfeit and pirated goods continues to increase. Strong government action is necessary to fundamentally realign incentive structures and thereby encourage the private sector to increase self-policing efforts and focus more innovation and expertise on this vital problem. Therefore, DHS will immediately undertake the following actions and make recommendations for other departments and agencies to combat the trafficking of counterfeit and pirated goods.

| <b><i>Immediate Actions by DHS and Recommendations for the U.S. Government</i></b>            |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>1. Ensure Entities with Financial Interests in Imports Bear Responsibility</b>             |
| <b>2. Increase Scrutiny of Section 321 Environment</b>                                        |
| <b>3. Suspend and Debar Repeat Offenders; Act Against Non-Compliant International Posts</b>   |
| <b>4. Apply Civil Fines, Penalties and Injunctive Actions for Violative Imported Products</b> |
| <b>5. Leverage Advance Electronic Data for Mail Mode</b>                                      |
| <b>6. Anti-Counterfeiting Consortium to Identify Online Nefarious Actors (ACTION) Plan</b>    |
| <b>7. Analyze Enforcement Resources</b>                                                       |
| <b>8. Create Modernized E-Commerce Enforcement Framework</b>                                  |
| <b>9. Assess Contributory Trademark Infringement Liability for Platforms</b>                  |
| <b>10. Re-Examine the Legal Framework Surrounding Non-Resident Importers</b>                  |
| <b>11. Establish a National Consumer Awareness Campaign</b>                                   |

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<sup>3</sup> International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition's comments made on the Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Office of Intellectual Property Rights', Report on the State of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods Trafficking Recommendations, 29 July 2019. Posted on 6 August 2019. <https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOC-2019-0003-0072>

## **Best Practices for E-Commerce Platforms and Third-Party Marketplaces**

Government action alone is not enough to bring about the needed paradigm shift and ultimately stem the tide of counterfeit and pirated goods. All relevant private-sector stakeholders have critical roles to play and must adopt identified best practices, while redoubling efforts to police their own businesses and supply chains.

While the U.S. brick-and-mortar retail store economy has a well-developed regime for licensing, monitoring, and otherwise ensuring the protections of intellectual property rights (IPR), a comparable regime is largely non-existent for international e-commerce sellers. The following table catalogs a set of high priority “best practices” that shall be communicated to all relevant private sector stakeholders by the National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center. It shall be the Center’s duty to monitor and report on the adoption of these best practices within the scope of the legal authority of DHS and the Federal government.

| <b><i>Best Practices for E-Commerce Platforms and Third-Party Marketplaces</i></b> |                                                                                                          |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>1.</b>                                                                          | <b>Comprehensive "Terms of Service" Agreements</b>                                                       |
| <b>2.</b>                                                                          | <b>Significantly Enhanced Vetting of Third-Party Sellers</b>                                             |
| <b>3.</b>                                                                          | <b>Limitations on High Risk Products</b>                                                                 |
| <b>4.</b>                                                                          | <b>Rapid Notice and Takedown Procedures</b>                                                              |
| <b>5.</b>                                                                          | <b>Enhanced Post-Discovery Actions</b>                                                                   |
| <b>6.</b>                                                                          | <b>Indemnity Requirements for Foreign Sellers</b>                                                        |
| <b>7.</b>                                                                          | <b>Clear Transactions Through Banks that Comply with U.S. Enforcement Requests for Information (RFI)</b> |
| <b>8.</b>                                                                          | <b>Pre-Sale Identification of Third-Party Sellers</b>                                                    |
| <b>9.</b>                                                                          | <b>Establish Marketplace Seller ID</b>                                                                   |
| <b>10.</b>                                                                         | <b>Clearly Identifiable Country of Origin Disclosures</b>                                                |

Foremost among these best practices is the idea that e-commerce platforms, online third-party marketplaces, and other third-party intermediaries such as customs brokers and express consignment carriers must take a more active role in monitoring, detecting, and preventing trafficking in counterfeit and pirated goods.

## 2. Introduction

*E-commerce platforms represent ideal storefronts for counterfeits...and provide powerful platform[s] for counterfeiters and pirates to engage large numbers of potential consumers.*

**- Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development<sup>4</sup>**

The rapid growth of e-commerce platforms, further catalyzed by third-party online marketplaces connected to the platforms, has revolutionized the way products are bought and sold. “Online third-party marketplace” means any web-based platform that includes features primarily designed for arranging the sale, purchase, payment, or shipping of goods, or that enables sellers not directly affiliated with an operator of such platforms to sell physical goods to consumers located in the United States.

In the United States, e-commerce year-over-year retail sales grew by 13.3 percent in the second quarter of 2019 while total retail sales increased by only 3.2 percent as brick-and-mortar retail continued its relative decline.<sup>5</sup> For example, Amazon reports third-party sales on its marketplace grew from \$100 million in 1999 to \$160 *billion* in 2018.<sup>6</sup> In 2018 alone, Walmart experienced an e-commerce sales increase of 40 percent.<sup>7</sup>

Counterfeits threaten national security and public safety directly when introduced into government and critical infrastructure supply chains, and indirectly if used to generate revenue for transnational criminal organizations. Counterfeits also pose risks to human health and safety, erode U.S. economic competitiveness and diminish the reputations and trustworthiness of U.S. products and producers. Across all sectors of the economy, counterfeit goods unfairly compete with legitimate products and reduce the incentives to innovate, both in the United States and abroad.

While the expansion of e-commerce has led to greater trade facilitation, its overall growth—especially the growth of certain related business models—has facilitated online trafficking in counterfeit and pirated goods. American consumers shopping on e-commerce platforms and online third-party marketplaces now face a significant risk of purchasing counterfeit or pirated goods. This risk continues to rise despite current efforts across e-commerce supply chains to reduce such trafficking.

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<sup>4</sup> OECD (2018), *Governance Frameworks to Counter Illicit Trade*, Illicit Trade, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264291652-en>.

<sup>5</sup> Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, Economic Indicators Division, “Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales 2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter 2019,” 19 August 2019. <https://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical/ecom/19q2.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> Jeff Bezos, “2018 Letter to Shareholders,” *The Amazon Blog*, 11 April 2019. <https://blog.aboutamazon.com/company-news/2018-letter-to-shareholders>

<sup>7</sup> Note: Walmart does not separate out the percentage of third-party vendor sales. More information can be found, *here*, Jaiswal, Abhishek, “Getting Started Selling on Walmart in 2019: An Insider’s Guide to Success,” *BigCommerce*. <https://www.bigcommerce.com/blog/selling-on-walmart-marketplace/#millennials-are-the-drivers-of-legacy-brand-change-including-walmart>. See also, “Walmart Marketplace: Frequently Asked Questions,” *Walmart*. <https://marketplace.walmart.com/resources/#1525808821038-8edf332b-5ba2>.

The OECD reports international trade in counterfeit and pirated goods amounted to as much as \$509 billion in 2016. This represents a 3.3 percent increase from 2013 as a proportion of world trade. From 2003<sup>8</sup> through 2018, seizures of infringing goods by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) increased from 6,500 to 33,810 while the domestic value of seized merchandise — as measured by manufacturer’s suggested retail price of the legitimate good (MSRP) — increased from \$94 million in 2003 to \$1.4 billion in 2018.<sup>9</sup>

The rise in consumer use of third-party marketplaces significantly increases the risks and uncertainty for U.S. producers when creating new products. It is no longer enough for a small business to develop a product with significant local consumer demand and then use that revenue to grow the business regionally, nationally, and internationally with the brand protection efforts expanding in step. Instead, with the international scope of e-commerce platforms, once a small business exposes itself to the benefits of placing products online — which creates a geographic scope far greater than its more limited brand protection efforts can handle — it begins to face increased foreign infringement threat.

Moreover, as costs to enter the online market have come down, such market entry is happening earlier and earlier in the product cycle, further enhancing risk. If a new product is a success, counterfeiters will attempt, often immediately, to outcompete the original seller with lower-cost counterfeit and pirated versions while avoiding the initial investment into research and design.

In other words, on these platforms, the counterfeit and pirated goods compete unfairly and fraudulently against the genuine items. While counterfeit and pirated goods have been sold for years on street corners, alleys, and from the trunks of cars, these illicit goods are now marketed to consumers in their homes through increasingly mainstream e-commerce platforms and third party online marketplaces that convey an air of legitimacy.

With the rise of e-commerce, the problem of counterfeit trafficking has intensified. The OECD documents a 154 percent increase in counterfeits traded internationally, from \$200 billion in 2005 to \$509 billion in 2016.<sup>10</sup> Data collected by CBP between 2000 and 2018 shows that seizures of infringing goods at U.S. borders, much of it trafficked through e-commerce, has increased ten-fold. Over 85 percent of the contraband seized by CBP arrived from China and Hong Kong. These high rates of seizures are consistent with a key OECD finding.

*Counterfeit and pirated products come from many economies, with China appearing as the single largest producing market. These illegal products are frequently found in a range of industries, from luxury items (e.g. fashion apparel or deluxe watches), via intermediary products (such as machines, spare parts or*

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<sup>8</sup> [https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FY2003%20IPR%20Seizure%20Statistics\\_0.pdf](https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FY2003%20IPR%20Seizure%20Statistics_0.pdf).

<sup>9</sup> [https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2019-Aug/IPR\\_Annual-Report-FY-2018.pdf](https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2019-Aug/IPR_Annual-Report-FY-2018.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> OECD/EUIPO (2016), Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic Impact, OECD Publishing, Paris. <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264252653-en.pdf?expires=1576509401&id=id&accname=id5723&checksum=576BF246D4E50234EAF5E8EDF7F08147>

*chemicals) to consumer goods that have an impact on personal health and safety (such as pharmaceuticals, food and drink, medical equipment, or toys).<sup>11</sup>*

## Operation Mega Flex

In 2019, in response to the alarmingly high rates of contraband uncovered by DHS and a request from the White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy (OTMP), CBP initiated Operation Mega Flex. This operation uses enhanced inspection and monitoring efforts to identify high-risk violators that are shipping and receiving illicit contraband through international mail facilities and express consignment hubs.

The periodic “blitz operations” conducted under the auspices of Operation Mega Flex examine thousands of parcels from China and Hong Kong and carefully catalog the range of contraband seized. To date, such operations have included visits to seven of CBP’s international mail facilities and four express consignment hubs and the completion of over 20,000 additional inspections. The following table summarizes the findings of three Mega Flex blitzes conducted between July and September of 2019.

| <b>Results of Operation Mega Flex (2019)</b> |                                           |                                     |                                         |               |
|----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|---------------|
|                                              | <b>Blitz I</b><br><i>July 16 &amp; 17</i> | <b>Blitz II</b><br><i>August 21</i> | <b>Blitz III</b><br><i>September 18</i> | <b>Total</b>  |
| <b>Inspections</b>                           | <b>9,705</b>                              | <b>5,757</b>                        | <b>5,399</b>                            | <b>20,861</b> |
| <b>Discrepancies</b>                         | <b>1,145</b>                              | <b>1,010</b>                        | <b>735</b>                              | <b>2,890</b>  |
| <b>Discrepancy Rate</b>                      | <b>11.8%</b>                              | <b>17.5%</b>                        | <b>13.6%</b>                            | <b>13.9%</b>  |
| <b>Counterfeits</b>                          | <b>212</b>                                | <b>467</b>                          | <b>382</b>                              | <b>1,061</b>  |
| <b>Counterfeit Rate</b>                      | <b>2.2%</b>                               | <b>8.1%</b>                         | <b>7.1%</b>                             | <b>5.1%</b>   |

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Among the discrepancies uncovered by Operation Mega Flex were 1,061 shipments of counterfeit products. These counterfeits range from fake name brand items, like Louis Vuitton bags to sports equipment made with faulty parts. Other contraband included drug paraphernalia, deadly opioids, and counterfeit drivers’ licenses.<sup>12</sup> In all, counterfeits constituted more than one of every three discrepancies uncovered by inspectors.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> OECD/EUIPO (2016), Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic Impact, OECD Publishing, Paris.  
<https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264252653-en.pdf?expires=1576509401&id=id&accname=id5723&checksum=576BF246D4E50234EAF5E8EDF7F08147>

<sup>12</sup> Oren Fliegelman, “Made in China: Fake IDs,” *The New York Times*. 6 February 2015.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/education/edlife/fake-ids-or-why-would-a-student-order-a-tea-set.html>

<sup>13</sup> Among the near 3,000 discrepancies, 20% of them were agricultural violations, such as bad meat, fruit, or produce, unsafe for the American consumer. These agricultural discrepancies are dangerous to the United States because they may contain diseases or pests that can greatly impact agriculture. For example, on October 16, 2018, CBP seized nearly 900 pounds of mitten crabs from an incoming Chinese freight. In Asia, mitten crabs are considered a seasonal delicacy; however, they have a disastrous impact on other global habitats and are labeled as an invasive species. See, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “CBP Prevents Smuggling of Nearly 900 Pounds of Invasive Mitten Crabs,” 31 October 2018.  
<https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-prevents-smuggling-nearly-900-pounds-invasive-mitten-crabs>.

Authorities also seized 174 controlled or prohibited substances, including: recreational drugs like LSD, cocaine, DMT, ecstasy, marijuana, mushrooms, and poppy pods as well as steroids and highly addictive painkillers like Tramadol.

It is not just a rise in the volume of counterfeits we are witnessing. GAO notes that counterfeiters are increasingly producing a “wider variety of goods that may be sold on websites alongside authentic products.”<sup>14</sup>

DHS finds the current state of e-commerce to be an intolerable and dangerous situation that must be addressed firmly and swiftly by strong actions within the Department and across other relevant agencies of the U.S. Government (USG). These include: The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of the Treasury. This report provides a blueprint for swift and constructive changes and sets forth several actions for immediate implementation.

### 3. Overview of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods Trafficking

While most e-commerce transactions involve legitimate sellers and products, far too many involve the trafficking of counterfeit and pirated goods and expose legitimate businesses and consumers to substantial risks. This is a global phenomenon; the OECD reports international trade in counterfeit and pirated goods amounted to as much as half a trillion dollars in 2016.<sup>15</sup>

#### **Key Drivers of Counterfeiting and Piracy in E-Commerce**

Historically, many counterfeits were distributed through swap meets and individual sellers located on street corners. Today, counterfeits are being trafficked through vast e-commerce supply chains in concert with marketing, sales, and distribution networks. The ability of e-commerce platforms to aggregate information and reduce transportation and search costs for consumers provides a big advantage over brick-and-mortar retailers. Because of this, sellers on digital platforms have consumer visibility well beyond the seller’s natural geographical sales area.

Selling counterfeit and pirated goods through e-commerce is a highly profitable activity: production costs are low, millions of potential customers are available online, transactions are convenient, and listing on well-branded e-commerce platforms provides an air of legitimacy.

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Other discrepancies found by CBP in the blitz operations included 13 weapon modifications and gun parts, 3 occurrences of drug paraphernalia, and 3 pill presses. For full summary of findings, see, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Operation Mega Flex I, II and III Summaries, 2019.

<sup>14</sup>U.S. Government Accountability Office Report to the Chairman, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate: *Intellectual Property: Agencies Can Improve Efforts to Address Risks Posed by Changing Counterfeits Market*, GAO-18-216, Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, January 2018. <https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/689713.pdf>

<sup>15</sup>See OECD, Trends in Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods (March 2019), available at <https://www.oecd.org/governance/risk/trends-in-trade-in-counterfeit-and-pirated-goods-g2g9f533-en.htm>

<sup>15</sup>See Parker et al. 2016

When sellers of illicit goods are in another country, they are largely outside the jurisdiction for criminal prosecution or civil liability from U.S. law enforcement and private parties.

### *The Role of Online Third-Party Marketplaces*

Third-party online marketplaces can quickly and easily establish attractive “store-fronts” to compete with legitimate businesses. On some platforms, little identifying information is necessary to begin selling.

A counterfeiter seeking to distribute fake products will typically set up one or more accounts on online third-party marketplaces. The ability to rapidly proliferate third-party online marketplaces greatly complicates enforcement efforts, especially for intellectual property rights holders. Rapid proliferation also allows counterfeiters to hop from one profile to the next even if the original site is taken down or blocked. On these sites, online counterfeiters can misrepresent products by posting pictures of authentic goods while simultaneously selling and shipping counterfeit versions.

Counterfeiters have taken full advantage of the aura of authenticity and trust that online platforms provide. While e-commerce has supported the launch of thousands of legitimate businesses, their models have also enabled counterfeiters to easily establish attractive “store-fronts” to compete with legitimate businesses.

Platforms use their third-party marketplace functions to leverage “two-sided” network effects to increase profitability for the platform by adding both more sellers and more buyers. Because sellers benefit with each additional buyer using the platform (more consumers to sell to), and buyers are more likely to join/use the platform with each additional seller (more sellers to buy from), there can be diminished internal resistance to adding lower quality sellers.

Platforms that recognize this strategy may incentivize seller listings to stimulate further growth and increase profits but do so without adequate scrutiny. As just one incentive, many platforms create “frictionless entry” by reducing the costs for sellers and buyers to join, thereby increasing the likelihood that the platform will reach an efficient and highly profitable scale.

Platforms also generate value by opening previously unused (or less frequently used) markets. In addition, online platforms reduce transaction costs by streamlining the actual transaction; for example, buyers and sellers use a standardized transaction method that simplifies interactions with buyers and reduces the risk that the buyer will not pay.

For example, before the rise of e-commerce, secondhand products could be sold at garage sales or in classified newspaper advertisements. E-commerce created a process for allowing buyers and sellers to trade goods digitally, reducing transaction costs and creating a global marketplace for used, but too often counterfeit, products.

Another way platforms generate value is by aggregating information and reducing search costs. A buyer may search for a product, either by keyword or product category, at lower search cost than visiting brick-and-mortar stores. Because of this, sellers on digital platforms have consumer visibility well beyond the seller’s natural geographical sales area.

In addition, consumers who have made a purchase may use tools provided by the marketplace to rate the product and the seller involved. These ratings create an important mechanism to facilitate future consumer trust in an otherwise unknown seller.

In principle, such a rating system provides a key to overcoming a common economic problem that might otherwise preclude sales: without a low-cost trust building feature that also communicates quality, and in a market with significant numbers of low-quality products, buyers may refuse to purchase any product at all, or would demand a lower price to reflect the uncertainty. One frequent result is that low cost counterfeits drive out high quality, trusted brands from the online marketplace. In practice, even the ratings systems across platforms have been gamed, and the proliferation of fake reviews and counterfeit goods on third-party marketplaces now threatens the trust mechanism itself.

### *Lower Startup and Production Costs*

The relative ease of setting up and maintaining e-commerce websites makes online marketplaces a prime locale for the retailing of counterfeit and pirated goods. E-commerce retailers enjoy low fixed costs of setting up and maintaining web businesses and lower costs for carrying out normal business operations such as managing merchant accounts. These ventures can be set up quickly without much sophistication or specialized skills.

Some online platforms allow retailers to use pre-made templates to create their stores while other platforms only require that a seller create an account. These businesses face much lower overhead costs than traditional brick-and-mortar sellers because there is no need to rent retail space or to hire in-person customer-facing staff. Not only can counterfeiters set up their virtual storefronts quickly and easily, but they can also set up new virtual storefronts when their existing storefronts are shut down by either law enforcement or through voluntary initiatives set up by other stakeholders such as market platforms, advertisers, or payment processors.

In the production stage, counterfeiters keep costs low by stealing product secrets or technological knowledge, exploiting new production technologies, and distributing operations across jurisdictions. One method involves employees who sell trade secrets to a third party who, in turn, develops and sells counterfeit products based on the stolen secrets. Another method relies on an intermediary to steal a firm's product or technology. The use of intermediaries reduces the traceability to the counterfeiter.

Counterfeiting and piracy operations also take advantage of new low-cost production technologies. For example, the technological advances in modeling, printing and scanning technologies such as 3D printing reduce the barriers for reverse engineering and the costs of manufacturing counterfeit products.

Lower production costs can also be achieved through distributed production operations. One method involves manufacturing the counterfeit good in a foreign market to lower the chances of detection and to minimize legal liability if prosecuted. This can be combined with importation of

the counterfeit labels separately from the items, with the labels being applied to the products after both items arrive in the U.S.

In addition, it is much cheaper to manufacture illicit goods because counterfeit and pirated goods are often produced in unsafe workplaces with substandard and unsafe materials by workers who are often paid little—and sometimes nothing in the case of forced labor. Moreover, in the case of goods governed by Federal health and safety regulations, it often costs much less to produce counterfeit versions that do not meet these health and safety standards.

### *Lower Marketing Costs*

Businesses that use only an internet presence as their consumer-facing aspect typically enjoy lower costs of designing, editing, and distributing marketing materials. Counterfeiters also benefit from greater anonymity on digital platforms and web sites and greater ease to retarget or remarket to customers. For example, counterfeiters use legitimate images and descriptions on online platforms to confuse customers, and they open multiple seller accounts on the platform so that if one account is identified and removed, the counterfeiter can simply use another.

The popularity of social media also helps reduce the costs of advertising counterfeit products. The nature of social media platforms has aided in the proliferation of counterfeits across all e-commerce sites. Instagram users, for example, can take advantage of connectivity algorithms by using the names of luxury brands in hashtags. Followers can search by hashtag and unwittingly find counterfeit products, which are comingled and difficult to differentiate from legitimate products and sellers.

### *Lower Distribution Costs*

Traditionally, many counterfeit goods were distributed through swap meets and individual sellers located on street corners. With the rise of online platforms for shopping, customers can have products delivered to them directly.

Foreign entities that traffic in counterfeits understand how to leverage newer distribution methods better suited to e-commerce than the traditional trade paradigm (i.e., imports arriving via large cargo containers with domestic distribution networks). Today, mail parcel shipments, including through express consignments, account for more than 500 million packages each year.<sup>16</sup> Seizures in the small package environment made up 93 percent of all seizures in 2018, a 6 percent increase over 2017. From 2012 to 2016, the number of seizures from express consignment carriers increased by 105 percent, and the MSRP of those seizures had a 337 percent increase.<sup>17</sup> In contrast, seizures from cargo decreased by 36 percent from FY17 to FY18.

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<sup>16</sup><https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2019-Apr/FY%202017%20Seizure%20Stats%20Booklet%20-%20508%20Compliant.pdf> p. 14

<sup>17</sup>[https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/689713.pdf?mod=article\\_inline](https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/689713.pdf?mod=article_inline) p. 14

The International Chamber of Commerce found that counterfeiters use international air packages because the high volume of these packages makes enforcement more difficult.<sup>18</sup> A recent report by the OECD points out that distributing counterfeits across a series of small packages spreads the risk of detection, and lowers the loss from having one or more shipments seized, suggesting that losses to the counterfeiter on an ongoing basis would be within a tolerable range.<sup>19</sup>

The OECD report also notes that it is harder for authorities to detect counterfeits in small parcels than in shipping containers because cargo containers making entry at a maritime port provide customs officials with more information, well in advance of arrival. Moreover, the effort required for CBP to seize a shipment does not vary by size of the shipment, meaning that a package of a few infringing goods requires the same resources to seize as a cargo container with hundreds of infringing goods.

Section 321 of the Tariff Act of 1930 has likewise encouraged counterfeiters to favor smaller parcel delivery. Under Section 321, a foreign good valued at or less than \$800 and imported by one person on one day is not subject to the same formal customs entry procedures and rigorous data requirements as higher-value packages entering the United States. This reduced level of scrutiny is an open invitation to exploit Section 321 rules to transport and distribute counterfeits.

Rules set by the Universal Postal Union (UPU) have historically contributed to the distortion in rates for delivery of international e-commerce purchases to the United States.<sup>20</sup> UPU reimbursement rates have underpriced domestic postage rates for small parcels. This market distortion made it cheaper for small package exports to the United States from certain countries than would otherwise be economically feasible and has encouraged the use of the international postal mode over other shipment channels. The United States recently scored a historic victory when the UPU overhauled its terminal dues system<sup>21</sup>, effectively eliminating this outdated policy.<sup>22</sup>

### *Consumer Attitudes and Perceptions*

The sale of counterfeits away from so-called “underground” or secondary markets (e.g. street corners, flea markets) to e-commerce platforms is reshaping consumer attitudes and perceptions. Where in the past, consumers could identify products by relying on “red flag” indicators—such as a suspicious location of the seller, poor quality packaging, or discount pricing—consumers are now regularly exposed to counterfeit products in settings and under conditions where the articles appear genuine.

While the risks of receiving a counterfeit may have been obvious to a consumer purchasing items on street corners, with the rise of online platforms, it is not so obvious anymore. For example, it is

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<sup>18</sup><https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2015/03/ICC-BASCAP-Roles-and-Responsibilities-of-Intermediaries.pdf> p. 32

<sup>19</sup>OECD/EUIPO (2018), *Misuse of Small Parcels for Trade in Counterfeit Goods: Facts and Trends, Illicit Trade*, OECD Publishing, Paris. <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264307858-en> p. 77

<sup>20</sup>The UPU is a specialized agency of the United Nations that coordinates postal policies between 190 countries. Importantly, these treaties determine the cost of shipping between the various countries and offers low rates to mail originating from abroad, as compared to domestic postage rates.

<sup>21</sup> Universal Postal Union (2019), *Decisions of the 2019 Geneva Extraordinary Congress*, [http://www.upu.int/uploads/tx\\_sbdownloader/actsActsOfTheExtraordinaryCongressGenevaEn.pdf](http://www.upu.int/uploads/tx_sbdownloader/actsActsOfTheExtraordinaryCongressGenevaEn.pdf)

<sup>22</sup> <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/25/business/universal-postal-union-withdraw.html>

unlikely that anyone would set out to purchase a counterfeit bicycle helmet given the potential safety risks; however, such items are readily available to unsuspecting consumers on e-commerce websites.

Reports indicate that some third-party marketplace listings falsely claim to have certifications with health and safety standards or offer items banned by federal regulators or even the platforms themselves. Coupled with the inability of buyers to accurately determine the manufacturer or the origin of the product, it is challenging for buyers to make informed decisions in the e-commerce environment.

In 2017, MarkMonitor found that 39 percent of all unwitting purchases of counterfeit goods were bought through online third-party marketplaces.<sup>23</sup> Sellers on large well-known platforms rely on the trust that those platforms hosting of the marketplace elicits. The results of this survey indicate that bad actors selling counterfeit goods on legitimate online platforms erodes trust in both the brands and the platforms themselves.

In 2018, Incopro conducted a survey focusing on United Kingdom (UK) consumers who had unwittingly purchased counterfeit goods and how their perceptions of online marketplaces were affected as a result.<sup>24</sup> The results of this survey show that 26 percent of respondents reported that they had unwittingly purchased counterfeits. Of these, 41 percent reported that they had never received a refund after reporting a seller to online marketplaces.

In addition, roughly one-third of respondents reported that they would be less likely to buy a widely counterfeited product from an online marketplace while 46 percent reported no longer using a particular online marketplace after receiving counterfeit goods. Respondents also reported that, when trying to differentiate between genuine and counterfeit products, they consider online reviews along with the reputation of online marketplaces.

These recent findings, against the larger backdrop of the e-commerce environment, demonstrate the immediacy of the problem as consumer confidence and brand integrity continue to suffer in the realm of online third-party marketplaces.

## **Top Products Prone to Counterfeiting and Piracy**

Counterfeiters sell fake goods as authentic goods — for example, a copy of a Louis Vuitton bag or Rolex watch fraudulently sold as the “real thing.” Counterfeiters use identical copies of registered trademarks without the authorization of the rightful owner.

Piracy typically refers to the act of copying a protected work (such as a book, movie, or music) without the consent of the rights holder or person duly authorized by the rights holder.

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<sup>23</sup>MarkMonitor (2017). *MarkMonitor Online Barometer: Global online shopping survey 2017 – consumer goods*. Downloaded from [https://www.markmonitor.com/download/report/MarkMonitor\\_Online\\_Shopping\\_Report-2017-UK.pdf](https://www.markmonitor.com/download/report/MarkMonitor_Online_Shopping_Report-2017-UK.pdf), p. 6

<sup>24</sup>INCOPRO, 2018. Counterfeit Products are Endemic – and it is damaging brand value: INCOPRO Market Research Report available at [https://www.incoproip.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2018\\_Incopro\\_Market-Research-report.pdf](https://www.incoproip.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2018_Incopro_Market-Research-report.pdf).

The below table provides a summary of the annual IPR seizure statistics collected by CBP in FY18; including items from all modes of transportation. Apparel and other types of accessories, along with footwear, top the list at 18 percent and 14 percent of seizures, respectively. Commonly counterfeited items in these categories include brand name shoes such as Nike and Adidas, as well as NFL jerseys.

Watches and jewelry follow at 13 percent of total seizures. During the Mega Flex operation on August 21, 2019, for example, CBP officers seized counterfeit Rolex watches valued at over \$1.4 million. Handbags and wallets represented nearly 11 percent of all seizures, including counterfeits of luxury brands such as Louis Vuitton, Michael Kors, and Gucci. Consumer electronics represented 10 percent of seizures, including products such as iPhones, hover boards, earbuds, microchips, and others.

Pharmaceuticals and personal care items account for only 7 percent of total seizures. However, as discussed in the next section, many of the products in these categories pose significant dangers to the consumer. Fake prescription drugs can lack active ingredients, contain incorrect dosages, or include dangerous additives. Fake personal care items such as cosmetics have been found to contain everything from harmful bacteria to human waste. Between 2017 and 2018, CBP and ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) seized over \$31 million in fake perfumes from China.

| <i><b>CBP Intellectual Property Rights Annual Seizure Statistics Fiscal Year 2018</b></i> |                 |                         |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| <b>Products</b>                                                                           | <b>Seizures</b> | <b>Percent of Total</b> |
| <b>1. Wearing Apparel/Accessories</b>                                                     | <b>6,098</b>    | <b>18%</b>              |
| <b>2. Footwear</b>                                                                        | <b>4,728</b>    | <b>14%</b>              |
| <b>3. Watches/Jewelry</b>                                                                 | <b>4,291</b>    | <b>13%</b>              |
| <b>4. Handbags/Wallets</b>                                                                | <b>3,593</b>    | <b>11%</b>              |
| <b>5. Consumer Electronics</b>                                                            | <b>3,388</b>    | <b>10%</b>              |
| <b>6. Consumer Products</b>                                                               | <b>2,816</b>    | <b>8%</b>               |
| <b>7. Pharmaceuticals/Personal Care</b>                                                   | <b>2,293</b>    | <b>7%</b>               |
| <b>8. Optical Media</b>                                                                   | <b>561</b>      | <b>2%</b>               |
| <b>9. Toys</b>                                                                            | <b>487</b>      | <b>1%</b>               |
| <b>10. Computers/Accessories</b>                                                          | <b>450</b>      | <b>1%</b>               |

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection

## 4. Health and Safety, Economic, and National Security Risks

Counterfeit trafficking exposes American consumers to significant health and safety risks — in addition to significant economic impacts and, in some cases, threats to national security.

### **Health and Safety**

The types of counterfeit goods available on e-commerce platforms go far beyond those products with potential hidden toxins — like sports jerseys, jewelry and purses—and include many products

that can pose more obvious serious risks to health and safety, like prescription drugs and air bags. It is not only the sellers of the counterfeit goods, but also the e-commerce platforms and other third-party intermediaries (e.g., shippers) that facilitate their sale, that are profiting from the marketing and distribution of these illicit products to the American public.

The profit margins are especially high for counterfeiters in the sale of counterfeit pharmaceuticals. In the past, counterfeit prescription drugs primarily involved so-called lifestyle drugs like sildenafil (Viagra). Today, this market has expanded to include all types of therapeutic medicines, including insulin, cancer medications, and cardiovascular drugs.

Counterfeiting has also spread into over-the-counter medicines like cough syrup and weight loss drugs. As more Americans purchase drugs online, many U.S. consumers appear to be largely unaware of the potential dangers of purchasing counterfeit drugs from internet pharmacies.

Unlike legitimate drug manufacturers that are subject to inspections by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, labs that manufacture counterfeits have no such oversight. According to a 2019 Better Business Bureau study, “companies based in China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and India shipped 97 percent of the counterfeit medicines seized in the U.S.”<sup>25</sup>

In March 2019, Europol, the European Union’s law enforcement agency, seized 13 million doses of counterfeit medicine ranging from opioids to heart medication. Europol noted that this type of counterfeiting is on the rise due to the relatively low risk of criminal detection.<sup>26</sup>

Counterfeit medicines not only defraud consumers who are often afflicted with serious health issues; they can also be lethal. Fake prescription opioids are often laced with deadly fentanyl, much of which originates in China. In raising awareness of the dangers, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has warned:

*Preventing counterfeit medicines from entering the United States is especially difficult, in part because nearly 40 percent of drugs are made overseas and approximately 80 percent of the active medicinal components of drugs are imported. Because many of these medicines are expensive, buyers are attracted by lower prices. The rise of Internet pharmacies makes regulation of drug safety more difficult.*<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>Baker, C. Steven, “Fakes are Not Fashionable: A BBB Study of the Epidemic of Counterfeit Goods Sold Online,” *Better Business Bureau*, May 2019. [https://www.bbb.org/globalassets/local-bbbs/st-louis-mo-142/st\\_louis\\_mo\\_142/studies/counterfeit-goods/BBB-Study-of-Counterfeit-Goods-Sold-Online.pdf](https://www.bbb.org/globalassets/local-bbbs/st-louis-mo-142/st_louis_mo_142/studies/counterfeit-goods/BBB-Study-of-Counterfeit-Goods-Sold-Online.pdf)

<sup>26</sup>Baker, C. Steven, “Fakes are Not Fashionable: A BBB Study of the Epidemic of Counterfeit Goods Sold Online,” *Better Business Bureau*, May 2019. Pg. 9. [https://www.bbb.org/globalassets/local-bbbs/st-louis-mo-142/st\\_louis\\_mo\\_142/studies/counterfeit-goods/BBB-Study-of-Counterfeit-Goods-Sold-Online.pdf](https://www.bbb.org/globalassets/local-bbbs/st-louis-mo-142/st_louis_mo_142/studies/counterfeit-goods/BBB-Study-of-Counterfeit-Goods-Sold-Online.pdf)

<sup>27</sup>National Institutes of Health, Blackstone, Erwin A., Joseph P. Fuhr Jr., and Steve Pociask, “The Health and Economic Effects of Counterfeit Drugs,” *American Health and Drug Benefits* 7(4): 216-224, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4105729/>; See also, Mackey, Tim K., et al., “After counterfeit Avastin®-- what have we learned and what can be done,” *Nature Reviews Clinical Oncology* 12, 302-308. 2015. <https://www.nature.com/articles/nrclinonc.2015.35.pdf>

Health and safety risks extend far beyond fake prescription drugs. Counterfeit cosmetics often contain ingredients such as arsenic, mercury, aluminum, or lead and may be manufactured in unsanitary conditions, which can ultimately lead to problems with one's eyes or skin.

An investigation of counterfeit iPhone adapters conducted by the GAO found a 99 percent failure rate in 400 counterfeit adapters tested for safety, fire, and shock hazards, and found that 12 of the adapters posed a risk of lethal electrocution to the user.<sup>28</sup> In December 2015, CBP seized 1,378 hover boards with counterfeit batteries, which can cause fires resulting in injury or death.<sup>29</sup>

Children's toys, some laced with deadly metals like cadmium and lead, represent another area in which counterfeiters have taken advantage of e-commerce business models that provide limited to no accountability for sellers.

The Department of Justice has prosecuted individuals for the online sale of a "high value target" of counterfeiters — namely, airbags.<sup>30</sup> Along with other counterfeit automotive parts like brake pads, wheels, and seat belts, unsafe airbags can have catastrophic consequences for drivers, as well as for their passengers and others on the road. Bicycle helmets, another favorite of counterfeiters, likewise can lead to catastrophic consequences for cyclists.

Of the contraband products seized in 2016 by CBP and ICE/HSI, an astonishing 16 percent posed direct and obvious threats to health and safety.<sup>31</sup> E-commerce also facilitates the widespread sale of pirated versions of copyrighted works. Pirated medical books — which can contain errors that endanger patients' lives — have been found on platforms along with other pirated books (textbooks and trade books) and illicit reproductions of music-CD box sets.

## Economic Harm

The growth in online sales of counterfeit and pirated goods directly harms — and unfairly competes against — the many legitimate companies that produce, sell and distribute genuine goods, often resulting in lost profits, employee layoffs, and diminished incentives to innovate. Frontier Economics (2018) finds that counterfeit goods displaced roughly half a trillion dollars of global sales of legitimate companies in 2013 and forecasts this displacement to reach \$1 to \$1.2 trillion by 2022.<sup>32</sup> The study also estimates that global employment losses due to counterfeit goods

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<sup>28</sup>Underwriters Laboratory (UL), "Counterfeit iPhone Adapters", available at: [https://legacy-uploads.ul.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/40/2016/09/10314-CounterfeitiPhone-WP-HighRes\\_FINAL.pdf](https://legacy-uploads.ul.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/40/2016/09/10314-CounterfeitiPhone-WP-HighRes_FINAL.pdf). Also see, U.S. Government Accountability Office Report to the Chairman, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate: *Intellectual Property: Agencies Can Improve Efforts to Address Risks Posed by Changing Counterfeits Market*, GAO-18-216, Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, January 2018. Pg.18. <https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/689713.pdf>

<sup>29</sup>U.S. Government Accountability Office Report to the Chairman, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate: *Intellectual Property: Agencies Can Improve Efforts to Address Risks Posed by Changing Counterfeits Market*, GAO-18-216, Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, January 2018. <https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/689713.pdf>

<sup>30</sup>Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, Western District of New York, "Two Men Charged with Importing and Selling Counterfeit Airbags," 24 October 2016. <https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdny/pr/two-men-charged-importing-and-selling-counterfeit-airbags>; Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, Western District of New York, "Cheektowaga Man Sentenced for Buying and Selling Counterfeit Airbags," 9 May 2019.

<sup>31</sup>Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Intellectual Property Rights: Fiscal Year 2018 Seizure Statistics," August 2019. [https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2019-Aug/IPR\\_Annual-Report-FY-2018.pdf](https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2019-Aug/IPR_Annual-Report-FY-2018.pdf)

<sup>32</sup><https://iccwbo.org/publication/economic-impacts-counterfeiting-piracy-report-prepared-bascap-inta/>

were between 2 million and 2.6 million jobs in 2013, with job displacement expected to double by 2022.

Counterfeit goods also damage the value of legitimate brands. When brand owners lose the ability to collect a price premium for branded goods, it leads to diminished innovation as brand owners are less likely to invest in creating innovative products. Legitimate companies, and particularly small businesses, report devastating impacts due to the abundance of competing online counterfeits and pirated goods. Moreover, while e-commerce platforms can benefit legitimate businesses by helping them to reach customers with a new product, the same process and technology also makes it easier for unscrupulous firms to identify popular new products, produce infringing versions of them, and sell these illicit goods to the business's potential customers.

As previously noted, the speed at which counterfeiters can steal intellectual property through e-commerce can be very rapid. If a new product is a success, counterfeiters may attempt to immediately outcompete the original seller with lower-cost counterfeit versions — while avoiding research and development costs. The result: counterfeiters may have a significant competitive advantage in a very short period of time over those who sell trusted brands.

Such fast-track counterfeiting poses unique and serious problems for small businesses, which do not have the same financial resources as major brands to protect their intellectual property. Lacking the ability to invest in brand-protection activities, such as continually monitoring e-commerce platforms to identify illicit goods, perform test buys, and send takedown notices to the platforms, smaller businesses are more likely to experience revenue losses as customers purchase counterfeit versions of the branded products.

In many cases, American enterprises have little recourse aside from initiating legal action against a particular vendor. Such legal action can be extremely difficult. Many e-commerce sellers of infringing products are located outside the jurisdiction of the United States, often in China; existing laws and regulations largely shield foreign counterfeiters from any accountability.

## **Organized Crime and Terrorism**

The impact of counterfeit and pirated goods is broader than just unfair competition. Law enforcement officials have uncovered intricate links between the sale of counterfeit goods and transnational organized crime. A study by the Better Business Bureau notes that the financial operations supporting counterfeit goods typically require central coordination, making these activities attractive for organized crime, with groups such as the Mafia and the Japanese Yakuza heavily involved.<sup>33</sup> Criminal organizations use coerced and child labor to manufacture and sell counterfeit goods. In some cases, the proceeds from counterfeit sales may be supporting terrorism and dictatorships throughout the world.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>[https://www.bbb.org/globalassets/local-bbbs/st-louis-mo-142/st\\_louis\\_mo\\_142/studies/counterfeit-goods/BBB-Study-of-Counterfeit-Goods-Sold-Online.pdf](https://www.bbb.org/globalassets/local-bbbs/st-louis-mo-142/st_louis_mo_142/studies/counterfeit-goods/BBB-Study-of-Counterfeit-Goods-Sold-Online.pdf)

<sup>34</sup>United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Focus On: The Illicit Trafficking of Counterfeit Goods and Transnational Organized Crime*, available at: [https://www.unodc.org/documents/counterfeit/FocusSheet/Counterfeit\\_focussheet\\_EN\\_HIRES.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/counterfeit/FocusSheet/Counterfeit_focussheet_EN_HIRES.pdf)

## National Security

One of the greatest threats counterfeits pose to national security is their entry into the supply chain of America's defense industrial base. This defense industrial base includes both private sector contractors and government agencies, particularly the Department of Defense.

In FY 2018, 12 percent of DHS seizures included counterfeit versions of critical technological components, automotive and aerospace parts, batteries, and machinery. Each of these industrial sectors have been identified as critical to the defense industrial base, and thus critical to national security. One example drawn from a 2018 study by the Bureau of Industry and Security within the Department of Commerce featured the import of counterfeit semiconductors or "Trojan chips" for use in defense manufacturing and operations<sup>35</sup>. Such Trojan chips can carry viruses or malware that infiltrate and weaken American national security. The problem of counterfeit chips has become so pervasive that the Department of Defense has referred to it as an "invasion." Companies from China are the primary producers of counterfeit electronics.<sup>36</sup>

## 5. How E-Commerce Facilitates Counterfeit Trafficking

While e-commerce has supported the launch of thousands of legitimate businesses, e-commerce platforms, third-party marketplaces, and their supporting intermediaries have also served as powerful stimulants for the trafficking of counterfeit and pirated goods. The central economic driver of such trafficking is this basic reality: Selling counterfeit and pirated goods through e-commerce platforms and related online third-party marketplaces is a highly profitable venture.


For counterfeiters, production costs are low, millions of potential customers are available online, transactions are convenient, and listing goods on well-known platforms provides an air of legitimacy. When sellers of illicit goods are in another country, they are also exposed to relatively little risk of criminal prosecution or civil liability under current law enforcement and regulatory practices. It is critical that immediate action be taken to protect American consumers and other stakeholders against the harm and losses inflicted by counterfeiters.

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<sup>35</sup><https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/technology-evaluation/37-defense-industrial-base-assessment-of-counterfeit-electronics-2010/file>

<sup>36</sup>Saunders, Gregory and Tim Koczanski, "Counterfeits," *Defense Standardization Program Journal*, October/December 2013. <https://www.dsp.dla.mil/Portals/26/Documents/Publications/Journal/131001-DSPJ.pdf>

Figure One provides a simplified overview of how counterfeit products move from production by counterfeiters to sales to American consumers:



## Counterfeit Production and Distribution

The counterfeit sales process begins with some type of production capability for the counterfeit good. In this stage, counterfeiters enjoy enormous production cost advantages relative to legitimate businesses. Counterfeits are often produced in unsafe workplaces, with substandard and unsafe materials, by workers who are often paid little or sometimes nothing in the case of forced labor.

In the case of goods subject to federal health and safety regulations, it costs much less to produce counterfeit versions that do not meet these health and safety requirements that make the legitimate products so safe.

Counterfeiters likewise minimize the need for incurring significant research and development expenditures by stealing intellectual property, technologies, and trade secrets. They also shave production costs using inferior ingredients or components.

For example, a common way for counterfeiters to produce *fake* prescription opioids like Oxycontin, or a prescription drug like Viagra, is to start with the *real* pills as a basic ingredient. These real pills are then ground up into a powder, diluted with some type of (sometimes toxic) powder filler, and then “spiked” with an illegal and deadly narcotic like fentanyl, in the case of fake opioids, or illegal and deadly amphetamines or strychnine, in the case of Viagra.

In the case of apparel, such as running shoes, employees from a legitimate branded company may leave the company and set up their own facility. These employees have the expertise to manufacture identical-looking shoes; but they will typically do so with cheaper, inferior components. The result: the shoes may fail during activity, injure the user with an inferior insole, or, at a minimum, wear out faster than the real product.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>37</sup>Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “CBP Seizes Over \$2.2 Million worth of Fake Nike Shoes at LA/Long Beach Seaport,” 9 October 2019. <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/cbp-seizes-over-22-million-worth-fake-nike-shoes-lalong-beach-seaport>

The technological advances in modeling, printing, and scanning technologies such as 3D printing, have also significantly reduced the barriers for reverse engineering and the costs of manufacturing counterfeit products. Again, one problem that may arise may be the use of inferior production inputs that lead to product failure.

These are just a few of the many ways counterfeits begin their long journey into American households. There is often no way for legitimate businesses to compete, on a production cost basis, with counterfeiters. There is also often no way for a consumer to tell the difference between a counterfeit and legitimate good.

### **Third-Party Marketplaces and Counterfeiter Websites**

A counterfeiter seeking to distribute fake products will typically set up one or more accounts on third-party marketplaces, and these accounts can often be set up quickly and without much sophistication or many specialized skills. Under such circumstances, it is axiomatic that online retailers face much lower overhead costs than traditional brick-and-mortar sellers. There is no need to rent retail space or to hire in-person, customer-facing staff.

In a common scenario, third-party marketplace websites contain photos of the real product, fake reviews of the counterfeit product, and other such disinformation designed to mislead or fool the consumer into believing the legitimacy of the product. The proliferation of such disinformation is the hallmark of the successful online counterfeiter. Such deception not only provides counterfeiters with an enormous competitive advantage over their brick-and-mortar counterparts; legitimate sellers on the internet are harmed as well.

In some cases, counterfeiters hedge against the risk of being caught and their websites taken down from an e-commerce platform by preemptively establishing multiple virtual store-fronts. A key underlying problem here is that on at least some e-commerce platforms, little identifying information is necessary for a counterfeiter to begin selling. In the absence of full transparency, counterfeiters can quickly and easily move to a new virtual store if their original third-party marketplace is taken down.

The popularity of social media also helps proliferate counterfeits across various e-commerce platforms. Instagram users, for example, can take advantage of connectivity algorithms by using the names of luxury brands in hashtags. Followers can search by hashtag and unwittingly find counterfeit products, which are comingled and difficult to differentiate from legitimate products and sellers.

According to a 2019 report, *Instagram and Counterfeiting*, nearly 20 percent of the posts analyzed about fashion products on Instagram featured counterfeit or illicit products.<sup>38</sup> More than 50,000 Instagram accounts were identified as promoting and selling counterfeits, a 171 percent increase from a prior 2016 analysis. Instagram's Story feature, where content disappears in twenty-four hours, was singled out as particularly effective for counterfeit sellers.

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<sup>38</sup>Stroppa, Andrea, *et al.*, "Instagram and counterfeiting in 2019: new features, old problems," *Ghost Data*, 9 April 2019. Rome, New York. [https://ghostdata.io/report/Instagram\\_Counterfeiting\\_GD.pdf](https://ghostdata.io/report/Instagram_Counterfeiting_GD.pdf)

A more recent development on social media is the proliferation of “hidden listings” for the sale of counterfeits. Social media is used to provide direct hyperlinks in private groups or chats to listings for counterfeit goods that purport to be selling unrelated legitimate items. By accessing the link, buyers are brought to an e-commerce platform which advertises an unrelated legitimate item for the same price as the counterfeit item identified in the private group or chat. The buyer is directed to purchase the unrelated item in the listing but will receive the sought-after counterfeit item instead.

## **Order Fulfillment in E-Commerce**

The foreign counterfeiter must first choose between sending a package either by express consignment carrier or through the international post. As a general proposition, express consignment shippers — such as DHL Express, Federal Express, and the United Parcel Service — were subject to data requirements before they were extended to the international posts.

In the next step along the delivery chain, a parcel will arrive at a port of entry under the authority of CBP. Millions of parcels arrive daily, and it is impossible to inspect more than a very small fraction.

Although ocean shipping is still a major mode of transport for counterfeits, the rapid growth of other modes, such as truck and air parcel delivery, threaten to upend established enforcement efforts, and as such, is increasingly used by international counterfeiters. This continued shift from bulk cargo delivery to other modes by counterfeiters is illustrated in the trends in seizure statistics.

It is clear from these observations that counterfeit traffickers have learned how to leverage newer air parcel distribution methods that vary from the traditional brick-and-mortar retail model (for example, imports arriving via large cargo containers with domestic distribution networks). This is an issue that must be directly addressed by firm actions from CBP.

## **Section 321 De Minimis Exemption and Counterfeit Trafficking**

Under Section 321 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA), articles with a value of \$800 or less, imported by one person on one day, can be admitted free of duty and taxes. Under 19 CFR § 10.151 and 19 CFR part 143, Subpart C, those importations are often not subject to the same formal customs procedures and rigorous data requirements as higher-value packages entering the United States. Instead, the low-value shipments can be admitted into U.S. commerce with the presentation of a bill of lading or a manifest listing each bill of lading and a limited data set. The relatively limited nature of the data requirements complicates the identification of high-risk goods by CBP and other enforcement agencies. Under 19 CFR § 143.22, CBP has existing authority to require formal entry (and the complete data set for any shipment) for any merchandise, if deemed necessary for import admissibility enforcement purposes; revenue protection; or the efficient conduct of customs business.

## **Warehouses, Fulfillment Centers and Counterfeit Trafficking**

Certain e-commerce platforms have adopted a business model that relies on North American warehouses to provide space for foreign-made goods, followed by one-at-a-time order fulfillment, at which point the goods are individually packed and shipped to U.S. consumers on much shorter delivery timelines. The platforms that use this model may also coordinate with customs brokers, as well as provide third-party logistics and freight forwarding services to assist with the initial delivery of goods to the warehouse.

Although this model is a significant innovation for legitimate commerce and provides benefits to consumers in the form of reduced costs and shipping time, it creates a mechanism that allows counterfeit traffickers to minimize transportation costs as well, while intermingling harmful goods among legitimate goods. From a risk perspective, this model allows goods to enter the United States in a decentralized manner, allowing a counterfeit trafficker to spread the risk of seizure across a number of low-value packages. In situations where the fulfillment center is outside the U.S. Customs area, this model provides the opportunity to use ocean container shipping as the primary mode of transit for the shipment, which keeps overall shipping costs relatively low as ocean cargo is much cheaper than air delivery. It is in part because of these incentives that these fulfillment centers have emerged as an important element of the supply chains for many counterfeit traffickers.

## **6. Private Sector Outreach and Public Comment**

This report benefitted from extensive outreach to, and comments from, numerous private sector stakeholders in response to the FRN 2019-14715 issued on July 10, 2019. Respondents included: e-commerce platforms that operate third-party marketplaces, third-party sellers, shippers, third-party logistics providers, payment processors, and intellectual property rights holders.

### **Rights holders and Stakeholders Feedback**

In providing comments on platforms' current preventative efforts, rights holders argued that some platforms do not do enough to ensure that sellers provide accurate information. They also stressed that the onboarding and vetting of sellers remains a concern of the highest priority.

Some commenters further argued that sellers will not be sufficiently deterred unless they can be identified and punished for promoting counterfeit and pirated goods via online platforms. Further, they contended that platforms should be more proactive in their approach to combating IPR theft and misuse. Commenters also advised that the lack of relevant policies and procedures to verify sellers' true names and addresses, and to conduct the necessary vetting and due diligence, contributes to a range of impediments to effective enforcement.

Rights holders widely view the present legislative landscape for online enforcement — where online intermediaries are generally not strictly liable for the products sold on their marketplaces by third parties — to be out of date. While in the brick-and-mortar economy, contributory infringement liability has been well-developed through case law for the licensing and oversight of

sellers, a comparable regime is largely non-existent in the e-commerce realm. A key problem here is that the laws that apply today have remained largely unchanged since the early days of e-commerce. They were developed at a time when Congress' primary concern was to avoid over-regulation of the nascent market — as exemplified by the numerous safe harbors and limitations on liability for third-party intermediaries.

Rights holders further argued that the current rules, regulations, and practices governing e-commerce disproportionately place the burden of enforcement on rights holders. While e-commerce platforms that operate third-party marketplaces provide various tools for rights holders to report counterfeit listings of their brands, they have effectively shifted the primary responsibility to monitor, detect, and remove infringing products to the rights holders.

Commenters also noted several disparities across e-commerce platforms. For example, among third-party marketplaces that control who may list products on their site for sale, some scrutinize their sellers much more than others. Some allow anyone to sell a product if they provide basic information about themselves, such as credit card and tax identity information. Others require more detailed information, such as an existing online presence, proof that the seller is a business entity and not an individual, and that the seller has established customer support.

Submissions were also received from several platforms noting that they have invested heavily in proactive efforts to prevent counterfeits from reaching their online stores, and several commenters noted that some platforms have significant interactions with law enforcement to combat counterfeits trafficking. Additionally, there was concern expressed by some respondents that while several of the leading online platforms have built out substantial programs, mandating that these practices be adopted by all online platforms could have significant consequences for smaller competitors.

### **Observations in Support of Strong Government Action**

Five observations emerged from this stakeholder outreach and a broader review of the e-commerce landscape: first, actions by the private sector components of the e-commerce supply, distribution, and sales chain will be critical to reducing the heavy volume of counterfeit and pirated goods circulating in the U.S. economy. This is particularly true for third-party marketplaces, which provide tools that producers of counterfeit and pirated goods can exploit.

With respect to such actions, platforms are increasingly developing methods to remove counterfeit listings and compensate consumers who have unwittingly purchased counterfeit goods. Platforms are also improving their capabilities to more quickly identify counterfeits as well as identify product sectors that are more vulnerable to counterfeiting.

Second, despite such actions, private stakeholders have fallen far short of adequately addressing the substantial challenges that must be surmounted if the trafficking of counterfeit and pirated goods is to be deterred. Such trafficking continues to grow both in the volume and array of goods trafficked. A key failing within the private sector is a lack of a commonly accepted set of best practices to combat counterfeit trafficking.

Third, rights holders are often burdened by e-commerce platforms that operate third-party marketplaces with a disproportionate share of the costs of monitoring, detection, and enforcement falling on rights holders. This burden falls heavily on smaller American enterprises that cannot spread the costs due to trademark infringements and brand enforcement over large sales and inventories.

Fourth, no amount of officers or government resources alone can stem this trafficking.

Fifth, absent the adoption of a set of best practices and a fundamental realignment of incentives brought about by strong government actions, the private sector will continue to fall far short in policing itself. Indeed, the current incentive structure tends to reward the trafficking in counterfeit and pirated goods more than these incentives help to deter such trafficking.

The next two sections of this report identify a set of strong government actions that DHS, in consultation with the interagency, believes is necessary to bring about this fundamental realignment of incentives — and thereby ensure that e-commerce stakeholders appropriately shoulder much more of the responsibility for preventing the online trafficking in counterfeit and pirated goods.

## 7. Immediate Action by DHS and Recommendations for the USG

CBP and ICE are the primary federal agencies responsible for securing America's borders. A key responsibility is to prevent goods that infringe U.S. copyrights, registered trademarks, and certain patents from entering the United States. CBP's interdiction of counterfeit goods at U.S. Ports of Entry (POE) is the frontline of USG IPR enforcement.

In meeting their responsibilities, CBP and ICE have the statutory authority to inspect *any* package as it is imported into U.S. territory. CBP and ICE may draw upon numerous other authorities to stop and prevent the trafficking of counterfeit and pirated goods, from the assessment of civil fines and other penalties to debarring and suspending irresponsible actors. Many of these authorities are underutilized or underdeveloped to match the risks in the evolving e-commerce environment.

The previous sections of this report have provided an overview of the counterfeit trafficking landscape and identified key problems that need to be addressed firmly and swiftly. This section identifies a set of actions DHS will make through enforcement actions, sub-regulatory changes, and as necessary, notice and comment rulemaking or requested statutory amendments. These actions are summarized in the following table:

| <i>Immediate Actions to be Taken by DHS and Recommendations for the U.S. Government</i> |                                                                                            |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>1.</b>                                                                               | <b>Ensure Entities with Financial Interests in Imports Bear Responsibility</b>             |
| <b>2.</b>                                                                               | <b>Increase Scrutiny of Section 321 Environment</b>                                        |
| <b>3.</b>                                                                               | <b>Suspend and Debar Repeat Offenders; Act Against Non-Compliant International Posts</b>   |
| <b>4.</b>                                                                               | <b>Apply Civil Fines, Penalties and Injunctive Actions for Violative Imported Products</b> |

|                                                                                            |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>5. Leverage Advance Electronic Data for Mail Mode</b>                                   |
| <b>6. Anti-Counterfeiting Consortium to Identify Online Nefarious Actors (ACTION) Plan</b> |
| <b>7. Analyze Enforcement Resources</b>                                                    |
| <b>8. Create Modernized E-Commerce Enforcement Framework</b>                               |
| <b>9. Assess Contributory Trademark Infringement Liability for Platforms</b>               |
| <b>10. Re-Examine the Legal Framework Surrounding Non-Resident Importers</b>               |
| <b>11. Establish a National Consumer Awareness Campaign</b>                                |

Unless the trafficking of counterfeit and pirated goods is greatly reduced, Americans will continue to face unacceptably high health and safety risks, American enterprises and workers will continue to endure severe negative impacts, innovation and economic growth will suffer, and America will continue to be exposed to significant national security risks.

### **1. Ensure Entities with Financial Interests in Imports Bear Responsibility**

DHS will pursue a modernized enforcement and regulatory framework that reflects the economic realities of international e-commerce and ensures that the flow of contraband is stopped at its source.

- CBP will adjust its entry processes and requirements, as necessary, to ensure that all appropriate parties to import transactions are held responsible for exercising a duty of reasonable care.
- CBP will treat domestic warehouses and fulfillment centers as the ultimate consignee for any good that has not been sold to a specific consumer at the time of its importation. As discussed in this report, counterfeit products evade detection and sit in fulfillment centers waiting for purchase by a consumer. By treating domestic warehouses and fulfillment centers as consignees in such circumstances, CBP can enhance their ability to identify Section 321 abuses consistent with current authorities, as well as use its other statutory and regulatory authorities to combat trafficking of counterfeit goods in the possession of domestic warehouses and fulfillment centers.
- DHS will encourage platforms and other third-party intermediaries that own or operate warehouses or fulfillment centers to pursue, in coordination with rights holders, bulk abandonment and destruction of contraband goods that were not interdicted by CBP but are in the platform's or other third-party intermediary's possession in a warehouse or fulfillment center. In cases where CBP suspects merchandise destined for a U.S. fulfillment center violates trade laws prohibiting importation of counterfeit goods and initiates a seizure process for merchandise, CBP will notify the platform or other third-party intermediary operating the fulfillment center or warehouse and request they pursue abandonment and destruction with the rights holders of any identical offending goods in their possession. Failure to cooperate following such notification could be a factor when CBP and ICE identify counterfeit cases to pursue under their existing authorities.

- CBP will require formal entry for shipments deemed high-risk, notwithstanding that such shipments might otherwise qualify for duty-free or informal entry treatment. High-risk merchandise shall include those categories of goods that pose an elevated risk of counterfeiting and shall consider the source of the merchandise.
- CBP will address such high-risk shipments within its current bonding regime, developing a framework for a new type of bond specifically for counterfeit risk (like bonds required for anti-dumping and countervailing duties).
- In consultation with the Department of Justice, CBP will provide guidance regarding the types of customs violations that could be actionable under the False Claims Act (FCA) and will make information regarding successful FCA claims publicly available to inform and enable the public to identify and bring such violations to the attention of the government.

## **2. Increase Scrutiny of Section 321 Environment**

As described above, existing laws and administrative practices may not sufficiently define responsibilities in the e-commerce environment, including who within an e-commerce transaction bears responsibility and legal liability for illicit merchandise and other violations. Statutes and administrative practices can be clarified and updated to provide greater transparency and information about the various parties involved so that DHS can identify high-risk transactions, interdict dangerous merchandise, and cause bad actors to pay the price for their actions. To address this problem in the Section 321 environment, CBP shall require data that sufficiently identifies the third-party seller and the nature and value of the imported merchandise, as well as other information that is necessary to determine the responsible party for Section 321 eligibility purposes, consistent with existing legal authorities. This will be informed by the following efforts:

- **Gather Information through Pilot Program.** CBP has been examining different e-commerce platform business models and has initiated several pilot programs designed to better understand the dynamics involved, and the type of information that the government should be collecting, including the “Section 321 Data Pilot” specifically for Section 321 entries, 84 Fed Reg. 35405 (July 23, 2019). CBP plans to continue these efforts for approximately two years and will use the information gained to better target counterfeits in the Section 321 environment, to help shape the scope of further policy formation, and ensure compliance with customs laws.
- **Enhanced Data Requirements.** Upon collection of adequate amounts of data through the Section 321 Data Pilot to identify gaps in the current data collection framework, but no later than six months from the issuance of this report, CBP will, consistent with applicable law, take all necessary steps — including, as applicable, issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking — to initiate a new data collection process. This process will include collecting certain information from domestic warehouses or fulfillment centers about third-party sellers in transactions for which the third-party seller utilizes a domestic warehouse or fulfillment center to store inventory for further sale to domestic consumers. The collection will also include data that sufficiently identifies the third-party seller and the nature and

value of the imported merchandise, as well as other information that is necessary to determine the responsible party for Section 321 eligibility purposes, consistent with existing legal authorities. As appropriate, the domestic warehouse or fulfillment center may be deemed the “person” for Section 321 eligibility if the warehouse or fulfillment center fails to provide CBP with such information.

- **Issue Guidance.** To prevent abuse of Section 321, CBP will develop administrative guidance and, if necessary, consider whether promulgating new regulations is necessary to better define and subsequently enforce Section 321 eligibility requirements. At a minimum this guidance will address the following:
  - What value needs to be reported for a Section 321 entry; and
  - What information will be necessary to uniquely identify the ultimate consignee.

### **3. Suspend and Debar Repeat Offenders; Act Against Non-Compliant International Postal Operators**

In appropriate circumstances, CBP and ICE currently take steps to add persons (both entities and individuals) that have been found to lack present responsibility to the federal suspension and debarment list. Those persons on this suspension and debarment list are prohibited from participating in both government procurement and certain other non-procurement activities. However, current agency practices continue to permit these persons to obtain importer of record numbers and import goods into the United States.

Explicitly clarifying the scope of suspension and debarment to prevent participation in the importer of record program by amending Executive Order 12549 will assist CBP in requiring regulated entities to screen their customers against the suspension and debarment list. This will improve targeting and reduce the number of packages sent by repeat offenders, thereby stopping the flow of contraband at their sources.

- CBP recommends amending Executive Order 12549 to explicitly bar suspended and debarred persons from participating in the Importer of Record Program.
- Following such an amendment, or as otherwise consistent with applicable law and Executive Orders, CBP will require express consignment operators, carriers, and hub facilities to verify their customers have not been suspended or debarred from participating in the Importer of Record Program and refuse to provide import-related services to such suspended or debarred customers.
- Consistent with applicable law, CBP will condition continued access to its “trusted trader programs” by express consignment operators, carriers, and hub facilities on compliance with this verification process that determines whether a customer has been suspended or debarred.

- Consistent with applicable law, CBP also will identify non-compliant international postal operators and international posts by developing an International Mail Non-Compliance metric and will take enforcement actions based on these metrics.

#### **4. Apply Civil Fines, Penalties, and Injunctive Actions for Violative Imported Products**

It is critical to the integrity of e-commerce and for the protection of consumers and rights holders that e-commerce platforms that operate third-party marketplaces, and other third-party intermediaries assume greater responsibility, and therefore greater liability for their roles in the trafficking of counterfeit and pirated goods. To that end, CBP and ICE will use existing statutory and regulatory authorities to reach the activities of third-party marketplaces and other intermediaries where evidence demonstrates they have unlawfully assisted in the importation of counterfeit and pirated goods through the following actions:

- CBP and ICE will immediately begin to identify cases in which third-party intermediaries have demonstrably directed, assisted financially, or aided and abetted the importation of counterfeit merchandise. In coordination with the Department of Justice, CBP and ICE will seek all available statutory authorities to pursue civil fines and other penalties against these entities, including remedies under 19 U.S.C. § 1526(f), as appropriate.
- DHS recommends the administration pursue a statutory change to explicitly permit the government to seek injunctive relief against third-party marketplaces and other intermediaries dealing in counterfeit merchandise.
- In the interim, DHS will provide information and support to registered brand owners looking to utilize statutory authorities to seek injunctive relief against persons dealing in counterfeit merchandise, whether through direct sales or facilitation of sales, following seizures of goods that are imported contrary to law.
- ICE shall prioritize investigations into intellectual property-based crimes regardless of size and will make referrals for all such investigations where appropriate.
- ICE will coordinate with the Department of Justice to develop a strategy to investigate and prosecute intellectual property violations at all levels of the supply chain at a sufficiently high level to respond to the concerns raised in this report and according to its budget and broader mission goals.

#### **5. Leverage Advance Electronic Data for Mail Mode**

The United States Postal Service (USPS) is responsible for the presentation of mail and the provision of advance electronic data (AED) to CBP for arriving international mail parcels. USPS receives such AED from international posts. As has been noted, given the number of e-commerce transactions that are sent by mail, there is a significant gap in the information CBP receives. USPS and CBP have enhanced their collaboration in the targeting and identification of offending

merchandise that is imported through international mail. Both agencies are implementing new strategies for leveraging the AED already available to identify offending merchandise by taking the following actions:

- DHS and USPS have signed a letter of intent that enables the USPS to work alongside CBP during special operations to become a force multiplier in the interdiction of counterfeit products.
- Upon completion and publication of the Synthetics Trafficking and Overdose Prevention (STOP) Act implementing regulations, DHS will use information gleaned from the 321 Data Pilot and will make recommendations to USPS to address any critical data gaps that remain between what is required of mail versus air cargo. At a minimum, this effort will seek to enhance the individualized tracking of international mail parcels sent through air cargo.

## **6. Plan for ACTION**

Counterfeit networks can be complex and multidimensional, exploiting legal and regulatory nuances in the different stages and aspects of international trade. Yet, for a variety of reasons, including competition law and trade secrets protection, various stakeholders in the e-commerce supply and distribution chains historically have not shared information on problematic sellers, shippers, freight forwarders, brokers, and other third-party intermediaries involved in counterfeit trafficking.

To address this issue, the IPR Center established the E-Commerce Working Group (ECWG) to foster and encourage the flow of actionable data and information between platforms and relevant third-party intermediaries as well as affected carriers, shippers, search engines, and payment processors. DHS supports the efforts of the IPR Center's ECWG and recommends the formation of the Anti-Counterfeiting Consortium to Identify Online Nefarious Actors (ACTION). Specific ACTION efforts will include the following:

- Sharing information within the ACTION framework on sellers, shippers, and other third-party intermediaries involved in trafficking in counterfeit and pirated goods.
- Sharing of risk automation techniques allowing ACTION members to create and improve on proactive targeting systems that automatically monitor online platform sellers for counterfeits and pirated goods.
- In addition, ACTION members may enter non-binding memoranda of understanding (MOU) with the IPR Center, consistent with U.S. law, to clarify the expectations and legal understanding for data sharing and coordinated IPR enforcement moving forward. Such MOUs will provide a vehicle to create a compliance scoring mechanism, as well as to delineate reasonable efforts to know the seller as well as the scope of products involved

(e.g., fast-moving consumer goods, consumer electronics, fashion and luxury products, sports goods, software, and games, and toys).

## **7. Analyze Enforcement Resources**

Packages shipped through the international mail environment account for approximately 500 million packages annually. This does not include the millions of packages sent out daily via express consignment carriers. Amidst this flood of packages, insufficient resources can create a key limitation on the capabilities of DHS and other government agencies to screen, target, and detect the counterfeit and pirated goods that hide amongst the increasing massive flow of small packages.

A lack of resources also limits the ability of intelligence gathering and analysis, the proper determination of whether suspect goods may be counterfeit, the collection of comprehensive data on the trafficking in counterfeit and pirated goods, and the ability to conduct criminal investigations into the organizations that traffic in counterfeit goods. To address these issues, the following actions shall be taken:

- CBP will analyze whether the fees collected by CBP are currently set at sufficient levels to reimburse the costs associated with processing, inspecting, and collecting duties, taxes, and fees for parcels. CBP shall also provide recommendations to the Department of the Treasury regarding any fee adjustments that would be necessary to fund and reimburse the federal government's costs for more effectively combating the trafficking of counterfeit and pirated goods.

## **8. Create Modernized E-Commerce Enforcement Framework**

DHS will pursue a modernized enforcement framework that reflects the economic realities of international e-commerce. This new framework may rely on the provision of privileges or benefits by CBP to e-commerce entities in exchange for the submission of additional data elements and sufficient internal controls that demonstrate the entities' ability to identify and manage risk within their respective supply chains. This new framework may also require updates to existing statutes and regulations to underpin this effort. Key elements of a modernized e-commerce enforcement framework could include, but are not limited to:

- Seeking statutory authority to treat IPR infringing goods as summarily forfeited upon discovery by CBP or ICE similar to the treatment of Schedule I and II narcotics under Title 21 of the U.S. Code. This will send a clear message about the importance of IPR enforcement, and simultaneously streamline the disposition of CBP enforcement actions.
- Pursuing statutory and/or regulatory changes, as necessary, so that CBP can better share information with the private sector;
- Implementing a risk-based bonding regime for e-commerce transactions; and
- Adopting streamlined enforcement processes for seized, abandoned, and forfeited goods.

## **9. Assess Contributory Trademark Infringement Liability for E-Commerce**

Online platforms have avoided civil liability for contributory trademark infringement in several cases. Given the advance and expansion of e-commerce, DHS recommends that the Department of Commerce consider the following measures:

- Assess the state of liability for trademark infringement considering recent judicial opinions, and the impact of this report—including platforms’ implementation of the best practices directed herein.
- Seek input from the private sector and other stakeholders as to the application of the traditional doctrines of trademark infringement to the e-commerce setting, including whether to pursue changes in the application of the contributory and/or vicarious infringement standards to platforms.

## **10. Re-Examine the Legal Framework Surrounding Non-Resident Importers**

Currently, non-resident importers can legally enter goods into the United States provided they have a “resident agent” as defined in regulation. In practice, it can be difficult to compel non-resident importers to pay civil penalties and respond to other enforcement actions available to the USG. With this in mind, DHS should reevaluate the legal framework for allowing non-resident importers in the Section 321 *de minimis* low-value shipment environment.

## **11. Establish a National Consumer Awareness Campaign**

Given the critical role that consumers can play in the battle against online counterfeiting, DHS recommends the development of a national public-private awareness campaign. The national public awareness campaign recommended by DHS should involve platforms, rights holders, and the applicable government agencies to provide education for consumers regarding the risks of counterfeits as well as the various ways consumers can use to spot counterfeit products. At present, many consumers remain uninformed as to the risks of buying counterfeit and pirated products online. These risks are both direct to them (e.g., tainted baby food), as well as indirect (e.g., sales revenues can fund terrorism).

Many consumers are also unaware of the significant probabilities they face of being defrauded by counterfeiters when they shop on e-commerce platforms. As this report has documented, these probabilities are unacceptably high and appear to be rising. Even those consumers motivated to conduct research and stay informed might lack the specialized knowledge and efficient user tools to make diligent online buying decisions.

A strong and ongoing national campaign to increase public awareness about the risks of counterfeits in an e-commerce world should help alert consumers about the potential dangers of some online purchases. To the extent e-commerce platforms empower their consumers to participate in the monitoring and detection of counterfeits, e.g., by implementing several of the best practices recommended in this report, this will also help in the fight against the trafficking in counterfeit and pirated goods.

This effort could use technology as well as provide online education. For example, online marketplaces could prominently display messages on their home pages, as well as on high-risk item pages, warning customers about the dangers of counterfeits and urging respect for intellectual property rights. Additionally, the campaign could be paired with technologically-enabled assurances of authenticity. Such an approach would provide commercial advantages to the platforms that adopt it while also benefiting consumers and rights holders through reliable methods to identify and certify the authenticity of branded products across online platforms.

## 8. Private Sector Best Practices

The following table catalogs a set of high priority “best practices” that should be swiftly adopted by e-commerce platforms that operate third-party marketplaces, and other third-party intermediaries. Under the authority of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, these best practices shall be recommended and communicated to all relevant private sector stakeholders by the ICE/HSI-led IPR Center.

It shall be a duty of the IPR Center to encourage, monitor, and report on the adoption of, and the progress and effectiveness of, these best practices, through all means necessary within the scope of the legal authority of DHS and the Federal Government.

| <i>Best Practices for E-Commerce Platforms and Third-Party Marketplaces</i>           |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>1. Comprehensive "Terms of Service" Agreements</b>                                 |
| <b>2. Significantly Enhanced Vetting of Third-Party Sellers</b>                       |
| <b>3. Limitations on High Risk Products</b>                                           |
| <b>4. Efficient Notice and Takedown Procedures</b>                                    |
| <b>5. Enhanced Post-Discovery Actions</b>                                             |
| <b>6. Indemnity Requirements for Foreign Sellers</b>                                  |
| <b>7. Clear Transactions Through Banks that Comply with U.S. Enforcement Requests</b> |
| <b>8. Pre-Sale Identification of Third-Party Sellers</b>                              |
| <b>9. Establish Marketplace Seller IDs</b>                                            |
| <b>10. Clearly Identifiable Country of Origin Disclosures</b>                         |

### **1. Comprehensive “Terms of Service” Agreements**

It is critical that platforms require all third-party sellers to sign comprehensive and stringent terms of service agreements that maximize the authorities of the platforms to combat counterfeit

trafficking. Terms of service agreements will provide platforms with an important legal means to combat counterfeit trafficking

Most obviously, these terms of service should incorporate explicit prohibitions on selling counterfeit and pirated goods. Once the platform has affirmatively detected infringement on a seller profile, the actions listed below under the category of “post-discovery actions” should be allowed under the terms and taken swiftly.

The terms of service should also list the potential repercussions sellers face for violations. Generally, these repercussions should allow platforms to impose sanctions such as suspension, termination, and debarment without waiting for a determination by a court for sellers who violate the terms of the agreement. The terms should include escalating capabilities to suspend, terminate, and debar counterfeit traffickers and their affiliates.

Specifically, they should allow the platform to conduct, at a minimum, the following actions in response to violations or identified risk factors in the seller’s profile and product postings without waiting for a determination by a court:

- (1) terminate or suspend a seller account based on the use or reference to a username that is confusingly similar to a registered trademark;
- (2) take down or suspend and keep down individual product postings based on the misuse of photographs, logos, external links to infringing content, certain coded messages with actual intellectual property references removed, or imbedded offers to manufacture; and
- (3) allow for an escalating enforcement structure that results in (for major infractions and/or repeat minor infractions) permanent removal of the seller, and any known related seller profiles, from the marketplace feature of the platform and further results in forfeiture and destruction of all offending goods in warehouses or fulfillment centers operated by, or under the control of, the platform.

To maximize platform authorities, and as explained further below, such terms of service should also allow platforms to impose appropriate limitations on products listed, require clearly identifiable country of origin disclosures, impose U.S. banking and indemnity requirements, and significantly improve pre-sale identification of third-party sellers.

## **2. Significantly Enhanced Vetting of Third-Party Sellers**

Significantly enhanced vetting of third-party sellers is one of the most effective forms of due diligence platforms can engage in to reduce the risk of counterfeits entering the e-commerce stream. Platforms should have a uniform and articulable vetting regime to determine if a seller will be allowed to list products for sale.

To facilitate enhanced vetting, platforms should, at a minimum, require the following:

- (1) sufficient identification of the seller, its accounts and listings, and its business locations prior to allowing the seller to list products on the platform;
- (2) certification from the seller as to whether it, or related persons, have been banned or removed from any major e-commerce platforms, or otherwise implicated in selling counterfeit or pirated products online; and
- (3) acknowledgment, where applicable, that the seller is offering trademarked products for which the seller does not own the rights (either because they are a reseller or seller of used products).

Information provided by potential sellers should also be vetted for accuracy, including through the following efforts:

- (1) use of technological tools, as well as analyses of historical and public data, to assess risk of sellers and products; and
- (2) establishment of an audit program for sellers, concentrating on repeat offenders and those sellers exhibiting higher risk characteristics.

Any failure to provide accurate and responsive information should result in a determination to decline the seller account and/or to hold the seller in violation of the platform's terms of service.

### **3. Limitations on High Risk Products**

Platforms should have in place protocols and procedures to place limitations on the sale of products that have a higher risk of being counterfeited or pirated and/or pose a higher risk to the public health and safety. For example, some of the major platforms completely prohibit the sale of prescription medications by third-party sellers in their marketplaces. Many platforms also ban the sale of products that are known to be particularly vulnerable to counterfeiting and that pose a safety risk when sold online. Examples include car airbag components, infant formula, and new batteries for cellular phones.

Platforms can also place other types of restrictions on third-party sellers before certain high-risk categories of goods may be sold. For example, some platforms require prior approval for items such as automotive parts, jewelry, art, food, computers, sports collectibles, DVDs, and watches that are particularly prone to counterfeiting.

Platforms should prominently publish a list of items that may not be sold on third-party marketplaces under any circumstances (prohibited), as well as a list of items that can only be sold when accompanied by independent third-party certification (restricted). In constructing these lists, platforms should consider, among other things, whether a counterfeit version of the underlying product presents increased risks to the health and safety of U.S. residents or the national security of the United States. When a seller claims their merchandise has an independent third-party certification, and this certification is required in order for the product to be legally offered for sale

in the United States, platforms should make good-faith efforts to verify the authenticity of these certifications.

#### **4. Efficient Notice and Takedown Procedures**

Notice and takedown is the most common method of removing counterfeit listings from third-party marketplaces and e-commerce platforms. This noticing process can be particularly time-consuming and resource-intensive for rights holders who currently bear a highly disproportionate share of the burden of identifying the counterfeit listings for noticing.

These rights holders must invest significant resources to scour millions of listings across multiple platforms to identify potentially counterfeit listings and notify the third-party marketplace or e-commerce platform. This kind of comprehensive policing of e-commerce often is not possible for smaller enterprises.

As a further burden, some third-party marketplaces require rights holders to buy the suspected products from the sellers to verify that they are in fact counterfeit. There often is a delay of a day or longer between the time that notice is provided, and the time listing is removed. During this period, counterfeiters may continue to defraud American consumers.

To address these abuses — and assume a much greater share of responsibility for the policing of e-commerce — platforms should create and maintain clear, precise, and objective criteria that allow for quick and efficient notice and takedowns of infringing seller profiles and product listings. An effective regime should include, at a minimum, the following: (1) minimal registration requirements for an interested party to participate in the notice and takedown process; (2) reasonable rules that treat profile owners offering large quantities of goods on consumer-to-consumer platforms as businesses; and (3) transparency to the rights holders as to how complaints are resolved along with relevant information on other sales activity by the seller that has been implicated.

#### **5. Enhanced Post-Discovery Actions**

Upon discovery that counterfeit or pirated goods have been sold, platforms should conduct a series of “post-discovery” actions to remediate the fraud. These should include:

- (1) notification to any buyer(s) likely to have purchased the goods in question with the offer of a full refund;
- (2) notification to implicated rights holders, with details of the infringing goods, and information as to any remaining stock of the counterfeit and pirated goods held in warehouses;
- (3) implementation of practices that result in the removal of counterfeit and pirated goods within the platform’s effective control and in a manner that prevents such goods from re-entering the U.S. or being diverted to other markets; and

(4) immediate engagement with law enforcement to provide intelligence and to determine further courses of action.

## **6. Indemnification Requirements for Foreign Sellers**

For a large portion of e-commerce, foreign sellers do not provide security or protection against a loss or other financial burden associated with the products they sell in the United States. Because these sellers are located outside the United States, they also may not be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in civil litigation or government enforcement actions. Further adding to this liability gap, there is this: while e-commerce platforms generally have a U.S. presence and are under U.S. jurisdiction, under the current interpretations of American laws and regulations, they are often found not to be liable for harm caused by the products they sell or distribute.

The result of this jurisdictional and liability gap is that consumers and rights holders do not have an efficient or predictable form of legal recourse when they are harmed by foreign products sold on third-party marketplaces. Accordingly, e-commerce platforms should require foreign sellers to provide some form of security in cases where a foreign product is sold to a U.S. consumer. Such form of security should be specifically designed to cover the potential types and scope of harm to consumers and rights holders from counterfeit or pirated products.

Note that there are several ways that platforms might flexibly achieve this goal. For example, requiring proof of insurance would provide a form of security for any reasonably foreseeable damages to consumers that might flow from the use of the product. Rights holders could also be compensated in cases of infringement.

## **7. Clear Transactions Through Banks that Comply with U.S. Enforcement Requests**

Many foreign sellers on third-party marketplaces do not have a financial nexus to the United States, making it difficult to obtain financial information and to subject all parts of the transaction to U.S. law enforcement efforts.

Platforms should close this loophole by encouraging all sellers to clear transactions only with banks and payment providers that comply with U.S. law enforcement requests for information and laws related to (relevant to) the financing of counterfeit activity.

## **8. Pre-Sale Identification of Third-Party Sellers**

Stakeholders have, at times, reported that buyers have been surprised to discover upon completion of an online sales transaction, that the order will be fulfilled by an unknown third-party seller and *not* the platform itself. Without addressing the separate legal question of whether this comprises deceptive action *per se*, at least some buyers may have made different purchasing decisions if they

had known, prior to purchase, the identity of the third-party “storefront” owner, and/or the party ultimately responsible for fulfilling the transaction.

To increase transparency on this issue, platforms should significantly improve their pre-sale identification of third-party sellers so that buyers can make informed decisions, potentially factoring in the likelihood of being sold a counterfeit or IPR infringing merchandise. Platforms should implement additional measures to inform consumers, prior to the completion of a transaction, of the identity of storefront owners and/or those responsible for fulfilling a transaction, as well as any allegations of counterfeits being sold by a particular seller. On the converse, if a particular seller is a licensed reseller of the product, this information should also be provided.

Even if this information may be currently available, firm steps should be taken to ensure that this information is featured prominently in product listings. This will prompt greater consumer awareness and lead to more informed decision-making.

## **9. Establish Marketplace Seller IDs**

Platforms generally do not require a seller on a third-party marketplace to identify the underlying business entity, nor to link one seller profile to other profiles owned by that same business, or by related businesses and owners. In addition, the party that appears as the seller on the invoice and the business or profile that appears on the platform to be the seller, may not always be the same. This lack of transparency allows one business to have many different profiles that can appear unrelated. It also allows a business to create and dissolve profiles with greater ease, which can obfuscate the main mechanism that consumers use to judge seller credibility, namely reviews by other buyers.

Platforms should require sellers to provide the names of their underlying business or businesses (if applicable), as well as any other related seller profiles owned or controlled by that seller or that clear transactions through the same merchant account. Platforms can use this seller ID information in three helpful ways:

First, to communicate to the consumer a more holistic view of “who” is selling the goods, allowing the consumer to inspect, and consult reviews of, all related seller profiles to determine trustworthiness. Second, linking all related sellers together will assist rights holders in monitoring who is selling goods that they believe to be infringing. Third, the platform can use the connections to other seller profiles to better conduct its own internal risk assessment, and make risk mitigation decisions (e.g., requiring cash deposits or insurance) as appropriate based on the volume and sophistication of the seller.

## **10. Clearly Identifiable Country of Origin Disclosures**

Brick-and-mortar retail stores are required to have labels on their products that clearly identify the country or countries of origin. No such requirement applies to online e-commerce.

Platforms should require sellers to disclose the country of origin of their products; and platforms should post this country of origin information for all the products they sell. This will assist both the platforms and consumers in evaluating the risks that a product might be counterfeit.

## 9. Conclusions

Both private sector and USG input to this report have shown that the flood of counterfeit and pirated goods now being trafficked to American consumers through online third-party marketplaces is threatening both the public health and safety as well as national security. The lack of effective methods for addressing counterfeit goods stifles American innovation and erodes the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturers and workers. Despite increased efforts of both the USG and private sector stakeholders, the trafficking of counterfeit and pirated goods continues to worsen, in both the volume and the array of products being trafficked.

This report to President Donald J. Trump has identified a set of strong government actions that DHS and other federal agencies can begin executing immediately to address a crisis that is undermining America's trust in e-commerce even as it is exposing the American public to undue and unacceptable risks.

Additionally, this report has proposed a set of best practices for private sector stakeholders that DHS believes should be adopted swiftly. As the longstanding experiences of brick-and-mortar stores demonstrate, the private sector is capable of operating businesses that sell legitimate, not illicit, goods to American consumers. We should expect the same level of care from online third-party marketplaces that we expect from the stores physically located in our communities.

During the time you have spent reading this report, hundreds of thousands of new clicks in online third-party marketplaces have started the process for a new wave of counterfeits flooding into the United States. Although the USG will continue to benefit from additional information flowing from current-running pilot programs, and longer-term legislative and regulatory efforts, the time has come for action, both from the USG and those private sector companies that desire to be good partners in combating the scourge of counterfeiting.

## 10. Appendix A: The IPR Center

The National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center (IPR Center) is led by Homeland Security Investigations. The IPR Center plays an important role in consumer and rights holders education on the dangers of purchasing counterfeit goods and on how to report a suspected counterfeit to law enforcement.

In 2018, the IPR Center conducted 192 IPR and commercial fraud-related outreach efforts, reaching 12,061 people. As recommended in this report, this IPR Center should play a critical and expanded role in the ongoing battle against counterfeit trafficking.

This Appendix describes some of the major initiatives the IPR Center is currently involved in.

### *Background on the IPR Center*

The IPR Center brings together 25 U.S Government and foreign government agencies in a task force setting using a three-pronged approach to combat intellectual property and trade crime: interdiction, investigation, and outreach to the public and law enforcement. It seeks to coordinate a unified USG response to the growing threat of counterfeiting and has significantly expanded the original multi-agency law enforcement and regulatory endeavor created to target IPR crimes.

As part of this effort, rights holders, online marketplaces, payment processors and companies involved in all points across the supply chain regularly meet with members of the IPR Center to share their best practices, concerns, and suggestions. The information gathered at these events can lead to further collaboration across sectors to develop innovative solutions to complex cross-cutting challenges, including enhanced information sharing, joint enforcement actions, and specialized, targeted training and outreach.

### *IPR Training*

The IPR Center, with assistance from the Department of State, works closely with International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (DOS/INL) and DOJ International Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property Section (formerly Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Coordinator - IPLEC). In conjunction with ICE Attaché offices, the IPR Center directs, organizes and delivers regional IPR training in the form of lectures and presentations to foreign customs, police, prosecutors, and magistrates.

IPR Center training programs are usually 3-5 days in length and emphasize IPR enforcement, particularly the investigation and prosecution of IPR violations and associated crimes such as smuggling and money laundering.

The training programs are interactive workshops led by subject matter experts and focus on health and safety risks associated with counterfeited items such as pharmaceuticals, electronics, automotive parts, and health and beauty products. With the growing number of e-commerce marketplaces, the training programs have an Internet-investigations focus as well.

Private sector representatives or associations are also invited to participate in the training programs to highlight the challenges their industry sector may face in a particular region and to highlight the necessity of government and industry cooperation.

#### *Automotive Anti-Counterfeiting Council*

The IPR Center meets regularly with automotive original equipment manufacturers through the Automotive Anti-Counterfeiting Council (A2C2) to address the sale and distribution of counterfeit parts and components to unsuspecting consumers, including the distribution of counterfeit parts through third-party marketplaces. The IPR Center and the A2C2 work together to provide training to federal and local law enforcement partners and payment processors on recognizing counterfeit automotive parts and conducting criminal investigations and prosecutions.

#### *Defense Industrial Base Supply Chain*

Addressing counterfeits in the defense industrial base supply chain is critical to national security. A faulty counterfeit product can harm not only the individual who uses it. It can impact the safety and security of the entire country if dangerous counterfeits are used in combat situations.

The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) is a Department of Defense (DOD)-specific supplement to the Federal Acquisitions Regulation (FAR), which establishes government-wide regulations governing executive agency procurement contracts. DFARS 252.246-7007, Contractor Counterfeit Electronic Part Detection and Avoidance System, requires that certain government contractors institute and implement a counterfeit detection and avoidance system for electronic parts, including establishing the minimum requirements for such a system and penalties for a failure to comply. In addition, contractors can recover the costs of any rework or corrective action taken to remedy any counterfeit parts from subcontractors.

Operation Chain Reaction (OCR) is an ICE-led initiative at the IPR Center that targets counterfeits entering the supply chains of the DOD and other USG agencies. OCR began in June 2011, and it combines the expertise of 17 federal agencies. Each year, the OCR Task Force co-hosts the Counterfeit Microelectronics Working Group (CMWG) with the Department of Justice's Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS). Attendees include representatives from industry, law enforcement, Department of Defense (DOD), and Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSAs). The focus of the meetings is to enhance communication between law enforcement and industry and discuss the latest trends in the counterfeiting of integrated circuits. The CMWG's role is to protect the DOD supply chain through extensive collaboration.

## 11. Appendix B: Ongoing CBP Activities to Combat Counterfeit Trafficking

This appendix provides a brief summary of some of the major activities CBP and DHS engage in as part of the battle against the trafficking of counterfeit and pirated goods.

### *National Targeting Center*

CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC) carries out daily targeting on IPR recidivists, which often use third-party marketplaces for counterfeit trafficking. It makes referrals to the IPR Center for review and distribution to its field offices for further investigation. It also provides real time IPR case support for Homeland Security Investigations and collaborates with the NTC's investigations division to collaborate on IPR criminal leads and existing cases.

### *COAC E-Commerce Working Group*

The Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee (COAC) provides recommendations to the Secretaries of the Treasury and DHS on improvements to the commercial operations of CBP. The COAC consists of 20 members appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of DHS.

COAC members are representative of the individuals and firms affected by the commercial operations of CBP. CBP's Office of Trade leads the COAC E-Commerce Working Group, which focuses on policy challenges surrounding the increase of e-commerce shipment volumes. The group recently finalized a supply chain map that the COAC recommended CBP use for outreach and policy-making endeavors.

### *Outreach*

Section 311 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act (TFTEA) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 4350) calls for DHS to develop and execute an educational awareness campaign aimed at informing international travelers about the legal, economic, and public health and safety impacts of importing IPR-infringing merchandise. There have been four phases to date in the "Truth Behind Counterfeits" IPR public awareness campaign—summer 2017, holidays 2017, summer 2018, and holidays 2018.

During each of these four phases, advertisements have run on large-scale billboards in major U.S. airports throughout the country. There has also been a digital component to the campaign where the ads run on relevant travel-related websites.

CBP continues to partner with the private sector to conduct IPR risk assessments by allowing IPR owners to assist CBP in identifying authentic and low-risk shipments. CBP is also highly engaged with the private sector through participation in the IPR Working Group of the COAC's Trade Enforcement and Revenue Collection Subcommittee, and the Department of Commerce's Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights.

In FY 2018, CBP conducted roundtables to bring together personnel from the law enforcement community and industry stakeholders for information sharing among members. This provided an opportunity for industry stakeholders to share specific industry standards with field personnel working to protect stakeholder rights at the border. In FY 2018, CBP held roundtables at the Automotive and Aerospace Center of Excellence and Expertise IPR Conference.

CBP personnel from headquarters, the ports, the centers, NTC, and the targeting groups also meet regularly with private sector stakeholders and trade associations to discuss trends, technologies, and ways to cooperate on IPR enforcement. CBP maintains IPR enforcement personnel across the country, allowing CBP personnel to meet with businesses and trade associations either at headquarters or in locations close to where the companies are located or do business. CBP personnel regularly meet with brand protection and other corporate officials on a company-specific basis.

Additionally, CBP pursues bilateral and multilateral engagements with foreign counterparts to conduct joint customs IPR enforcement operations, share effective enforcement practices, and exchange information on IPR violations to improve targeting and interdiction of counterfeit and pirated goods.

CBP, in coordination with ICE/HSI, focuses its bilateral engagement efforts on those countries with which CBP and ICE/HSI have a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement (CMAA) and continues to pursue establishing new CMAAs with foreign governments around the world. CBP attachés stationed at embassies around the world facilitate cooperation through operational planning, information exchange, and sharing best practices between CBP and foreign customs authorities.

### *Training*

CBP's IPR-related training focuses on training front-line and Center of Excellence and Expertise (Center) personnel on how detect, examine, and enforce IPR violations. Several offices within CBP collaborate to provide a robust IPR instructor-led training course that covers IPR seizure authority, enforcement best practices, administrative IPR procedures, and other critical legal and policy topics.

CBP's Office of Trade also conducts IPR webinars to educate port and Center personnel on IPR infringing products. Rights holders provide information on how to recognize IPR-infringing products, labels, and packaging. CBP is also developing a formalized Advanced IPR Enforcement Training course that will expand on the existing IPR Instructor-led Training course to increase students' knowledge of advanced IPR enforcement areas.

Private sector engagement also continues to comprise a significant part of CBP training for frontline personnel. Rights holders are routinely invited to address CBP audiences at local ports and the Centers. CBP also hosts national webinars with rights holders designed to train personnel across the country. Rights holders also provide CBP personnel with product identification guides

that describe methods to distinguish between genuine and infringing products. These guides afford frontline personnel the ability to compare imported merchandise with pictures of genuine products.

Additionally, CBP Regulations and Rulings provide training on advanced detection of trademark/copyright infringement to Import Specialists of the Automotive and Aerospace Center, the Consumer Products and Mass Merchandising Center, and the Apparel, Footwear and Textile Center, as well as to CBP officers at the ports of Newark, New Jersey, and John F. Kennedy Airport.

### *Rulemakings and Procedures*

CBP has recently published two notices of proposed rulemaking related to the protection of intellectual property rights. In the first, CBP proposes to standardize the process by which customs brokers verify the identity of their clients, typically importers. The proposed regulations would formalize the verification process and require that a re-verification process be carried out by brokers every year. This improved broker knowledge is designed to allow for better commercial fraud prevention and revenue protection, and to help prevent the use of shell or shelf companies by importers who attempt to evade the customs laws of the United States. Preventing the use of shell or shelf companies by importers would help reduce the misclassification of merchandise to avoid duties, protect against IPR violations, reduce antidumping/countervailing duty infractions, and reduce the importation of unsafe merchandise.

The second proposal would create a procedure for the disclosure of information otherwise protected by the Trade Secrets Act to a trademark owner when merchandise has been voluntarily abandoned if CBP suspects that the successful importation of the merchandise would have violated U.S. trade laws prohibiting the importation of merchandise bearing counterfeit marks. This regulation will provide greater transparency for partner government agencies, as well as for rights holders; allowing both to reassess and amend their own enforcement strategies in light of contemporaneous attempts to import counterfeit and pirated goods.

### *Trade Special Operations*

A CBP Trade Special Operation (TSO) is a comprehensive and focused trade targeting action conducted during a limited timeframe to address a specific trade enforcement risk, usually in support of one of CBP's Priority Trade Issues (PTIs), which include IPR violations. These operations target high-risk shipments at seaports, airports, CBP's international mail facilities, and express consignment carrier hubs across the United States.

Three related developments have contributed to the growth in the number of national and local TSOs and improved visibility into their results: (1) The implementation of the Automated Targeting System (ATS) Import Targeting module and the updated ATS Import Cargo module at the beginning of FY 2019; (2) the issuance of an updated TSO Standard Operating Procedures in FY 2019; and (3) the ongoing efforts of proactive trade enforcement managers collaborating within CBP's Integrated Trade Targeting Network, which meets monthly and represents all of CBP trade components (Field Offices, Centers, Headquarters, and other offices).

## 12. Appendix C: Homeland Security Investigations

Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) within DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency is the principal investigative arm of DHS. It is a vital U.S. asset in combating criminal organizations illegally exploiting America's travel, trade, financial and immigration systems and including the theft of intellectual property.

### *Investigations*

HSI investigates sophisticated, complex conspiracies that span international boundaries. These investigations result in the prosecution of members of transnational criminal organizations and the seizure of illicit proceeds and contraband.

### *Operation In Our Sites*

Since 2010, HSI has been conducting Operation In Our Sites (IOS). This operation targets criminal organizations that distribute dangerous and illicit goods via websites, online platforms, and social media sites.

Initially formed as a U.S.-based initiative for the seizure of domain name registrations, IOS has evolved to develop long term investigations that identify targets and assets in the U.S. and disrupt the financial schemes used by these organizations, both domestically and internationally.

Operation IOS has been expanded to include efforts by various European countries and coordinated by Europol (the European Union's law enforcement agency). These efforts include civil takedowns by private sector companies/groups.

In 2018, 26 countries and dozens of private sector companies participated in IOS, resulted in the criminal seizure of over 33,000 domain name registrations and the civil seizure of over 1.2 million domain name registrations.

In addition, over 2.2 million URL links to e-commerce platforms and social media platforms have been seized as a result of IOS. When a domain name registration is seized as part of IOS, Internet traffic to that site is redirected towards a seizure banner notifying visitors that the site has been seized for offering counterfeits. Since IOS began, there have been more than 177 million views of the IOS seizure banner.

On February 14, 2018, HSI also published its E-Commerce Strategic Plan. It leverages collaboration among private industry, law enforcement, and advocates for a cooperative enforcement approach to identify and dismantle organizations and prosecute people that traffic in dangerous and illicit goods utilizing various e-commerce outlets. These outlets include both the open-net and the dark web along with sales platforms, social media, and a variety of payment processors and shipping methods.

### *National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance*

HSI has two staff members at the National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA), a non-government organization in Pittsburgh, PA. The professionals at NCFTA work with industry and law enforcement to de-conflict leads and coordinate operations between agencies, as well as to share intelligence and develop investigative referrals. The NCFTA brings together experienced law enforcement agents and analysts, governmental experts, and industry leaders to form an integral alliance between academia, law enforcement, and industry.

### *E-Commerce Working Group*

In November 2017, HSI established the E-Commerce Working Group; it includes representatives from various online marketplaces, payment platforms, and express consignment businesses along with CBP and the FBI. This working group also includes the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, a Washington, D.C.-based non-profit organization devoted to combating product counterfeiting and piracy.

The E-Commerce Working Group meets regularly to facilitate the exchange of intelligence, share best practices, and identify cross-sector collaboration among its members. In late 2018, HSI led a pilot project which involved the sharing of data among the participating online platforms. This pilot project demonstrated that criminal organizations are exploiting multiple online platforms to sell counterfeit items.

HSI is also working with members of the E-Commerce Working Group as they strive to establish, by late 2019, a practice of sustained and timely sharing of large amounts of information between the platforms. Once this has been accomplished, the initiative will be expanded to include participation by the payment platforms and express consignment sectors.

### *Training*

HSI offers an advanced commercial fraud training course entitled “Intellectual Property and Trade Enforcement Investigations.” This two-week training covers a range of intellectual property and trade enforcement topics. Representatives from the consumer electronics, tobacco, automotive, and other industries subject to high counterfeit risk deliver presentations as part of this training. Four sessions of this course were delivered to 120 HSI and CBP attendees in FY 2019.

## 13. Appendix D: U.S. Government Efforts

Across the interagency, the USG engages in a comprehensive approach to monitor, deter, and prevent the importation, distribution, and sale of counterfeit and pirated goods into the United States. Law enforcement and regulatory agencies, as well as prosecutors and civil complainants all play a role in addressing this issue, especially as it affects the health and safety, economy and national security of the United States. Some aspects of this approach are mode-neutral while others are specific to the international sale of counterfeit and pirated goods through third-party platforms.

This appendix provides a brief summary of some of the major activities of select agencies and entities to address counterfeits and pirated goods sold on third-party marketplaces. This appendix does not present a comprehensive overview of all efforts to address intellectual property violations.

### *Department of State*

The U.S. Department of State has found that increased diplomatic engagement on intellectual property protections at the highest practical levels, supported by interagency engagement and sustained and targeted capacity building, is an effective way to build up the necessary political will to adequately protect IPR overseas. This diplomatic and capacity-building engagement provides evidence of the weight that the U.S. gives to IPR protection worldwide. High-level engagement on IPR also allows U.S. officials the opportunity to educate foreign officials on the economic, social, and cultural benefits of protecting IPR while at the same time warning of the dangers to their economies, public health, and human safety presented by counterfeits and piracy.

The Department of State, through its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), in consultation with the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs Office of Intellectual Property Enforcement, supports the U.S. Transnational and High-Tech Crime Global Law Enforcement Network (GLEN).

The GLEN consists of the worldwide deployment of experienced U.S. law enforcement experts to deliver training and technical assistance to foreign law enforcement partners designed to advance operational success. INL also provides assistance to United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the DHS IPR Center to enable them to deliver complementary capacity building.

### *Department of Commerce*

The Department of Commerce International Trade Administration's Office of Standards and Intellectual Property OSIP (OSIP) provides domestic outreach events to promote IPR protection in online marketplaces and to educate small and medium sized enterprises on the value of protecting and enforcing their intellectual property rights both domestically and internationally.

Commerce's "STOPfakes Road Shows" represent a unique, interagency outreach event. They are presented in multiple U.S. cities with IPR-intensive industries and provide an array of panel speakers and IPR experts. These Roadshows deliver critically important information about intellectual property to audiences that need it most – start-ups, entrepreneurs, small and medium-sized businesses, independent creators, and inventors.

In addition, OSIP continues to expand the program's unique interactive features. These include guided assistance by CBP officials to assist with trademark recordation and guidance from U.S. Copyright Office officials in registering copyright protections.

USPTO provides policy and technical advice to the Administration and Congress on legislation and other matters relating to civil, criminal, and border enforcement of intellectual property. It is constantly working to improve domestic intellectual property laws and regulations and also seeks to increase public awareness through education on the risks of infringement and the benefits of IPR protection and enforcement.

In 2019, USPTO launched a multi-year, nationwide public awareness campaign with the National Crime Prevention Council in a joint effort to educate U.S. consumers about the dangers of counterfeit goods.

USPTO, including through its Global Intellectual Property Academy (GIPA), provides and participates in technical assistance and capacity-building programs for foreign governments seeking to develop or improve their intellectual property laws and regulations, and to enhance the expertise of those responsible for intellectual property rights enforcement.

#### *Federal Bureau of Investigation*

In October 2015, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) developed a new strategy to combat IPR crime by helping different industry sectors identify common challenges and work together to solve these challenges. The FBI's strategy focuses on building partnerships with key intermediaries in the supply chain for counterfeit and pirated goods, such as e-commerce platforms, payment processors, and the ecosystem for online advertising.

The FBI's strategy also focuses on identifying and pursuing investigations against "systemic enablers" or entities which knowingly facilitate the large-scale infringement of intellectual property rights. As one example of this in action, in 2017 the FBI helped several e-commerce companies re-evaluate their policies regarding the sale of potentially hazardous counterfeit goods online.

At the IPR Center, the FBI helps provide funding and logistical support for the HSI-managed "report IP theft" button, a web-based application for consumers and rights holders to submit complaints to law enforcement regarding suspected infringing activities. The FBI is currently working on developing new analytic tools to help process consumer and rights holder complaints.

#### *U.S. Trade Representative*

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is responsible for developing and coordinating international trade policy for the U.S. government with respect to IPR protections. USTR also oversees negotiations with trading partners, including on IPR issues.

USTR uses a wide range of bilateral and multilateral trade tools to promote strong intellectual property laws and effective enforcement worldwide, reflecting the importance of intellectual property and innovation to the growth of the U.S. economy.

#### *U.S. Food and Drug Administration*

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) protects the public health by ensuring the safety, efficacy, and security of food, drugs, medical devices, cosmetics and many public health products. One key method that FDA uses to strengthen its public health mission is through regulations and investigations of counterfeit products.

The FDA also issues safety alerts and recalls of dangerous products. The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) promotes the safety of consumer products by addressing unreasonable risks of injury and developing uniform safety standards. Not surprisingly, counterfeit and pirated products typically do not comply with CPSC requirements.

#### *Consumer Product Safety Commission*

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#### *U.S. Postal Service*

As discussed in this report, one critical mission of USPS is to receive advance electronic data (AED) for inbound international mail, originating in 191 different countries. At present, USPS receives AED data from a majority of the inbound international mail it receives. However, it is also required, under the Synthetics Trafficking and Overdose Protection (STOP) Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-271, §§ 8001-8009, 132 Stat. 3893, Title VIII, Subtitle A, to receive AED on all international mail packages by December 31, 2020.

Importantly, USPS provides the its advance electronic data it receives to CBP. This information sharing assists CBP in better targeting packages before the items arrive at the international service centers.

## 14. Appendix E: Global Initiatives

The proliferation of counterfeit goods on third-party marketplaces is a global problem. This Appendix offers a brief survey of some of the global options and cooperative efforts available to combat the trafficking of counterfeit and pirated goods.

### *International Organizations*

The World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights contains disciplines to protect intellectual property that are enforceable through the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body. The World Intellectual Property Organization, a United Nations specialized agency, is a global forum for intellectual property services, policy, information, and collaboration. The World Customs Organization (WCO) leads international customs cooperation, including with respect to the enforcement of intellectual property rights.

The International Police Organization (INTERPOL), in a partnership with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) operates the International IPR Crime Investigators College (IIPCIC). The mission of IIPCIC is to educate global law enforcement and stakeholder groups to effectively combat transnational IPR crime. Over 160 countries have visited the IIPCIC site since its launch and representatives from over 800 law enforcement agencies have enrolled in the training. INTERPOL enables its members to share and access data on crime and criminals, including counterfeit goods.

### *Europe*

Several European government agencies have developed Memoranda of Understandings (MOUs) with the private sector to address counterfeit issues. For example, the European Commission has facilitated an MOU on the sale of counterfeit goods via the internet with major internet platforms and rights holders who are affected by online sales of counterfeit goods. The platforms commit to notice and take down procedures and to taking pro-active and preventive measures, such as the use of monitoring tools allowing detection of illegal content.

The European Commission also concluded an MOU on Online Advertising and IPR in 2018 that extends to trademarks and copyright. Signatories commit to minimize the placement of advertising on websites and mobile applications that infringe on IPR or disseminate counterfeit goods so as to reduce the revenues of these trafficking websites and apps.

In France, through the French Ministry of Economy, postal operators have signed a charter to address counterfeits with rights holders that focuses on outreach, collaboration and training. In December 2018, brand owners and certain online platforms also signed a charter to fight counterfeits online, which organizes cooperation between brand owners, online platforms, and law enforcement authorities and helps implement preventive measures as well as notice and takedown procedures.

There have also been European efforts to enhance technology associated with protecting intellectual property rights. The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) held the

inaugural EU Blockathon competition to develop IPR-protection solutions based on blockchain technologies.

The Intellectual Property Crime Coordinated Coalition (IPC3) at Europol provides operational and technical support to law-enforcement agencies and other partners in the EU. The IPC3 has supported more than 50 high-priority cases of intellectual property infringement. It takes down websites used to sell counterfeit merchandise and shut downs illegal operations that use bitcoin.

The City of London Police (CoLP), and IPR Center partner agency, host the Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit (PIPCU). CoLP is funded by the UK Intellectual Property Office to fight criminals who infringe trademark and copyrights. It works with law enforcement agencies in the UK and across the world to arrest criminals who engage in the production, importation and sale of counterfeit goods.

Postal and customs agencies in France and Italy have organized joint operations where all parcels entering the international office of exchanges from targeted countries are screened for counterfeit goods.

### *Canada*

Canada has created Project Chargeback to fight counterfeiting, fraud, and IPR theft by enabling deceived consumers to get their money back. The initiative, which began in 2012, is administered by the Canadian Anti-Fraud Center (CAFC).

Under the authority of Project Chargeback, defrauded consumers can file a complaint with their bank or the CAFC and provide information on the purchase. The CAFC then works with rights holders to confirm that the goods were counterfeit and relays this information to the cardholder's bank.

The cardholder's bank then initiates a charge back against the seller's merchant account. That results in the termination of the merchant's account used by the counterfeiter, and the victims are instructed not to return the counterfeit goods to the seller.

## 15. References

Following the mandates set forth in President Trump's April 3, 2019, *Memorandum on Combating Trafficking in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods*, the report shall, as its primary goals:

- Analyze available data and other information to develop a deeper understanding of the extent to which online third-party marketplaces and other third-party intermediaries are used to facilitate the importation and sale of counterfeit and pirated goods;
- Identify the factors that contribute to trafficking in counterfeit and pirated goods; and describe any market incentives and distortions that may contribute to third-party intermediaries facilitating trafficking in counterfeit and pirated goods.
- Identify appropriate administrative, statutory, regulatory, or other changes, including enhanced enforcement actions, that could substantially reduce trafficking in counterfeit and pirated goods or promote more effective law enforcement regarding trafficking in such goods.

In the course of pursuing these goals, the report shall also:

- Evaluate the existing policies and procedures of third-party intermediaries relating to trafficking in counterfeit and pirated goods, and identify the practices of those entities that have been most effective in curbing the importation and sale of counterfeit and pirated goods, including those conveyed through online third-party marketplace
- Identify appropriate guidance that agencies may provide to third-party intermediaries to help them prevent the importation and sale of counterfeit and pirated goods.
- Identify appropriate administrative, regulatory, legislative, or policy changes that would enable agencies, as appropriate, to more effectively share information regarding counterfeit and pirated goods, including suspected counterfeit and pirated goods, with intellectual property rights holders, consumers, and third-party intermediaries.
- Evaluate the current and future resource needs of agencies and make appropriate recommendations for more effective detection, interdiction, investigation, and prosecution regarding trafficking in counterfeit and pirated goods, including trafficking through online third-party marketplaces and other third-party intermediaries; and recommend changes to the data collection practices of agencies, including specification of categories of data that should be collected and appropriate standardization practices for data.
- Identify areas for collaboration between the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security on efforts to combat trafficking in counterfeit and pirated goods.

See full memorandum at, President Donald J. Trump, *Memorandum on Combating Trafficking in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods*, 3 April 2019. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-combating-trafficking-counterfeit-pirated-goods/>

# **EXHIBIT 3**

# Intellectual Property Rights Seizure Statistics



U.S. Customs and  
Border Protection

Fiscal Year  
2021



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Disclaimer: The information contained in this report does not constitute the official trade statistics of the United States. The statistics, and the projections based upon those statistics, are not intended to be used for economic analysis, and are provided for the purpose of establishing U.S. Department of Homeland Security workload.



# Executive Summary


U.S. Customs and Border Protection focuses its trade enforcement efforts on seven Priority Trade Issues (PTI). PTIs represent high-risk areas that can cause significant revenue loss, harm the U.S. economy, or threaten the health and safety of the American people. Current PTIs include **Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)**, which protect American Intellectual Property by interdicting violative goods and leveraging enhanced enforcement authorities.

Trade in illegitimate goods is associated with smuggling and other criminal activities, and often funds criminal enterprises. CBP protects the intellectual property rights of American businesses, safeguarding them from unfair competition and

use for malicious intent while upholding American innovation and ingenuity. CBP works with many partner government agencies and the trade community to mitigate the risks posed by imports of such illicit goods.

FY 2021 was another successful year for IPR enforcement. CBP made over 27,000 seizures (i.e., 102,490 seizure lines) with an estimated manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP) of over \$3.3 billion, which represents an increase of 152% over the previous Fiscal Year, when goods valued at \$1.3 billion MSRP were seized for IPR violations. CBP also received and responded to **711** inquiries from the field concerning IPR enforcement in **FY 2021**.

IPR Seizures 10 Year Totals



# Counterfeit Commodity Spotlight – Cell Phones and Accessories

Almost all of Americans now own a cell phone of some kind<sup>1</sup>. The percentage of Americans that own a smartphone is now 85%, up from just 35% in Pew Research Center's survey of smartphone ownership first conducted in 2011<sup>2</sup>. Production of goods such as smartphones, smartphone batteries, and chargers, is knowledge intensive and the industry relies heavily on technologies that are IPR-protected. Thus, the growing prevalence of such items not only intensifies IP dependence, but also makes it a lucrative target



for counterfeiters. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's report in 2017 found that nearly one in five mobile phones shipped internationally is fake<sup>3</sup>. Mobile phones, their accessories and components are among the top categories of fake goods seized by customs authorities and sold in great numbers during sales events such as Black Friday and Cyber Monday<sup>4</sup>. In addition, such counterfeits have been recently exploiting the global supply shortage in semiconductor chips. It is worth noting that the global shortage of semiconductor chips is linked to the high demand for digital services and manufacturing problems emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic<sup>5</sup>. Counterfeiters can exploit this demand and shortage in supply by using counterfeit semiconductors such as diodes in the market. As semiconductors are integral in many areas, e.g., healthcare, transport, and defense, the risk of private electronics such as mobile phones and accessories being affected is also high<sup>6</sup>.

In FY 2021, CBP seized over **1,895** shipments of counterfeit cell phones and accessories. The seized merchandise is estimated to have a Manufacturer's Suggested Retail Price of over **\$64 million**. A closer look at CBP statistics shows that most of the counterfeits originated from Hong Kong and China.

Further, the number of seizures occurred in the express consignment and cargo environment combined accounted for more than 90 percent of the total IPR seizures of cell phones and accessories for FY 2021.

In addition to the negative economic impacts that such counterfeit mobile phones and accessories pose to the public, there are also notable non-economic impacts that negatively impact society. First, counterfeit mobile phones pose significant health and safety risks. Such devices may contain levels of chemicals such as lead and cadmium that often exceed established safety standards. In some cases, the values were 35-40 times higher than the globally accepted limits for lead<sup>7</sup>. CBP, citing an investigation conducted by the Government Accountability Office, previously reported a 99 percent failure rate in 400 counterfeit adapters tested for safety,

1 Pew Research Center, "Mobile Fact Sheet," <https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/mobile/>, April 7, 2021.

2 Id.

3 "One in five mobile phones shipped abroad is fake," Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, March 28, 2017, [One in five mobile phones shipped abroad is fake - OECD](https://www.oecd.org/one-in-five-mobile-phones-shipped-abroad-is-fake/) and accompanying Report (OECD 2017 Report).

4 "Counterfeit and pirated goods get boost from pandemic, new report confirms," European Union Agency for Law Enforcement and Cooperation (Europol), March 7, 2022, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/counterfeit-and-pirated-goods-get-boost-pandemic-new-report-confirms> and accompanying report (EUROPOL 2022 IPR Threat Report).

# Counterfeit Commodity Spotlight – Cell Phones and Accessories

fire, and shock hazards, and found that 12 of such adapters posed a risk of lethal electrocution to the user<sup>5</sup>. In addition, counterfeit electronic devices may also include malware and other harmful software, adding the risk of data theft<sup>9</sup>.

To avert such dangers, consumers should purchase from reputable sources and professional resellers should be aware that counterfeit parts may be part of the supply chain.

## FY 2021 IPR Seizures – Cell Phones and Accessories

| Source Country      | Seizure Lines | % of Total    |
|---------------------|---------------|---------------|
| Hong Kong           | 1,118         | 59.0%         |
| China               | 606           | 32.0%         |
| South Africa        | 33            | 1.7%          |
| Malaysia            | 18            | 0.9%          |
| United States       | 17            | 0.9%          |
| All Other Countries | 103           | 5.4%          |
| <b>Grand Total</b>  | <b>1,895</b>  | <b>100.0%</b> |

## FY 2021 MSRP of IPR Seizures – Cell Phones and Accessories

| Source Country       | MSRP                | % of Total    |
|----------------------|---------------------|---------------|
| China                | \$ 39,183,693       | 60.7%         |
| Hong Kong            | \$ 22,105,010       | 34.2%         |
| Malaysia             | \$ 2,005,387        | 3.1%          |
| United Arab Emirates | \$ 432,091          | 0.7%          |
| Vietnam              | \$ 236,485          | 0.4%          |
| All Other Countries  | \$ 623,225          | 1.0%          |
| <b>Grand Total</b>   | <b>\$64,585,891</b> | <b>100.0%</b> |



<sup>5</sup> See EUROPOL 2022 IPR Threat Report at 12.

<sup>6</sup> *Id.*

<sup>7</sup> "International Telecommunication Union's ITU-T Technical Report," International Telecommunication Union, December 11, 2015, [https://www.itu.int/dms\\_pub/itu-t/opb/tut/T-TUT-CCICT-2015-PDF-E.pdf](https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-t/opb/tut/T-TUT-CCICT-2015-PDF-E.pdf), at 10.

<sup>8</sup> "Combatting Trafficking in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods," CBP, January 24, 2020, [https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20\\_0124\\_plcy\\_counterfeit-pirated-goods-report\\_01.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_0124_plcy_counterfeit-pirated-goods-report_01.pdf), at 10.

<sup>9</sup> See EUROPOL 2022 IPR Threat Report at 12.



# COVID-19 Spotlight

In FY 2021, CBP continued to target and seize illegal imports of counterfeit, unapproved, or otherwise substandard COVID-19 related products that threatened the health and safety of American consumers. These seizures included 38,154 Food and Drug Administration-prohibited COVID-19 test kits, just over 35 million counterfeit face masks and 8,677 Food and Drug Administration-prohibited hydroxychloroquine tablets. Fifty-three percent of the seizures occurred in the express consignment environment, 18 percent were discovered in incoming mail and roughly 31 percent originated in China. CBP also collaborated with partner government agencies to expedite medical supplies and personal protective equipment through the customs clearance process, while working to identify and intercept fraudulent, unapproved, or otherwise substandard material

**FY 2021 Overall COVID- 19 Related Seizure Totals  
As of 10/1/2021**

| Product                 | Total Seizures | Quantity   |
|-------------------------|----------------|------------|
| Covid-19 Test Kits      | 53             | 38,154     |
| Antibody Test Kits      | 9              | 1,063      |
| Masks                   | 670            | 35,092,178 |
| Chloroquine             | 10             | 1,810      |
| Hydroxychloroquine      | 59             | 8,677      |
| Azithromycin            | 32             | 2,141      |
| Lianhua Qingwen         | 17             | 17,567     |
| Respirator/Ventilator   | 1              | 27         |
| Hand Sanitizers         | 2              | 150,001    |
| Virus Shut-Out Lanyards | 1              | 30,000     |
| Vaccination Cards       | 734            | 21,314     |

CBP's COVID-19 Cargo Resolution Team (CCRT), is comprised of a network of subject matter experts from across the agency. The CCRT triaged incoming requests from importers and customers; coordinated with federal,



state, and local government agencies; facilitated inbound shipments through ports of entry; expedited importation of critical medical supplies; and responded directly to inquiries about the importation of personal protective equipment, COVID-19 test kits, ventilators, and other medical supplies.

In FY 2021, the CCRT was responsible for expediting shipments of the COVID-19 vaccine and related vaccine materials. The CCRT worked closely with several importers and other government agencies to ensure the vaccine and vaccine materials were released with minimal delay. During the FY 2021, the CCRT also responded to 939 questions from the trade community and facilitated the clearance of 788 Operation Warp Speed (OWS) shipments.

To read more about CBP's efforts during the pandemic, please visit <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/coronavirus>



# Operational and Enforcement Highlights

Components of CBP's Integrated Trade Targeting Network conducted 4 national level IPR Trade Special Operations and 76 local IPR Trade Special Operations in FY 2021. These operations targeted high-risk shipments at seaports, airports, rail facilities, international mail facilities and express carrier hubs across the United States. The IPR Trade Special Operation is an important tactic used by CBP to gather intelligence on how counterfeiters are shipping product to the U.S. The operations also disrupt these nefarious supply chains and lead to criminal investigations by Homeland Security Investigations.



In FY 2021, IPR Trade Special Operations resulted in seizures worth an estimated \$21 million dollars in MSRP. Importantly, Trade Special Operations often result in seizures of products that may be both counterfeits and violations of other import safety laws. Examples are prohibited food products and unapproved pharmaceuticals.

## IPR Enforcement Training

Part of the Office of Trade's responsibilities include training CBP field personnel in identifying suspect imports, making infringement determinations, and following proper IP border enforcement procedures. In FY 2021, despite the travel restrictions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Office of Trade conducted more advanced IP enforcement training sessions than in FY 2020, reaching 8 out of the 10 Centers of Excellence and Expertise, including the Pharmaceutical, Health and Chemical CEE, to which Regulations and Rulings provided instruction on IP enforcement relating to COVID-19 specific products, and to CBP officers (CBPO) stationed at the ports of entry with the highest volume of trade. The training continues to raise the profile of IPR issues: from FY 2019 to FY 2020 the number of requests from CBP Officers and Importer Specialists for pre-seizure IPR enforcement advice



from attorney-advisors in the Regulations and Rulings Directorate increased by 20% compared to FY 2019. In FY 2021 the number of pre-seizure requests rose even more steeply, increasing 57% from FY 2020, totaling over 700 requests.

# CBP Partnerships

CBP works with partner government agencies to facilitate legitimate trade that supports economic growth and shields the American public and businesses from unsafe products, intellectual property theft, and unfair trade practices.

## Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) – Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)

CBP and ICE-HSI identify cases in which third-party intermediaries have demonstrably directed, assisted financially, or aided and abetted the importation of counterfeit merchandise. In coordination with the Department of Justice, CBP and ICE-HSI seek all available statutory authorities to pursue civil fines and other penalties against these entities, including remedies under 19 U.S.C. § 1526(f), as appropriate.


CBP and ICE-HSI mitigate the welfare and financial risks posed by imports of illicit products. In FY 2021, ICE-HSI arrested 388 individuals, obtained 155 indictments, and received 100 convictions related to intellectual property crimes.

**Collaboration Spotlight:** In partnership with CBP, HSI launched *Operation Stolen Promise* (OSP) in April 2020 to protect the Homeland from the increasing and evolving threat posed by COVID-19- related fraud and criminal activity. As part of OSP, CBP Officers and HSI special agents have opened investigations nationwide, seized millions of dollars in illicit proceeds; made multiple arrests; and shut down thousands of fraudulent websites. Specifically, OSP during its year aimed to focus on three areas: combating the illegal import and sale of counterfeit and substandard products; detecting and deterring financial fraud scams; and preventing the exploitation of relief and stimulus programs.

One year after its inception in April 2020, OSP has yielded significant results, both statistically and in terms of the impact the initiative has on protecting the health and safety of the American public. This work has kept counterfeit and substandard goods out of the medical and consumer supply chains while ensuring violators are held accountable for their criminal efforts to exploit the pandemic for profit.

In total, this operation has yielded 3,131 COVID-19 related seizures that included prohibited COVID-19 Test Kits, Prohibited Pharmaceuticals, Counterfeit Masks and more. OSP has resulted in 362 Criminal Arrests,

Annual Arrests, Indictments, and Convictions Related to Intellectual Property Rights Crimes



31 Convictions, and a total of \$54.7 million USD of illicit proceeds seized. The operation has also led to 110 seizures of counterfeit vaccines, with 49 cases initiated and 15 criminal arrests made.

As the public demand for access to vaccines and treatments grow, so do illegal attempts to introduce counterfeit versions of these items into U.S. marketplace. As such, *Operation Stolen Promise 2.0* has been launched to expand the focus of OSP to address the emerging public health threat of counterfeit versions of COVID-19 vaccines and treatments entering the marketplace. OSP 2.0 will focus on tackling new and evolving public health threats posed by the sale and distribution of counterfeit and/or unauthorized vaccines and treatments.

HSI will continue to partner with CBP to seize mislabeled, fraudulent, unauthorized, and prohibited COVID-19 test kits, treatment kits, homeopathic remedies, and personal protective equipment (PPE).



# CBP Partnerships



# CBP Partnerships

## The United States Postal Service (USPS)

USPS is responsible for presenting mail and providing electronic data (AED) to CBP for arriving international mail parcels. USPS and CBP have worked to target and identify 31 violations imported through international mail. Both agencies are implementing new strategies for leveraging the AED already available to identify offending merchandise.

Collaboration Spotlight: *Operation Mega Flex* is a CBP-led, interagency effort that was initiated in July 2019 to ensure compliance and assess illicit networks in the international mail environment through periodic enhanced inspections. CBP conducts Mega Flex operations in close coordination with ICE, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to detect, intercept, and seize illicit goods arriving in small parcels from China.

For example, most seizures out of Memphis were counterfeit drivers' licenses. These shipments originated from China and were shipped to various locations throughout the United States. CBP learned that many of the shipments were smuggled in the bottom of boxes containing tassels, clothing, and even bundles of synthetic hair<sup>10</sup>. Further, in just one day in October 2020, CBPOs in LAX International Mail Facility (IMF) intercepted 812 shipments containing counterfeit footwear, handbags, wearing apparel, prohibited plant and animal products, and other items that threaten the health and safety of American consumers and undermine the competitiveness of U.S. businesses<sup>11</sup>. Similarly, CBP's New York Field Office, home to two IMF's, John F. Kennedy International Airport (the largest IMF in the United States), and the Port of New York/Newark, and its partners also inspected more than 4,000 shipments and seized 127 shipments for IPR violations<sup>12</sup>.

On average, CBP processes more than 420,000 parcels of mail from China each day. Throughout *Operation Mega Flex*, CBP found that more than 13 percent of targeted shipments contain counterfeit goods or contraband items.



10 See <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/cbp-memphis-seizes-nearly-200-shipments-through-operation-mega-flex>.

11 See <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/operation-mega-flex-stops-hundreds-illicit-made-china-shipments-lax>.

12 See <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/cbp-new-york-field-office-seizes-127-ipr-violations-during-operation>.

# CBP Partnerships

## The National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center (IPR Center)

The IPR Center, in collaboration with CBP, stands at the forefront of the United States government's response to combatting global intellectual property (IP) theft and enforcement of its international trade laws.

**Collaboration Spotlight:** *Operation Team Player* is an ongoing annual operation that begins after every Super Bowl and continues through the next one, targeting international shipments of counterfeit sports merchandise into the United States. This operation is run by the IPR Center in collaboration with CBP, the National Football League, and other major sports leagues to prevent the illegal importation and distribution of counterfeit sports merchandise.

Super Bowl LV was played on February 7, 2021, at Raymond James Stadium in Tampa, Florida. CBP and ICE HSI announced the seizure of more than 267,511 counterfeit sports-related items, worth an estimated \$97.8 million manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP), through a collaborative enforcement operation targeting international shipments of counterfeit merchandise into the United States. They seized items such as fake jerseys, hats, rings, t-shirts, jackets, tickets, souvenirs, and thousands of other sports related memorabilia prepared to be marked as legitimate and authentic items.


Due to COVID-19, much of the illegal activity moved online, which refocused partner government agency efforts more towards commercial websites engaged in the illegal sale and distribution of counterfeit goods.

## Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee (COAC)

The private sector plays an instrumental role in the global economy and has a unique opportunity to lend

their considerable expertise to CBP. By partnering with industry leaders, CBP links our processes with modern business practices, which results in enhanced compliance with trade laws, improves our facilitation and enforcement efforts, and assists the U.S. economy. CBP's engagement with its federal advisory committee, the COAC, is a key component in evaluating and adapting CBP policies and getting feedback about significant proposed changes.

CBP has been able to adopt and implement recommendations presented by the COAC IPRWG. As of January 2021, CBP began concurrently issuing the notice of seizure (NOS) and initiating publication of the notice of intent to forfeit on all seized shipments with a domestic value less than \$2,500. Although publication is advanced, all interested parties are afforded the same opportunity to respond to the NOS as they had under previously existing procedures. Additionally, CBP announced that effective June 7, 2021, NOS will be emailed to rights holders via the email addresses provided to CBP through the IPR e-Recordation program. Delivery of seizure notices via email allows for instantaneous notification to the rights holder. Issuing electronic NOS has increased the speed at which the trade community received the necessary information and allowed for instantaneous sharing of the information with the rights holder. It has also benefited CBP as it reduced the cost of mailing such notices. This paperless approach aligns with CBP's continuous effort to improve resource efficiency. CBP looks forward to further engagement with the COAC.





# Help CBP Protect American Ingenuity

## Donations Acceptance Program

Pursuant to Section 308(d) of the *Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act* of 2015, P.L. 114-125, CBP enacted regulations at 19 C.F.R. §133.61, setting forth policies and procedures for accepting donations from private sector parties of hardware, software, equipment, and technologies for IPR enforcement purposes. These regulations are consistent with the CBP Commissioner's FY 2021 priority to identify, detect, and interdict high-risk shipments through partnerships.

Since 19 C.F.R. §133.61 went into effect in January 2018, DAP has fully executed five formal IPR enforcement partnerships with Procter & Gamble, Otter Products, Cisco Systems, Apple Inc., and Nike Inc. To date, 214 product authentication tools have been deployed to 70 locations. More importantly, these partnerships are demonstrably benefiting CBP's frontline and yielding a positive return on investment for its partners.

## Intellectual Property Rights e-Recordation

CBP concentrates its IPR border enforcement on federally registered trademarks and copyrights that have been recorded with CBP by their owners using the Intellectual Property Rights e-Recordation (IPRR) system, <https://iprr.cbp.gov/>. All trademark and copyright recordations are contained in a secure proprietary database accessible by CBP personnel at all 328 ports of entry. Product ID manuals provided by rights holders are also linked to the database and used by CBP in making IPR border enforcement determinations. In FY21, CBP added over 2,000 recordations to their enforcement database. As of September 30, 2021, CBP was enforcing 20,758 active recorded copyrights and trademarks.

## Intellectual Property Rights e-Allegations

Information on potential IPR infringements can be submitted to CBP using the e-Allegations Online Trade


Violation Reporting System at <https://eallegations.cbp.gov/s/> or by calling 1-800-BE-ALERT.

The e-Allegation program provides an electronic portal through which the trade community and the public can report suspected trade violations to CBP. The e-Allegation process enables CBP, in collaboration with the partners, to protect our economy from the effects of unfair trade practices and guard against the entry of products that could pose a threat to health and safety.

In addition to IPR violations, there are other types of trade violations, such as forced labor violations, duty evasion violations, and shipping violations. For more information on various types of trade violations, visit <https://www.cbp.gov/trade/e-allegations>.

## Intellectual Property Rights Search

CBP works closely with rights holders in making IPR enforcement determinations. A public database of both active and inactive recordations is available using a search engine called the Intellectual Property Rights Search (IPRS) at <http://iprs.cbp.gov/>.



## e-Allegations by Fiscal Year (FY)

| Fiscal Year (FY) | Amount of IPR (Counterfeit Trademark & Piratical Copyright) e-Allegations | Total Number of e-Allegations received that FY |
|------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| 2018             | 324                                                                       | 1,162                                          |
| 2019             | 264                                                                       | 1,252                                          |
| 2020             | 360                                                                       | 1,290                                          |
| 2021             | 407                                                                       | 1,743                                          |

# DON'T TOY AROUND WITH COUNTERFEITS.

COUNTERFEITS ARE  
UNSAFE. ONLY TRUST  
REPUTABLE SOURCES.

The risks of shopping online  
aren't always obvious. Be  
informed about the dangers  
of counterfeit goods.

**Fake  
Goods.  
Real  
Dangers.**

[www.CBP.gov/fakegoodsrealdangers](https://www.CBP.gov/fakegoodsrealdangers)



U.S. Customs and  
Border Protection

# Exclusion Orders and Outreach

## Exclusion Orders

CBP enforces exclusion orders issued by the International Trade Commission (ITC). Most ITC exclusion orders are patent based. The ITC issues both limited and general exclusion orders. Limited exclusion orders apply only to infringing articles of named respondents. General exclusion orders bar the entry of infringing articles by all.

Exclusion orders prohibit the entry of all covered articles, even if they were not specifically accused and found to infringe by the ITC. Once excluded, subsequent importations of the same articles by the same importer are subject to seizure.

### » Exclusion Orders – for FY 2021:

- Seizures correctly citing 19 USC 1337(i): 81 cases
- Seizure Est. MSRP: \$1,930,683.
- Total Active Exclusion Orders: "At the end of FY 2021, CBP was administering 128 active exclusion orders issued by the U.S. International Trade Commission following investigations of unfair import practices in the importation of articles into the United States in violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1337."

## Public Awareness Campaign

In FY 2021, CBP continued the *Truth Behind Counterfeits* IPR Public Awareness Campaign intended to educate the public of many harms associated with the purchase of counterfeit goods. The goal of the campaign is to increase consumer conscientiousness by making people aware that buying counterfeits is not a victimless crime

and to encourage them to shop from legitimate and trustworthy sources. Due to COVID-19, CBP pivoted its consumer education campaign to leverage existing digital platforms and utilize relationships with trade associations to bring awareness to the dangers of counterfeit goods. This included the use of traditional media avenues as well as CBP's social media presence (Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram) and updating CBP's IPR website (<https://www.cbp.gov/trade/priority-issues/ipr>) and the *Truth Behind Counterfeits* standalone webpage (<https://cbp.gov/trade/fakegoodsrealdangers>).

## Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

In February 2021, at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Subcommittee on Customs Procedures (SCCP) meeting that was hosted virtually by New Zealand, CBP presented the results of the COVID-19 joint enforcement effort that took place from November 10 to December 10, 2020. This operation helped participating economies with the identification, interdiction, and deterrence of counterfeit COVID-19 related items and had participation from eight APEC economies (Australia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Thailand, and the United States). Following on this effort, the United States and Peru conducted a joint enforcement COVID-19 focused operation in June 2021 to assess IPR trends since the previous operation. Both the U.S. and Peru presented their results to the APEC SCCP at the virtual meeting held in August 2021.



**DON'T BARK UP THE WRONG TREE.**

COUNTERFEITS ARE UNSAFE. ONLY TRUST REPUTABLE SOURCES.

The risks of shopping online aren't always obvious. Be informed about the dangers of counterfeit goods.  
**Fake Goods.  
Real Dangers.**

[www.CBP.gov/fakegoodsrealdangers](https://www.CBP.gov/fakegoodsrealdangers)

 U.S. Customs and Border Protection

# Outreach: CBP/U.S. Chamber of Commerce Memorandum of Understanding

On May 26, 2021, CBP entered a novel memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Chamber) that outlines general terms of connecting resources and sharing information to stop the flow of counterfeit goods. This memorandum of understanding establishes a first-of-its-kind framework for public-private collaboration on combatting counterfeit and pirated goods. The MOU consists of four pillars:

- 1. Outreach:** CBP and the Chamber agreed to support outreach efforts related to bringing awareness to the public about the dangers of counterfeit goods. During the holiday season of 2021, CBP and the Chamber participated in a joint holiday campaign, the Shop Smart Campaign, which included a media blitz that reached an audience of over 83 million people.
- 2. CBP IPR Statistics Data Sharing:** CBP provides exclusive IPR seizure statistics on a quarterly basis to the Chamber. CBP has provided all the FY2021 Quarterly IPR statistics.
- 3. Training:** CBP and the Chamber have agreed to provide bi-directional training to each of their relevant personnel/members.
- 4. Data Pilot:** CBP is conducting a data sharing pilot with three of the Chamber's member companies, with the hopes of expanding the pilot to include other companies in the future. The current pilot serves as an opportunity to establish best practices for IPR data sharing with the private sector. It also offers CBP the ability to test the viability of data sharing with major brands to better target and seize imports of counterfeit and pirated goods and other IPR violative merchandise.

Information sharing between CBP and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce strengthens CBP's ability to defend intellectual property standards that generate American jobs, save lives, and enhance our economic prosperity. The MOU enhances CBP's abilities to effectively target and intercept substandard, illegitimate goods and protect American ingenuity.



# Outreach: The Year of the Small and Medium Sized Enterprises Webinar Series



In FY 2021 CBP launched a webinar series directed to small and medium enterprises entitled 'The Year of the Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SME)'. <https://www.cbp.gov/trade/priority-issues/ipr/cbp-year-sme>. The series of webinars focused on topics concerning how SMEs can work with CBP to help prevent imports of merchandise that infringes their IPR. During FY 2021, CBP hosted four webinars that reached 1200 members of the SME trade community. These webinars focused on

how SMEs could protect their ingenuity from infringing imports, what to do after registering your mark with CBP, and e-commerce businesses.

Due to this outreach, CBP has seen a rise in the number of recordation applications by trademark and copyright owners of small and medium sized businesses. This has reinforced that the CBP recordation program is a powerful tool for SMEs in combatting infringing importations.






# IPR and E-Commerce

E-commerce is a growing segment of the economy of the U.S. It made up 10.7% of the total retail sales in 2019 at \$578.5 billion U.S. dollars (USD) and subsequently accounted for 14% of the total retail sales in 2020 amounting to \$792 billion USD<sup>13</sup>. In 2020 alone, e-commerce sales in the U.S. grew over 40% and reached \$791.8 billion USD in value<sup>14</sup>.

During the second quarter of 2021, the U.S. retail e-commerce sales were estimated at \$222.5 billion, an increase of 3.3 percent from the first quarter of 2021<sup>15</sup>. The second quarter 2021 e-commerce estimate increased at 9.1 percent from the second quarter of 2020. E-commerce sales in the second quarter of 2021 accounted for 13.3 percent of total sales<sup>16</sup>. In FY 2021, CBP processed 213 million express shipments and 94 million international mail shipments.

Such growing trends comes with many challenges. While e-commerce shipments pose the same health, safety, and economic security risks as containerized shipments, due to the complex and dynamic nature of the industry, CBP lacks full visibility into the e-commerce supply chain. The overwhelming volume of small packages also makes CBP's ability to identify and interdict high risk packages difficult. Further, vague and inaccurate electronic data provided by certain trade entities poses significant challenge when targeting shipments.



In response to the increasing challenges in the e-commerce environment, CBP has been focusing its effort to improve trade risk management by working closely with the trade community. Going into its second year, CBP continues to operate two test pilot programs, the Section 321 Data Pilot and the Entry Type 86 Test and is now looking to formalize the success of these two pilot programs.

## Section 321 Data Pilot

Initiated in 2019, the Section 321 Data Pilot is a voluntary collaboration with online marketplaces, carriers, technology firms, and logistics providers to secure e-commerce supply chains and protect American consumers. CBP is conducting this test for two reasons: the first is to determine the feasibility of requiring advance data from different types of parties; and the second is to determine the feasibility of requiring additional data that is generally not required under current regulations to effectively identify and target high-risk shipments in the e-commerce environment. To further evaluate the Section 321 Data Pilot program and the risks associated with Section 321 *de minimis* shipments, in August 2021, CBP announced in the *Federal Register* its plan to extend the current test program through August 2023.

Since the establishment of the program in 2019, CBP has experienced significant operational benefits. Specifically, along with the administrative ruling issued in July 2020<sup>17</sup>, this pilot program better positions CBP to identify duty evasions and other abuses consistent with current statutory authorities and helps create a more predictable enforcement environment for trade. This ruling also provides CBP with important foreign seller information with which to target and interdict counterfeit products, consumer safety violations, and other threats before they enter the U.S. For the owner or purchaser to qualify as the "person" under Section 321, importers are required to provide the first and last name of the owner or purchaser, or the name of the business.

## Entry Type 86 Test

In September 2019, CBP also launched a voluntary test of a Section 321 *de minimis* commercial entry process

<sup>13</sup> "2019 E-Stats Report: Measuring the Electronic Economy," U.S. Census Bureau, August 5, 2021, <https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2021/e-estats-report-electronic-economy.html>.

<sup>14</sup> "Monthly Retail Trade," U.S. Census Bureau, <https://www.census.gov/retail/index.html>.

<sup>15</sup> "Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales – 2nd Quarter 2021," U.S. Census Bureau, August 19, 2021, [https://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/ec\\_current.pdf](https://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/ec_current.pdf).

<sup>16</sup> *Id.*

# IPR and E-Commerce

through the creation of the new Entry Type 86. The Entry Type 86 Test allows customs brokers and self-filers to electronically submit *de minimis* entries through the Automated Broker Interface, including those subjects to partner government agency (PGA) data requirements for clearance. This new entry type aimed to improve import safety and security by providing greater visibility into low value shipments for both CBP and PGAs while ensuring regulatory requirements are met. Creation of the new informal entry type 86 allows for customs brokers and self-filers to electronically submit entries with a limited data set that is exempt from duty, taxes and fees.



## **Documented Benefits of Section 321 Data Pilot and Entry Type 86 Test**

In FY 2021, CBP received 524 million filings on *de minimis* shipments (182 million Section 321 Data Pilot; 342 million Entry Type 86). In the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2020, CBP received Section 321 Data Pilot data on nearly 25% of all non-mail *de minimis* shipments. Similarly, Entry Type 86 filings accounted for almost 50% of all non-mail *de minimis* shipments. The two pilot programs have also shown significant operational benefits when pilot participants provided seller information, product pictures, and other transactional details. First, the programs led to more predictable and consistent enforcement environment for low-risk shipments and trusted trade partners. Second, obtaining advance data elements significantly reduced CBP workload with same-day clearance compared to the previous six- to eight-day wait times. Further, advance information led to fewer CBP holds and improved overall security, including mitigating risks associated with the importation

of potential counterfeit test kits, medical devices, and personal protective equipment related to COVID-19.

Pilot participants also experienced fewer holds. One platform experienced 97% fewer holds from when they first began transmitting data. Another platform also experienced 90% fewer holds. In addition to such operational benefits, feedback received in a CBP survey revealed that pilot participants saw an estimated \$2 billion USD in time and cost savings associated with the Entry Type 86 Test.

## **Informed Compliance Efforts**

While administering the two pilot programs, CBP has made significant efforts to engage with the trade community and to inform stakeholders of the Section 321 administrative ruling and its implications. In addition to engaging with the ETF, CBP's E-commerce Branch and Office of Trade Relations actively connect with the trade community in various fora. For example, CBP holds quarterly public meeting with the Advisory Committee on Commercial Operations (COAC), a group of private sector stakeholders selected to advise the Secretaries of the Department of Treasury and the Department of Homeland Security on the commercial operations of CBP (recordings of part meetings: <https://www.cbp.gov/trade/stakeholder-engagement/coac/coac-public-meetings>). To reach wider foreign sellers and shippers and inform them of the administrative ruling issued in July 2020, the branch also translated and issued the ruling in Chinese (<https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2021-Apr/1%20Administrative%20Ruling%20One-Pager%20Mandarin%20Translation.pdf>). Lastly, CBP participated in numerous webinars and online trainings to inform the public the latest regulations and available resources (<https://www.cbp.gov/trade/stakeholder-engagement>).

CBP understands the importance of working closely with the trade community to achieve its objectives, especially when implementing new administrative rulings. CBP has been engaged with the trade community throughout this dynamic process and will continue to work with not only the traditional players, but also foreign stakeholders who will be affected by the Section 321 administrative ruling.

17 CBP issued an administrative ruling that clarified whether importations made by a nonresident importer in one day and sent to a U.S. fulfillment facility or warehouse may qualify for informal duty-free entry under 19 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(2)(c). The administrative ruling when into effect on July 28, 2020 and was published in the Customs Rulings Online Search System (CROSS) on July 31, 2020. See <https://rulings.cbp.gov/search?term=H290219&collection=ALL&sortBy=RELEVANCE&pageSize=30&page=1>.

# Centers of Excellence and Expertise Spotlight

CBP has 10 Centers of Excellence and Expertise (Centers) to focus CBP's trade expertise on industry-specific issues through account-based processing on a national scale. The Centers, managed from strategic locations around the country, have national authority to make trade decisions at all ports of entry in an effort to meet the goals of strengthening America's economic competitiveness, enhancing industry knowledge and expertise, developing innovative trade processing procedures, applying strategic and impactful trade enforcement actions, and leveraging available trade

intelligence. The Centers are the operational entity of CBP responsible for identifying, assessing and prioritizing risks within their respective industries with a focus on CBP's priority trade issues. The Centers also administer the collection of trade remedies as well as lead and carry out operations to detect and deter unlawful trade activities.

To learn more about the Centers, visit <https://www.cbp.gov/trade/centers-excellence-and-expertise-information>.





# Mode of Transportation and Top Product Commodities

## SEIZURES BY MODE OF TRANSPORTATION



**7,293  
MAIL**



**2,274 CARGO**

**ALL OTHERS 622**

## TOP PRODUCTS SEIZED BY NUMBER OF SEIZURE LINES



**WEARING  
APPAREL/  
ACCESSORIES**



**HANDBAGS/  
WALLETS**



**FOOTWEAR**



**WATCHES/  
JEWELRY**



**CONSUMER  
ELECTRONICS**



**CONSUMER  
PRODUCTS**



**PHARMACEUTICAL/  
PERSONAL CARE**




**AUTOMOBILE/  
AEROSPACE**



**LABEL  
TAGS**

**ALL  
OTHER  
COMMODITIES  
4%**

# Seizure World Map




## FY 2021 TOTALS

**NUMBER OF SEIZURE LINES: 102,490**

**MSRP: \$3.3 Billion**


# Seizure World Map




**ALL OTHER COUNTRIES 27%**

# Number of Seizures

Number of Seizures Lines by Fiscal Year 2021



Number of Seizures Lines by Fiscal Year 2020



# Number of Seizures


| Number of Seizure Lines by Product – FY 2021 |                |             |
|----------------------------------------------|----------------|-------------|
| Products                                     | Seizure Lines  | Percentage  |
| Wearing Apparel/Accessories                  | 30,681         | 30%         |
| Handbags/Wallets                             | 28,331         | 28%         |
| Footwear                                     | 13,355         | 13%         |
| Watches/Jewelry                              | 12,313         | 12%         |
| Consumer Electronics                         | 5,380          | 5%          |
| Consumer Products                            | 3,721          | 4%          |
| Pharmaceuticals/Personal Care                | 3,155          | 3%          |
| Automotive/Aerospace                         | 1,303          | 1%          |
| Labels/Tags                                  | 641            | 1%          |
| All Other Commodities                        | 3,610          | 4%          |
| <b>Number of Seizure Lines</b>               | <b>102,490</b> | <b>100%</b> |

| Number of Seizure Lines by Product – FY 2020 |               |             |
|----------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|
| Products                                     | Seizure Lines | % of Total  |
| Wearing Apparel/Accessories                  | 20,386        | 28%         |
| Handbags/Wallets                             | 16,554        | 23%         |
| Footwear                                     | 10,868        | 15%         |
| Watches/Jewelry                              | 9,405         | 13%         |
| Consumer Electronics                         | 5,534         | 8%          |
| Consumer Products                            | 2,940         | 4%          |
| Pharmaceuticals/Personal Care                | 2,819         | 4%          |
| Automotive/Aerospace                         | 968           | 1%          |
| Labels/Tags                                  | 470           | 1%          |
| All Other Products                           | 2,413         | 3%          |
| <b>Number of Seizure Lines</b>               | <b>72,357</b> | <b>100%</b> |

\* In an effort to streamline DHS reporting, we are now reporting seized by seizure lines and not seizures. This will allow for greater specificity, especially for those seizures which contain more than one type of commodity. Shipments with multiple products are categorized as All Other Commodities. Because the individual percentage figures are rounded, in some cases, the sum of the rounded percentages for a given fiscal year is slightly higher or lower than 100 percent.


# Products Seized by MSRP

MSRP By Product FY 2021



Total FY 2021 MSRP \$3,330,037,350

MSRP By Product FY 2020



Total FY 2020 MSRP \$1,309,156,510

# Products Seized by MSRP


| MSRP By Product – FY 2021      |                        |             |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|-------------|
| Products                       | MSRP                   | Percentage  |
| Watches/Jewelry                | \$1,186,747,146        | 36%         |
| Handbags/Wallets               | \$972,495,390          | 29%         |
| Wearing Apparel/Accessories    | \$487,370,983          | 15%         |
| Pharmaceuticals/Personal Care  | \$185,043,493          | 6%          |
| Consumer Electronics           | \$171,010,749          | 5%          |
| Footwear                       | \$96,690,708           | 3%          |
| Consumer Products              | \$72,075,495           | 2%          |
| Toys                           | \$25,420,514           | 1%          |
| Computers/Accessories          | \$24,553,282           | 1%          |
| All Other Products             | \$108,629,590          | 3%          |
| <b>Grand Total</b>             | <b>\$3,330,037,350</b> | <b>100%</b> |
| <b>Number of Seizure Lines</b> | <b>102,490</b>         |             |

| MSRP By Product – FY 2020      |                        |             |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|-------------|
| Products                       | MSRP                   | Percentage  |
| Watches/Jewelry                | \$435,249,467          | 33%         |
| Handbags/Wallets               | \$282,702,448          | 22%         |
| Consumer Electronics           | \$173,829,670          | 13%         |
| Wearing Apparel/Accessories    | \$157,226,661          | 12%         |
| Footwear                       | \$63,146,456           | 5%          |
| Pharmaceuticals/Personal Care  | \$56,190,152           | 4%          |
| Consumer Products              | \$49,695,611           | 4%          |
| Labels/Tags                    | \$19,823,791           | 2%          |
| Automotive/Aerospace           | \$11,063,561           | 1%          |
| All Other Products             | \$60,228,693           | 5%          |
| <b>Grand Total</b>             | <b>\$1,309,156,510</b> | <b>100%</b> |
| <b>Number of Seizure Lines</b> | <b>72,537</b>          |             |

\* In an effort to streamline DHS reporting, we are now reporting seized by seizure lines and not seizures. This will allow for greater specificity, especially for those seizures which contain more than one type of commodity. Shipments with multiple products are categorized as All Other Commodities. Because the individual percentage figures are rounded, in some cases, the sum of the rounded percentages for a given fiscal year is slightly higher or lower than 100 percent.


# Total Seizure Lines and MSRP Seized by Economy

Seizure Lines By Economy FY 2021



Number of Seizure Lines: 102,490

Seizure Lines By Economy FY 2020



Number of Seizure Lines: 72,357

# Total Seizure Lines and MSRP Seized by Economy


| Seizures Lines and Related MSRP by Economy – FY 2021 |                |             |                        |
|------------------------------------------------------|----------------|-------------|------------------------|
| Trading Partner                                      | Seizure Lines  | % of Total  | MSRP                   |
| China                                                | 33,323         | 33%         | \$1,888,298,761        |
| Hong Kong                                            | 18,466         | 18%         | \$613,462,655          |
| Turkey                                               | 10,781         | 11%         | \$60,347,048           |
| Philippines                                          | 6,416          | 6%          | \$45,692,010           |
| Colombia                                             | 5,912          | 6%          | \$23,980,798           |
| All Other Countries                                  | 27,592         | 27%         | \$698,256,079          |
| <b>Total</b>                                         | <b>102,490</b> | <b>100%</b> | <b>\$3,330,037,350</b> |

| Seizures Lines and Related MSRP by Economy – FY 2020 |               |             |                        |
|------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|------------------------|
| Trading Partner                                      | Seizure Lines | % of Total  | MSRP                   |
| China                                                | 26,985        | 37%         | \$660,767,476          |
| Hong Kong                                            | 23,493        | 32%         | \$428,961,694          |
| Turkey                                               | 6,831         | 9%          | \$31,237,035           |
| Vietnam                                              | 2,123         | 3%          | \$25,803,755           |
| Thailand                                             | 1,445         | 2%          | \$12,601,807           |
| All Other Countries                                  | 11,480        | 16%         | \$149,784,743          |
| <b>Grand Total</b>                                   | <b>72,357</b> | <b>100%</b> | <b>\$1,309,156,510</b> |


\* The aggregate seizure data reflect the reported country of origin, not necessarily where the seized goods were produced. Because the individual percentage figures are rounded, in some cases, the sum of the rounded percentages for a given fiscal year is slightly higher or lower than 100 percent.

# Seizures by Mode of Transportation

Modes of Transportation by MSRP (in millions)



Modes of Transportation by Seizures




# Seizures by Mode of Transportation

|              | Modes of Transport           |                  |                  |                  |
|--------------|------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
|              | Estimated MSRP (in Millions) |                  |                  |                  |
|              | FY 2021                      | FY 2020          | FY 2019          | FY 2018          |
| Express      | \$1,036.1                    | \$589.1          | \$553.5          | \$549.2          |
| Mail         | \$231.5                      | \$98.1           | \$175.6          | \$197.3          |
| Cargo        | \$1,575.7                    | \$463.4          | \$488.2          | \$447.9          |
| Other        | \$486.7                      | \$158.5          | \$337.9          | \$205.4          |
| <b>TOTAL</b> | <b>\$3,330.0</b>             | <b>\$1,309.1</b> | <b>\$1,555.2</b> | <b>\$1,399.8</b> |


|              | Modes of Transport |               |               |               |
|--------------|--------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
|              | Seizures           |               |               |               |
|              | FY 2021            | FY 2020       | FY 2019       | FY 2018       |
| Express      | 16,926             | 17,001        | 15,811        | 21,632        |
| Mail         | 7,293              | 6,886         | 8,982         | 9,643         |
| Cargo        | 2,274              | 1,993         | 1,903         | 1,673         |
| Other        | 622                | 623           | 903           | 862           |
| <b>TOTAL</b> | <b>27,115</b>      | <b>26,503</b> | <b>27,599</b> | <b>33,810</b> |

# Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) by Product

Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) by Commodity FY 2021



Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) by Commodity FY 2020



# Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) by Product

| Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) by Commodity – FY 2021 |               |             |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|
| Health, Safety, and Security                              | Seizure Lines | % of Total  |
| Pharmaceuticals/Personal Care                             | 3,041         | 46.6%       |
| Consumer Electronics                                      | 1,165         | 17.8%       |
| Automotive/Aerospace                                      | 1,002         | 15.3%       |
| Wearing Apparel/Accessories                               | 457           | 7.0%        |
| Cigarettes                                                | 309           | 4.7%        |
| Consumer Products                                         | 170           | 2.6%        |
| Computers/Accessories                                     | 84            | 1.3%        |
| Sporting Goods                                            | 38            | 0.6%        |
| Food                                                      | 19            | 0.3%        |
| All Other Commodities                                     | 247           | 3.8%        |
| <b>Number of Seizure Lines</b>                            | <b>6,532</b>  | <b>100%</b> |

| Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) by Commodity – FY 2020 |               |             |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|
| Health, Safety, and Security                              | Seizure Lines | % of Total  |
| Pharmaceuticals/Personal Care                             | 2,706         | 47.6%       |
| Consumer Electronics                                      | 1,630         | 28.7%       |
| Automotive/Aerospace                                      | 511           | 9.0%        |
| Consumer Products                                         | 165           | 2.9%        |
| Computers/Accessories                                     | 139           | 2.4%        |
| Cigarettes                                                | 119           | 2.1%        |
| Sporting Goods                                            | 81            | 1.4%        |
| Wearing Apparel/Accessories                               | 30            | 0.5%        |
| Food                                                      | 21            | 0.4%        |
| All Other Commodities                                     | 277           | 4.9%        |
| <b>Number of Seizure Lines</b>                            | <b>5,679</b>  | <b>100%</b> |

\* In an effort to streamline DHS reporting, we are now reporting seized by seizure lines and not seizures. This will allow for greater specificity, especially for those seizures which contain more than one type of commodity. Shipments with multiple products are categorized as All Other Commodities. Because the individual percentage figures are rounded, in some cases, the sum of the rounded percentages for a given fiscal year is slightly higher or lower than 100 percent.

# MSRP by Centers of Excellence and Expertise

| MSRP by Center of Excellence             |                        |                 |                        |                 |
|------------------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| Fiscal Year                              | FY 2021                |                 | FY 2020                |                 |
| Center Name                              | MSRP                   | % of Total MSRP | MSRP                   | % of Total MSRP |
| Consumer Products and Mass Merchandising | \$2,358,989,573        | 70.84%          | \$841,588,271          | 64.84%          |
| Apparel, Footwear and Textiles           | \$588,394,332          | 17.67%          | \$231,915,396          | 17.99%          |
| Electronics                              | \$196,173,287          | 5.89%           | \$170,643,120          | 13.22%          |
| Pharmaceuticals, Health and Chemicals    | \$138,605,159          | 4.16%           | \$21,024,365           | 1.63%           |
| Automotive and Aerospace                 | \$21,168,082           | 0.64%           | \$10,857,996           | 0.84%           |
| Agriculture and Prepared Products        | \$9,284,046            | 0.28%           | \$893,941              | 0.07%           |
| Industrial and Manufacturing Materials   | \$5,514,953            | 0.17%           | \$3,260,622            | 0.25%           |
| Machinery                                | \$10,741,371           | 0.32%           | \$22,860,881           | 1.77%           |
| Base Metals                              | \$1,166,547            | 0.04%           | \$6,111,920            | 0.47%           |
| <b>Total</b>                             | <b>\$3,330,037,350</b> | <b>100%</b>     | <b>\$1,309,156,510</b> | <b>100%</b>     |

# MSRP by Centers of Excellence and Expertise

| Centers of Excellence and Expertise (CEEs) |                        |                 |                        |                 |
|--------------------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|-----------------|
|                                            | FY 2019                |                 | FY 2018                |                 |
|                                            | MSRP                   | % of Total MSRP | MSRP                   | % of Total MSRP |
| 4.28%                                      | \$1,000,628,016        | 64.34%          | \$1,037,183,326        | 74.09%          |
| 7.71%                                      | \$383,694,303          | 24.67%          | \$192,996,007          | 13.79%          |
| 3.03%                                      | \$117,028,274          | 7.52%           | \$121,609,130          | 8.69%           |
| 0.61%                                      | \$9,234,202            | 0.59%           | \$8,896,989            | 0.64%           |
| 0.83%                                      | \$9,868,483            | 0.63%           | \$14,638,119           | 1.05%           |
| 0.07%                                      | \$3,882,013            | 0.25%           | \$4,578,951            | 0.33%           |
| 0.25%                                      | \$1,225,896            | 0.08%           | \$951,393              | 0.07%           |
| 1.75%                                      | \$27,810,170           | 1.79%           | \$11,475,793           | 0.82%           |
| 0.47%                                      | \$1,897,700            | 0.12%           | \$7,544,135            | 0.54%           |
| 100%                                       | <b>\$1,555,269,057</b> | <b>100%</b>     | <b>\$1,399,873,842</b> | <b>100%</b>     |

# CBP IPR Points of Contact

## **Questions? Contact the IPR Help Desk For A**

Monday through Friday to answer questions on  
via email at [IPRHELPDESK@cbp.dhs.gov](mailto:IPRHELPDESK@cbp.dhs.gov).

## **Regulations, Rulings, and Recordation – For c**

contact Regulations and Rulings (RR) at [hqiprb](mailto:hqiprb@cbp.dhs.gov)  
the e-Recordation program, contact [iprrrequest](mailto:iprrrequest@cbp.dhs.gov)  
articles potentially subject to an ITC exclusion o  
[Rulings@cbp.dhs.gov](mailto:Rulings@cbp.dhs.gov).

## **Guidance on CBP IPR Policy and Programs - T**

coordinates with rights holders, members of the  
agencies, and foreign governments in developin  
policy and programs. To contact the IPR Division

**e-Allegations** - If you are aware of or suspect a  
please report the trade violation using CBP's e-  
System at <https://eallegations.cbp.gov/s/>. Trade  
1-800-BE-ALERT.

## **National Intellectual Property Rights Coordin**

Intellectual Property Rights, including counterfe  
Coordination Center at [https://www.iprcenter.g](https://www.iprcenter.gov)

# CBP IPR Points of Contact

**Assistance** - CBP's IPR Help Desk is staffed for IPR enforcement. Contact the IPR Help Desk

Questions about CBP's IP enforcement regime, [enforcement@cbp.dhs.gov](mailto:enforcement@cbp.dhs.gov). For information concerning [inquiries@cbp.dhs.gov](mailto:inquiries@cbp.dhs.gov). Ruling requests regarding [EOEBBranch.ITC337](mailto:EOEBBranch.ITC337).

The IPR and E-Commerce Division (IPR Division) works with the trade community, CBP staff, other Federal agencies, and implementing the Agency's IPR strategy, email [iprhelpdesk@cbp.dhs.gov](mailto:iprhelpdesk@cbp.dhs.gov).

If a company or individual is committing IPR crime, violations Online Trade Violation Reporting System (OTVRS) violations can also be reported by calling


**IPR Violation Center** - To Report Violations of IPR, trademark, and piracy, contact the National IPR Violation Center <https://www.cbp.gov/referral/> or telephone 1-866-IPR-2060.





U.S. Customs and  
Border Protection

# **EXHIBIT 4**

Plaintiff's product:



**Type 1 Infringing Product against claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 12,478,892**

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p>A toy, comprising:</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | <p>This is the preamble; “comprising” means including, but not limited to.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| <p>a platform defined by at least a surface, a first channel, and a second channel not rectilinearly parallel to the first channel,</p> <p>each of the first channel and the second channel including a first sidewall of a first protrusion extending from the surface and a second sidewall of a second protrusion extending from the surface,</p> <p>wherein optionally the first protrusion or the second protrusion of the first channel corresponds to one of the first protrusion or the second protrusion of the second channel; and</p> |  <p><i>Defendants’ infringing product has a platform defined by a surface with at least two channels not rectilinearly parallel.</i></p> <p><i>Each channel of Defendants’ infringing product has a first and second sidewall extending from the surface.</i></p> |
| <p>a discrete flexible member being cylindrical along at least a partial length thereof and having a thickness such that a bulk of the discrete flexible member is releasably securable along the partial length thereof within the first channel or the second channel such that at least a portion of the discrete flexible member is curvilinear, wherein the discrete flexible member has a cross-sectional profile having a circumdiameter less than a length of the discrete flexible member.</p>                                          |  <p><i>Defendants’ infringing product includes at least one discrete flexible member for insertion into a channel.</i></p>                                                                                                                                      |

**Type 2 Infringing Product against claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 12,478,892**

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p>A toy, comprising:</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | <p>This is the preamble; “comprising” means including, but not limited to.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| <p>a platform defined by at least a surface, a first channel, and a second channel not rectilinearly parallel to the first channel,</p> <p>each of the first channel and the second channel including a first sidewall of a first protrusion extending from the surface and a second sidewall of a second protrusion extending from the surface,</p> <p>wherein optionally the first protrusion or the second protrusion of the first channel corresponds to one of the first protrusion or the second protrusion of the second channel; and</p> |  <p><i>Defendants’ infringing product has a platform defined by a surface with at least two channels not rectilinearly parallel.</i></p> <p><i>Each channel of Defendants’ infringing product has a first and second sidewall extending from the surface.</i></p> |
| <p>a discrete flexible member being cylindrical along at least a partial length thereof and having a thickness such that a bulk of the discrete flexible member is releasably securable along the partial length thereof within the first channel or the second channel such that at least a portion of the discrete flexible member is curvilinear, wherein the discrete flexible member has a cross-sectional profile having a circumference less than a length of the discrete flexible member.</p>                                           |  <p><i>Defendants’ infringing product includes at least one discrete flexible member for insertion into a channel.</i></p>                                                                                                                                      |

**Type 3 Infringing Product against claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 12,478,892**

| A toy, comprising:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | This is the preamble; “comprising” means including, but not limited to.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p>a platform defined by at least a surface, a first channel, and a second channel not rectilinearly parallel to the first channel,</p> <p>each of the first channel and the second channel including a first sidewall of a first protrusion extending from the surface and a second sidewall of a second protrusion extending from the surface,</p> <p>wherein optionally the first protrusion or the second protrusion of the first channel corresponds to one of the first protrusion or the second protrusion of the second channel; and</p> |  <p><i>Defendants’ infringing product has a platform defined by a surface with at least two channels not rectilinearly parallel.</i></p> <p><i>Each channel of Defendants’ infringing product has a first and second sidewall extending from the surface.</i></p> |
| <p>a discrete flexible member being cylindrical along at least a partial length thereof and having a thickness such that a bulk of the discrete flexible member is releasably securable along the partial length thereof within the first channel or the second channel such that at least a portion of the discrete flexible member is curvilinear, wherein the discrete flexible member has a cross-sectional profile having a circumdiameter less than a length of the discrete flexible member.</p>                                          |  <p><i>Defendants’ infringing product includes at least one discrete flexible member for insertion into a channel.</i></p>                                                                                                                                      |

**Type 4 Infringing Product against claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 12,478,892**

| A toy, comprising:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | This is the preamble; “comprising” means including, but not limited to.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p>a platform defined by at least a surface, a first channel, and a second channel not rectilinearly parallel to the first channel,</p> <p>each of the first channel and the second channel including a first sidewall of a first protrusion extending from the surface and a second sidewall of a second protrusion extending from the surface,</p> <p>wherein optionally the first protrusion or the second protrusion of the first channel corresponds to one of the first protrusion or the second protrusion of the second channel; and</p> |  <p><i>Defendants’ infringing product has a platform defined by a surface with at least two channels not rectilinearly parallel.</i></p> <p><i>Each channel of Defendants’ infringing product has a first and second sidewall extending from the surface.</i></p> |
| <p>a discrete flexible member being cylindrical along at least a partial length thereof and having a thickness such that a bulk of the discrete flexible member is releasably securable along the partial length thereof within the first channel or the second channel such that at least a portion of the discrete flexible member is curvilinear, wherein the discrete flexible member has a cross-sectional profile having a circumference less than a length of the discrete flexible member.</p>                                           |  <p><i>Defendants’ infringing product includes at least one discrete flexible member for insertion into a channel.</i></p>                                                                                                                                      |